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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis argues that the aesthetic character of some conceptual works of art can be 
determined by the possession of essential aesthetic properties. By discussing Peter 
Lamarque’s account of individual aesthetic essentialism one can suggest that conceptual 
works can be aesthetically investigated. Chapter I introduces the concept of the aesthetic and 
discusses Frank Sibley’s account of aesthetic concepts. Chapter II analyses in detail Sibley’s 
two-fold relational character of aesthetic properties. Chapter III introduces Lamarque’s 
concept of aesthetic properties and it also insists on a distinction between artistic and 
aesthetic properties. Chapter IV introduces a general account of essentialism and then 
discusses Lamarque’s new-object theory. Chapter V investigates Lamarque’s weaker version 
of individual aesthetic essentialism and analyses the distinction between essential and 
inessential aesthetic properties. Finally, Chapter VI considers the aesthetics of conceptual art 
and argues that some conceptual pieces have essential aesthetic properties. The philosophical 
discussions are supported by appeal to many different works of art, from traditional works to 
contemporary works. I conclude that all conceptual works have aesthetic properties but 
mostly there are inessential properties. My suggestion at the end of this thesis is more radical. 
A close analysis identified essential aesthetic properties in some conceptual works of art and 
this contributes to the aesthetic character and value of these works. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1 Motivating Questions 
 
This thesis is motivated by the debate in contemporary aesthetics about the nature and main 
characteristics of works of art, in particular conceptual works. On the one hand, I am 
interested in the main philosophical theories of art which deal with the characterisation of 
works of art and their main features. On the other hand I am interested in the explanatory 
force these theories have in clarifying ontological questions about works of art and the 
complex subjective experiences prompted by works of art.   
 
     In contemporary aesthetics there are two sets of important conceptions that function as a 
basis for most discussions. The first set consists in these three concepts: the work of art, the 
artist and the art audience. The second set has the following three important concepts: the 
aesthetic attitude, the aesthetic properties and the aesthetic experience. I have become 
fascinated by the relations of dependency and the impact that those concepts have on shaping 
our understanding of art and art responses. Therefore, I decided that I have to make a choice 
about a starting point in investigating works of art and their experience, and this starting point 
was the concept of aesthetic properties.   
 
    There are rival theories about aesthetic properties and the most important dichotomy is that 
between a realist position (aesthetic properties are in the work) and an anti-realist position      
(aesthetic properties are not in the work, they are imputed to the work). The most important 
philosophical literature about aesthetic concepts and properties are the papers by Frank Sibley 
and his supporters. I focused mainly on Sibley’s work and that of his philosophical 
descendants. There are also other discussions, like the one about the distinction between 
artistic and aesthetic properties, which contribute to a larger picture of the importance of 
aesthetic properties in art.  
 
    While developing a picture about philosophical contributions to explanations of the nature 
and the role of aesthetic properties in art experiences and appreciation, in particular in 
conceptual works’ appreciation, I have become conscious of a contemporary predilection for 
anti-essentialist approaches to art. However, I realised that I am a realist about aesthetic 
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properties and I believe that an essentialist position about aesthetic properties can be 
sustained. I found Peter Lamarque’s position on aesthetic essentialism very convincing, even 
though there are a number of serious objections to it. Interestingly, I found that the most 
effective way to tackle some of these objections is by a detailed analysis and discussion of 
particular works of art. 
 
2 Overview of the Thesis 
 
Experiences of works of art are some of the most rewarding experiences one has. There is a 
fierce debate about what kind of experiences are responses to conceptual art. In this thesis I 
shall suggest that conceptual art can be aesthetically experienced and appreciated. In order to 
support this claim, I shall first discuss Lamarque’s individual aesthetic essentialism. 
Lamarque’s essentialism proposes that some works of art necessarily possess a distinctive 
aesthetic character. In order to present this account and consider objections to it, it is useful to 
set up a strong conceptual framework. The concept of the aesthetic and that of aesthetic 
properties are vital for an understanding of Peter Lamarque’s aesthetic essentialism.  
 
    CHAPTER I of this thesis has two main sections. In Section 1, I introduce the main 
historical dimensions of the concept of the aesthetic in order to reveal interesting 
developments in the use of the term and to identify a number of contemporary philosophical 
arguments about works of art and aesthetic properties. In Section 2, I discuss Frank Sibley’s 
conception of the aesthetic, proposed in his investigation of aesthetic concepts. I close the 
chapter with an initial proposal about main features of the concept of the aesthetic: the 
concept is indissolubly linked to the perceptual and any account of the aesthetic needs to 
involve an understanding of the distinction and the relationship between the aesthetic and the 
non-aesthetic.  
 
    CHAPTER II discusses one of the most important concepts of any theory about works of 
art, that of aesthetic properties. In this chapter I focus mainly on Sibley’s account of aesthetic 
properties, an account which had a big influence on Lamarque’s aesthetic realism, in 
particular his property realism.  I analyse in detail the two-fold relational character of 
aesthetic properties: aesthetic properties are dependent upon non-aesthetic perceptual 
properties (Section 1) and aesthetic properties have a relation to qualified observers (Section 
2). I conclude, in a Sibleyan manner, that the dependence of aesthetic properties on non-
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aesthetic properties is one of emergence. Moreover, I propose a broad employment of the 
concept of the aesthetic, beyond sense perception.  
 
     CHAPTER III introduces Lamarque’s account of key features of aesthetic properties. In 
Section 1 of this chapter, I go over the main characteristics of aesthetic properties, on which 
Lamarque agrees with other thinkers, and also the characteristics which Lamarque argues for, 
in opposition to other views. In Section 2, of this chapter, I discuss in detail the difference 
between aesthetic and artistic properties, a distinction which is important of discussions of the 
aesthetics of contemporary art. Also here I analyse a number of 20
th
 century works of art in 
order to illuminate the attribution of important aesthetic properties to those works. 
 
    CHAPTER IV proposes first a general introduction to essentialism (Section 1) and 
secondly an introduction to Lamarque’s argument for individual essentialism (Section 2). 
This particular type of essentialism rests upon two premises. The first one is that works of art 
are ontologically different objects from the mere objects that embody them (Lamarque calls 
this view, new-object theory). Lamarque’s new-object theory is the subject of Section 2 of 
this chapter. But Lamarque’s second premise is dealt with in the next chapter. The conclusion 
of this chapter agrees with Lamarque that works of art are cultural objects which are public 
and perceivable, they are new things brought into the world by artists’ manipulation and 
creation under a certain conception and these new objects have a certain identity and certain 
survival conditions. 
 
    CHAPTER V discusses Lamarque’s two versions of individual essentialism and explains 
why Lamarque prefers the weaker version. It also analyses in detail Lamarque’s second 
premise of his aesthetic individual essentialism, which suggests that some aesthetic properties 
have a necessary relation to the individual works of art and not to the objects that embody 
them. One of the pillars of the investigation into individual aesthetic essentialism is the 
distinction between essential and inessential aesthetic properties. I apply this distinction by 
looking at a number of works of contemporary art. The conclusion of this chapter is in 
agreement with Lamarque’s essentialism, that some works of art necessarily possess a 
distinctive aesthetic character because they possess potentially identifiable essential aesthetic 
properties. 
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    CHAPTER VI considers conceptual art and argues that conceptual works can be 
aesthetically investigated if one is able to show that some conceptual pieces have essential 
aesthetic properties. Thus, in the first section of this chapter I briefly remind the reader of the 
main concepts I discussed in previous chapters (Section 1), in the next section I try to present 
a general characterisation of conceptual art (Section 2), and in the third section I propose my 
own characterisation of conceptual art, arguing that works of conceptual art can be assessed 
aesthetically and that a small number of conceptual works have essential aesthetic properties 
(Section 3).  
 
     Therefore this thesis shows that Lamarque’s individual essentialism can be applied to 
conceptual works of art, and an in depth analysis of conceptual art works shows that many 
conceptual works can be aesthetically assessed.  
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CHAPTER I 
The Concept  of the Aesthetic – Historical Dimensions 
 
     There are two ways in which the term ‘aesthetic’ is used: one refers to the discipline of 
aesthetics
1
 (as a branch of philosophy) which deals with the appreciation of art and nature 
and the other is used mainly as a qualifier applied to a variety of substantives.  For example 
the term ‘aesthetic’ can be applied to the words: perception, attitude, distance, experience, 
enchantment, interest, inclination, emotion, dimension, situation, intentions, judgement, 
principles, evaluation, theory, realism, properties, object, appearance, style, etc. Richard 
Shusterman emphasises that the vagueness and variability of the concept lead some 
philosophers to frustration and scepticism regarding the usefulness of such a concept: 
 
One source of the concept's blurredness is that the aesthetic ambiguously refers not 
only to distinctive but also diverse objects of perception [...]. It also refers to a 
distinctive mode of consciousness that grasps such objects [...] To complicate things 
further, 'aesthetic' also applies to the distinctive discourse used to discuss those 
objects and modes of perception.
2
  
 
Despite these ambiguities Shusterman argues that ‘even vague terms still signify’ and one 
way of dealing with this lack of precision is through a detailed investigation into the myriad 
of conceptions that are embedded in different uses of the term. My initial attempt to deal with 
this vagueness is to look at some of the historical usages of the term ‘aesthetic’ and briefly 
distinguish between them. Although I am aware that an overview of the history of the term 
‘aesthetic’ appears painstakingly meticulous, I believe that such an enterprise would reveal 
interesting developments in the use of the term and could illuminate a number of  
contemporary philosophical arguments of the experience and appreciation of art. 
     One could argue that the 18
th
 century was a turning point for the meaning and the 
theoretical functions of the concept of the aesthetic. The roots of the conception of the 
aesthetic could be trace back to two main periods: the period before the 18
th
 century (when 
there was a general conception of sensory perception) and the period after the 18
th
 century 
                                            
1
Noël Carroll makes a different kind of distinction between a broad sense of aesthetics, which is interchangeable 
with the term ‘philosophy of art’ and a narrow sense of aesthetics, which refers to the audience’s response to 
artworks or nature. (N. Carroll, Philosophy of Art, Routledge, London, 1999, p.153). 
2
 R. Shusterman, ‘Aesthetic Experience: From Analysis to Eros’ in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 
Vol. 64, No. 2, Spring 2006, p. 217 
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(when the aesthetic referred to a particular mode of perception). The history of the concept of 
the aesthetic becomes even more complicated in the 20
th
 century when some philosophers 
begin to be sceptical about using the term ‘aesthetic’ to describe a particular mode of 
perception and apply the qualifier ‘aesthetic’ not to modes of perception but to experiences, 
attitudes, properties or situations.  
     Section 1 of this chapter deals with the period before the 18
th
 century when I briefly 
mention the etymological roots of the term ‘aesthetic’  – in particular Plato’s and Aristotle’s 
use of the term aisthētikόs, and for the 18th century period I mention the British taste theorists, 
and the German philosophers Alexander G. Baumgarten and Immanuel Kant. In Section 2, I 
discuss a 20
th
 century essential conception of the aesthetic proposed by Frank Sibley in his 
investigation of aesthetic concepts
3
 and I end up with an initial proposal of how I intend to 
use the term ‘aesthetic’. 
 
Section 1 
 
    The word ‘aesthetic’ comes from the Greek aisthētikόs and means things perceptible by the 
senses and a person who perceives is an aesthētēs.4 Diane Collinson underlines that during 
the Ancient Greek period the term ‘aesthesis’: 
 
...had no special application to the perception of works of art and beauty; it 
described every kind of perception based on the senses and it marked out one side of 
a division that was important in Greek thought, namely, the division between the 
sensory perception of things and the intellectual apprehension of them. (Collinson 
1992, p. 112)  
 
I would argue that although this sense of the term did not refer specifically to the appreciation 
of nature or art it is an important part of the history of the term ‘aesthetic’, because any 
philosophical discussion of the aesthetic experience should start with perception. There are a 
number of preliminary observations I would like to make regarding the role of perception in 
aesthetic experience. First, there are some philosophers in contemporary philosophy who 
argue that all discussions about the aesthetic experience should be conducted within the 
                                            
3
 Frank Sibley ‘Aesthetic Concepts’ in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art eds. Peter Lamarque and Stein 
Haugom Olsen, Blackwell, Oxford,  2004 and ‘Particularity, Art and Evaluation’ in Aesthetics and the 
Philosophy of Art eds. Peter Lamarque and Stein Haugom Olsen, Blackwell, Oxford,  2004 
4
 The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology, 1966 
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sphere of philosophy of perception. For example, Bence Nanay in his paper ‘Aesthetic 
Attention’ argues that: ‘What is distinctive about aesthetic experiences is the way our 
perceptual attention is exercised’.5 Indeed when discussing aesthetic experience one needs to 
start with an investigation into the phenomenal character of a perceptual experience, which 
according to D.W. Hamlyn is: 
 
....the result of the ways in which sensations produced in us by objects blend with 
our ways of thinking of and understanding those objects (which, it should be noted, 
are things in the world and should not be confused with the sensations they 
produce). (Hamlyn 2000, p. 463) 
 
However, a comprehensive account of aesthetic experience should not stop here; discussions 
of the phenomenal character should be combined or followed by discussions of the role of 
imagination, the importance of art history knowledge and the deployment of a varied array of 
concepts related to art encounters.
6
 The second observation is that there are many 
philosophers that speak of aesthetic perception as a special faculty of perception, a tradition 
started by the British taste theorists, and it is important to critically acknowledge the role of 
perception in the aesthetic experience of visual arts.  And the last observation is that in recent 
decades an interesting debate has started about the distinction between two types of art:  
perceptual and non-perceptual art and therefore discussions about perception in the arts are 
crucial to this debate.
7
 To conclude, arguments from philosophy of perception have an 
important role to play in arguments about the aesthetic experience but an investigation into 
the nature of the aesthetic experience should not be exhausted by arguments from the 
philosophy of perception.  
     To go back to the original intention of presenting historical uses of the concept of the 
aesthetic, one should start with Plato’s use of the term aisthesis.  In the second part of 
                                            
5
 Unpublished article presented by B. Nanay at the 50
th
 Anniversary of the British Society of Aesthetics, 
Heythrop College, London, 2010 
6
One can mention here the two fold character of such an experience (phenomenal and representational or 
conceptual). For defences of such a view see Millar’s argument that the phenomenal character of an experience 
can be detached from its conceptual character (A. Millar, Reasons and Experience, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1991,  pp. 495-505) and Peter Lamarque’s remark that: ‘The permeability of experience (and perception) to 
belief plays a crucial part in the perception of all visual art’ (P. Lamarque,  ‘On Perceiving Conceptual Art’ , 
eds. Peter Goldie and Elisabeth Schellekens, Philosophy and Conceptual Art,  Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007, p 
12)  
7
 For example, this is discussed in detail in James Shelley’s article ‘The Problem of  Non-Perceptual Art’, 
British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol. 43, No. 4, Oct. 2003 and in P. Lamarque‘s article ‘On Perceiving Conceptual 
Art’, 2007. 
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Theaetetus (151d-186e), Plato puts forward an argument that knowledge is perception which 
he rejects in the third part of the dialogue (187a-210c):  
 
Theaetetus:  [...] It is perfectly clear now that knowledge is different from perception. 
Socrates: [...] we have completely given up looking for knowledge in perception. 
Instead we’ll look for it in whatever one calls the function of the mind when it is 
involved with things by itself. (Plato 1987, 187a, p. 91) 
 
In the third and fourth part of the dialogue, Plato seems to argue that aesthesis is both 
sensation and perception (the Greek term means both) which implies that it has a non-
cognitive and a cognitive use.  Different scholars agree that Plato is not very clear about what 
kind of capacity aesthesis is: judgemental/cognitive or non-judgemental/non-cognitive. For 
example, Allan Silverman argues that Plato does not distinguish between perception and 
sensation (Silverman: 1990, footnote 1)
8
 and Robin A. H. Waterfield justifies the use of 
‘perception’ in his translation of Theaetetus as follow: 
 
‘Perception’ is the closest we can get in English to the initial vagueness of aesthesis: 
the dictionary definition of both terms range from sensation to mental understanding 
(Waterfield, 1987, p.144) 
 
    Aristotle dedicated most of De Anima to the faculty of perception (aesthesis); Hamlyn   
makes two important observations about Aristotle’s treatment of the term aesthesis, one is 
that Aristotle does not take a traditional epistemological approach: 
 
But his approach is nevertheless philosophical (whatever else it is) in that he clearly 
attempts to give an account of the concept of aesthesis. He is concerned with the 
logic of our talk about perception, or, to be more exact, of Greek talk about aesthesis. 
(Hamlyn 1959, p. 7) 
 
Hamlyn’s other observation is that Aristotle is inconsistent in using the technical vocabulary  
                                            
8
 For a detailed discussion of the Platonic sense of aesthesis see Allan Silverman: ‘Plato on Perception and 
“Commons” ‘,  The Classical Quarterly, Vol. 40, No.1, 1990, pp. 148-175 and   J. Cooper, 'Plato on Sense-
Perception and Knowledge (Theaetetus 184-6)', Phronesis Vol. 15, No. 2, 1970, p. 123-46.  For an in depth 
discussion regarding Aristotle’s use of the term aesthesis see Hamlyn’s article: ‘Aristotle's Account of Aesthesis 
in the De Anima’, The Classical Quarterly, New Series, Vol. 9, No. 1, May, 1959, pp. 6-16 
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related to aesthesis. Hamlyn’s concludes of the Aristotelian use of the term aesthesis that:  
 
It covers both what we should call 'perception' and also what we should call 
'sensation'. There has always been a tendency (natural but incorrect) on the part of 
philosophers to assimilate perception to sensation, and where, as in Greek, there is 
no distinct terminology, it is only too easy not to make the distinction at all. [...]   
The faculty of sense-perception is that faculty by means of which we are able to 
characterize or identify things as a result of the use of our senses. It is reasonable, 
therefore, to connect perception with judging, as Aristotle does, although it is 
incorrect to identify it with judging, as he also does. (Hamlyn 1959, p. 6) 
 
 Although Plato and Aristotle used the term ‘aesthesis’ to refer to perception in general9 and 
did not use the term in relation to the appreciation of art and nature, I wanted to emphasise 
that the Greek roots of the term ‘aesthetic’ point to the importance of understanding the role 
of perception in aesthetic experience.
10
  
     After Plato and Aristotle other philosophers like Plotinus, Augustine, Thomas Aquinas or 
the Renaissance thinkers continued and developed arguments regarding the appreciation of 
beauty and the arts but the term aesthetics started to be used in connection with the 
appreciation of art and nature only after Alexander G. Baumgarten proposed the term 
‘aesthetica’ for a ‘science of perception’ in 1750.11 Roger Scruton notices that Baumgarten 
used the term ‘aesthesis’:  
 
....to denote what he considered to be the distinctive feature of poetry, namely that it 
presents a form of “sensuous” knowledge, through which we grasp particulars, as 
opposed to intellectual or conceptual knowledge which always generalizes. [...] This 
means that the content of poetry is always at some level a perceptual content and not 
expressible through concepts alone.’ (Scruton 2007, p. 233) 
                                            
9
 Roger Scruton in his article ‘In Search of the Aesthetic’ also points out that the Greek term aesthesis means, 
depending on context ‘sensation, perception or feeling (as in ‘anaesthetic’)’. British Journal of Aesthetics, No. 3,  
July 2007, p. 233 
10 There is a another discussion that one can have with regard to Plato’s and Aristotle’s contributions to debates  
about beauty, different art forms (poetry, music, painting, dance, tragedy) and other art related terms (for 
example: mimesis, catharsis, artistic value). 
11
 Aesthetica (Frankfurt 1750, 1758) and an earlier version of arguments about the sensuous perception appears 
in his Meditationes Philosophicae de Nonnullus ad Poema Pertinentitous in 1735.  
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What Scruton draws attention to, is that Baumgarten did consider the perceptual level of 
poetry as well as the conceptual level as part of the content of poetry. Similarly Nicholas 
Davey explains that Baumgarten’s account shows that poetic works have an intensive as well 
as an extensive clarity:  
 
....intensive in so far that they invoke a highly particular object, and extensive in as 
much as the richness of poetic allusions involves making all the implicit associations 
of an image explicitly clear. (Davey 2001, p. 41) 
 
The most important observation regarding Baumgarten’s theory is that for him aesthetics was 
a ‘science’ of sensitive knowing, which involved perception in order to experience beauty. 
He emphasised the importance of immediate experience as oppose to an intellective/scientific 
approach. But what was this sensitive knowing? According to Shusterman, Baumgarten 
considered the sense of sight and hearing not as lower senses but as ‘higher’ senses, primarily 
associated with mental activity. Because we have this independent source of knowledge –
exercising the higher sense perception, one could argue, we can appreciate the content of 
poetry both perceptually and conceptually.  
      Before moving to the discussion regarding the Kantian use of the concept of the aesthetic 
one needs to mention the British taste theorists’ tradition (Lord Shaftesbury, Francis 
Hutcheson, Thomas Reid and David Hume). James Shelley in his article ‘The Concept of the 
Aesthetic’ argues that: 
 
 The concept of the aesthetic descends from the concept of taste. [...] the eighteenth-
century theory of taste emerged, in part, as a corrective to the rise of rationalism, 
particularly as applied to beauty, and to the rise of egoism, particularly as applied to 
virtue. (Shelley 2009, p.2) 
 
Shelley argues that the rationalism about beauty meant that judgements of beauty were 
judgements of reason and that the British empiricist tradition reacted against the idea that 
judgements of taste were ‘mediated by inferences form principles or application concepts’ 
(Shelley, 2009, p.2). He calls this reaction against rationalism the immediacy thesis and 
points out that as early as 1719 Jean-Baptiste Dubos said that:  
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We have a sense given us by nature to distinguish whether the cook acted according 
to the rules of his art. People taste the ragoo, and tho’ unacquainted with those rules, 
they are able to tell whether it be good or not. The same may be said in some respect 
of the production of the mind, and of pictures made to please and move us. (Dubos 
1748, vol. II, p. 238–239 quoted in Shelley 2009, p. 2) 
 
Shelley underlines that other thinkers like Dubos, for example Hume, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson 
and Reid regarded the faculty of taste as a kind of “internal sense” different from the five 
senses and this sense was dependent ‘for its objects on the antecedent operation of some other 
mental faculty or faculties’ (Shelley 2009, p.3). The taste theory argues for a capacity that is 
used for distinguishing different aesthetic features of objects and in particular beauty. 
According to David W. Whewell the taste philosophers argue for different understandings of 
what taste involves: (a) an ‘inner sense’ – a form of aesthetic perception (as described earlier), 
(b) an attitude one needs to adopt – the correct aesthetic attitude (for example, Kant’s 
disinterestedness) or (c) an aesthetic response to the formal features of an object (for example, 
the most obvious such features are unity, balance and harmony).
12
 Although there are a lot of 
objections to the taste theory (for example: how can we account for the diversity of aesthetic 
responses, what is a competent judge, what are the universal principles of taste, how can we 
explain such a thing as natural good taste?), my intention in this section was only to briefly 
look at some usages of the concept of the aesthetic and to draw attention to its multitude of 
senses in order to create an historical navigation map for my own journey.  
     To return to the exploration of different senses of the concept of the aesthetic, the history 
of the concept culminated in the 18
th
 century with Kantian aesthetics. First I briefly mention 
the Kantian employment of the term (a more detailed analysis of Kantian aesthetics is 
presented in Appendix 1) and secondly I point out different worries about the conception of 
the aesthetic after Kant.  
     Kant used the term ‘aesthetics’ long before the Critique of the Power of Judgement (1790), 
in his lecture courses (1765-66): 
 
And in this, the very close relationship of the materials under examination leads us 
at the same time, in the critique of reason, to pay some attention to the critique of  
                                            
12
 David A. Whewell ‘Taste’, in: David Cooper (ed.),  A Companion to Aesthetics, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 
2001, p. 417 
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taste, that is to say, aesthetics.
13
  
 
Kant was influenced by Baumgarten’s work and he gave lectures in 1772-73 about 
‘aesthetics’ when discussing ‘the nature of poetic invention, differences among the arts and 
genius as the source of artistic creation’ (Paul Guyer’s Introduction to CPJ, 2003, xvi). Guyer 
argues that, during this period, Kant worked on the association between taste and the faculty 
of pleasure which becomes the focus of his third critique. By 1781 when he wrote the 
Critique of Pure Reason he had already thought of a systematic way of arguing for universal 
principles of feelings and taste. The term ‘aesthetic’ appears in Kant’s first section ‘The 
Transcendental Doctrine of Elements’ of his first critique; section which is divided into: 
‘Transcendental Aesthetic’ and ‘Transcendental Logic’. However here the term ‘aesthetic’ is 
used differently from its modern usage; Kant writes in a footnote from Transcendental 
Aesthetic: 
 
The Germans are the only ones who now employ the word “aesthetics” to designate 
that which others call the critique of taste. The ground for this is a failed hope, held 
by the excellent analyst Baumgarten, of bringing the critical estimation of the 
beautiful under the principles of reason, and elevating its rules to a science. But this 
effort is futile. […] For this reason it is advisable again to desist from the use of this 
term and to save it for that doctrine which is true science (Kant, CPR, 2000, p. 156) 
 
In his first critique Kant rejects Baumgarten’s idea of a science of taste proposing  to use the 
term ‘aesthetic’ for ‘his theory of the contribution of the forms of sensibility to knowledge in 
general’ (Guyer & Wood, CPR, Introduction, 2000, p. 4). By 1790 when Kant published the 
Critique of the Power of Judgement (1790) he accepted Baumgarten’s usage of ‘aesthetics’ as 
a science of taste and he believed that he could find a priori principles for taste. In his third 
critique, particularly in the first section, the ‘Analytic of the Beautiful’, Kant focuses on the 
analysis of Beauty and aesthetic judgements and the grounds for making these judgements: 
the immutable features of the aesthetic experience (subjectivity, pleasurableness and 
disinterestedness). Kant’s introduction of the aesthetic judgement as a special faculty which 
allows the free play between the cognitive faculties of imagination and understanding is one 
                                            
13
 Kant’s Announcement of the Program of his Lectures for Winter Semester 1765-66, 2:303-13, quoted in 
Editor’s Introduction to CPJ, ed. P. Guyer, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. xvi 
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of the most influential proposals to the problem of taste (the cornerstones of this proposal are: 
the distinction between judgement and pleasure, the universality of aesthetic judgement and 
his concept of sensus communis as a universal shared faculty of agreeing).  
    To return to the semantic dimension for Kant the ‘aesthetic’ has two usages: as a general 
term to refer to sensible aspects of our cognition of nature and in a narrower way as referring 
to those sensible objects valued as art or being beautiful.
14
 Regarding the latter, Scruton says:  
 
In Kant’s usage the term ‘aesthetic‘ denoted the sensuous aspect of our appreciation 
of beauty, which in turn is suppose to explain its ‘freedom from concepts’: in other 
words it was part of a theory designed to explain the phenomena that in Baumgarten 
are merely observed. (Scruton, 2007, p. 233) 
      
     However, James Shelley points out that there is a terminological discontinuity between the 
Kantian concept of taste and our contemporary conception of the aesthetic. He suggests that 
we use the term ‘aesthetic’ instead of the term ‘taste’ first, because we prefer an adjective to a 
noun and secondly, because the etymological Greek root of the term ‘aesthetic’(‘sensory 
perception’)  maintains the strong link to ‘immediacy’ that is manifest in our understanding 
of the conception of taste. Shelly explains that the consequence of this preference: 
 
…has allowed for the retiring of a series of awkward expressions: the expressions 
“judgment of taste,” “emotion of taste” and “quality of taste” [which] have given 
way to the arguably less offensive “aesthetic judgment,” “aesthetic emotion,” and 
“aesthetic quality”. (Shelley 2009, p.5) 
      
Another interesting characterisation of the evolution of concept of the aesthetic in a post-
Kantian era is proposed by Nick Zangwill who maintains that we need to centre the 
discussions of the aesthetic on the concept of aesthetic judgement. He argues that the current 
concept of aesthetic judgement includes judgements of beauty and ugliness and this way of 
thinking uses a wider sense of the concept of the aesthetic than the Kantian conception. 
However Zangwill notices that: 
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 D. Burnham,  An Introduction to Kant’s Critique of Judgement, Edinburgh University Press, 2000, p.40 
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….there is also a respect in which the contemporary notion seems to be narrower 
than Kant's notion. For Kant used the notion to include both judgments of beauty (or 
of taste) as well as judgments of the agreeable […]. The contemporary notion also 
excludes judgments about pictorial and semantic content.
15
 
 
Zangwill’s view captures well the contemporary notion of the aesthetic and the perplexity 
related to its different uses as a predicate which qualifies ‘many different kinds of things’. He 
also reminds us that the two most important conceptions of the aesthetic of the 20th century 
are Monroe C. Beardsley’s and Frank Sibley’s.16 In the following section I focus mainly on 
Sibley’s characterisation of the aesthetic, view which influenced most of the debates about 
aesthetic vocabulary and aesthetic appreciation, and a view which is also foundational for 
Lamarque’s aesthetic essentialism.  
      
   Section 2  
 
    Taking into consideration the development of the arts in the 20
th
 century
17
, the trajectory of 
aesthetics as a discipline
18
 and the preoccupation with different issues of empiricism, 
ontology, interpretation and intentionality, shows that the more traditional usage of the term 
‘aesthetic’ suffered noticeable changes. For example, Berys Gaut underlines the puzzlement 
provoked by the term ‘aesthetic’ which is ‘a frustrating one’ and ‘at once indispensable and 
yet obdurately obscure’. 19  According to Gaut, there are two main senses of the word 
‘aesthetic’, a narrow one and a wider one. The narrow sense has to do with traditional usage: 
when people talk about something that is aesthetically good they mean that it is beautiful and 
when they talk about something aesthetically bad or ‘unaesthetic’ they mean it is ugly. The 
wider sense goes beyond the beautiful and the ugly and it gets its main force from Frank 
                                            
15
 Nick Zangwill, ‘Aesthetic Judgement’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition), Edward 
N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/aesthetic-judgment/>  
16
 The main critics of Beardsley’s and Sibley’s theories about the notion of the aesthetic are George Dickie, and 
Ted Cohen and Peter Kivy (Nick Zangwill, ‘Aesthetic Judgement’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Fall 2014 Edition) 
17
 The development of the term ‘aesthetic’ reaches a critical mass at the beginning of the 20th century, especially 
in the formalist tradition when the term ‘aesthetic’ was used in relation to the perception of the formally unified 
(the most significant representatives are Roger Fry, Clive Bell, Monroe C. Beardsley). Lamarque discusses in 
detail the role of formalism in literary appreciation and also his views are relevant in discussing visual arts and 
aesthetic empiricism – I will return to the importance of formal qualities in the arts in the following chapters. 
18
 Interestingly R. Scruton remarks that there are many doubts about the subject matter of aesthetics and also 
that a number of thinkers argue that aesthetic is an invented category which has nothing to do with the human 
condition. However he rejects such approaches. (‘In Search of the Aesthetic’, British Journal of Aesthetics, No. 
3,  July 2007, p. 232) 
19
 B. Gaut, Art, Emotion and Ethics, OUP, Oxford, 2013, p. 26 
15 
 
Sibley’s article ‘Aesthetic Concepts’ (1959). Sibley also wrote about the distinction between 
aesthetic and nonaesthetic properties, the link between aesthetics and perception and most 
importantly, about our use of aesthetic vocabulary. An interesting historical point is that 
Sibley, according to Colin Lyas, is reported compiling his list of aesthetic concepts by 
carrying out an extensive research between 1948 and 1949 of critical writings of literature 
and paintings and finding a wealth of ‘praise words’, ‘merit and demerit terms’ and ‘aesthetic 
terms’.20 Sibley’s original heterogeneous list of aesthetic concepts includes concepts like: 
‘unified, balanced, integrated, lifeless, serene, sombre, dynamic, powerful, vivid, delicate, 
moving, trite, sentimental, tragic’ as well as the following expressions: ‘telling contrast, set 
up a tension, conveys a sense of…’.21 This rich terminological resource made Sibley versatile 
in discussions of aesthetic concepts and one can see how this resource was useful in his 
construal of his arguments from his two influential papers ‘Aesthetic Concepts’ and 
‘Particularity, Art and Evaluation’.22 Here one needs to add that, although Sibley speaks 
about application of aesthetic concepts, he also often switches his discourse to aesthetic 
properties.
23
  
     Another feature of Sibley’s take on aesthetic concepts is pointed out by Derek Matravers 
who suggests that Sibley’s choice of ‘concepts’ instead of ‘properties’ suits better the 
aesthetic discourse because it avoids a lot of problems related to ‘the varied and often 
obscure’ uses of ‘property’. 24  However, Eddy Zemach suggests that Sibley’s list is a 
compilation of predicates which attributed to different things denote different properties. For 
example, Zemach explains how the attribution of the predicate ‘black’ to a poem denotes an 
aesthetic property but its attribution to a surface does not.
25
 Thus, although I take Matravers’s 
point about the importance of the distinction between aesthetic concepts and aesthetic 
properties, I am not worried about this distinction here, because in this section I talk about 
Sibley’s analysis of aesthetic concepts and in the first part of Chapter II of this thesis, I look 
at Sibley’s discussion of aesthetic qualities (indeed Sibley ends up using the term ‘qualities’ 
instead of ‘properties’ in his later works).  In other words, because I am interested in the 
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properties that are the focus of aesthetic experience and the nature of our aesthetic responses 
to works of art, inevitably means to talk about both aesthetic concepts and the properties they 
name – in other words, to consider how one makes aesthetic attributions. In addition, I need 
to mention that I am not very worried about the ‘existence’ claim about aesthetic properties – 
I assume that there are such things as aesthetic properties. However, I find the question about 
the nature of such properties intriguing and for the rest of this thesis I will often come back to 
this by trying to clarify claims about the nature of aesthetic properties, in particular in 
Chapter II and III.    
     There are many issues arising for Sibley’s famous papers about aesthetic concepts and 
properties; the most important ones that I would like to briefly mention here are: certain 
requirements for the aesthetic properties to be perceived, their relational character and the 
descriptive and evaluative character of the aesthetic concepts that name the aesthetic 
properties. For the rest of this section I am going to focus on Sibley’s influential view on 
aesthetic concepts and their character.
26
 
     The distinction between the evaluative and descriptive character of aesthetic concepts is 
discussed in detail by Sibley in his paper ‘Particularity, Art and Evaluation’ (1974) where he 
questions P.F. Strawson’s claim that all general terms used in supporting aesthetic verdicts 
are evaluative but not descriptive.
27
  Although Sibley considers the distinction surrounded by 
‘murk and ambiguity’ he thinks that there are ways in which people use this distinction in 
aesthetic assessment that make sense.
28
 Sibley’s analysis of such characterization has become 
well known and is given a prevalent treatment in a number of important aesthetic arguments, 
for example, in the works of M. Beardsley, J. Levinson, A. Goldman, A. Isenberg, P. 
Lamarque. To begin the discussion of evaluative and descriptive characterizations of 
aesthetic concepts and of the aesthetic properties they name, I present Sibley’s distinction and 
afterwards I discuss in particular Livingston’s usage of this distinction.  
     Sibley argues that there are three different ways in which people call a term ‘evaluative’ 
depending on what weight one puts on the thing that the term is applied to (to what extent the 
thing is considered valuable as a whole, or to what extent the term is just naming a property 
which is considered a merit or demerit of that thing, or to what extent it is used not only to 
show that a property is attributed to the thing but also to indicate that the speaker has a 
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 F. Sibley ‘Particularity, Art and Evaluation’, in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art eds. Peter Lamarque and 
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favourable or unfavourable attitude towards that property).
29
 Accordingly, Sibley thinks that 
people use three categories of terms when applying evaluative terms or expressions to things: 
 
a) Intrinsically or solely evaluative terms. These do not attribute a particular quality to 
the object but imply a range of qualities. Sibley says that it will be ‘contextually 
implied’ that the thing to which we apply such a term has ‘some qualities in virtue of 
which it is valued or disvalued but no indication is given of what these qualities might 
be’. Such terms are: ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘mediocre’, ‘nice’, ‘nasty’, ‘obnoxious’, ‘valuable’, 
‘effective’ or ‘worthless’.30 Sibley gives the following examples with 
regard to aesthetic assessments: ‘beautiful’, ‘ugly’, or ‘lovely’.31  
 
b) Descriptive merit-terms merely name properties of things and could be applied by a 
person who does not even value those properties but only names them. Sibley gives 
the following examples from common language: ‘sharp’ (which names a property for 
razors), ‘selective’ (for wireless) or ‘spherical’ (for tennis balls). He thinks that these 
terms are straightforward property terms. His examples from aesthetics are: 
‘balanced’, ‘unified’, ‘evocative’, ‘vivid’, ‘funny’, ‘witty’, ‘dynamic’ or ‘moving’; 
they are descriptive terms and they point out qualities generally valued in art and 
aesthetic matters’.32 
 
c)  Evaluation-added property terms. These terms have both a descriptive and an 
evaluative component and when used, they name the presence of a particular property 
in an object, as well as, an indication that the speaker favours or disfavours this 
property. Sibley’s examples from casual language are ‘tasty’, ‘insipid’, ‘flagrant’, 
‘cacophonous’ or ‘brash’.33 The terms from aesthetics which appear to be part of this 
category are: ‘elegant’, ‘graceful’, ‘handsome’, ‘pretty’, ‘ungainly’, ‘garish’ or 
‘hideous’. However, Sibley rebrands this third category as ‘descriptive’ because the  
              terms it contains, he argues, are initially ‘evaluation added quality words’ but they  
             are commonly used ‘in a neutral and purely descriptive way’.34  
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There are a number of issues to discuss in relation to this tripartite categorization of 
evaluative terms and how aesthetic terms are applied. First, the category of solely evaluative 
terms appears to be accepted by most contemporary aestheticians as a category which 
contains purely evaluative terms and I think this category should be retained. To elaborate 
one could add other terms to Sibley’s first category: ‘striking’, ‘splendid’, excellent’, 
‘mediocre’, ‘miserable’ and execrable’ 35  and argue that the solely evaluative category 
encompasses terms with the following characteristics: they represent the viewer’s approval or 
disapproval of an object or of a subject-matter (a positive or a negative reaction), and it will 
be contextually implied that the object has some properties for which it is approved or 
disapproved of. For example, the term ‘mediocre’ is never used in a positive way; it is used to 
show disapproval of an object and this is a clear indication that the term conjures a negative 
reaction, which can be justified by appeal to some properties of the object if needed. A 
painting can be characterised as ‘mediocre’ because the composition is unbalanced and the 
chromatics are not subtle enough for the depicted subject, or on a different occasion another 
painting is ‘mediocre’ because the depicted subject is very conventional and is the execution 
is very crude or unskilled. Because on one occasion the application of ‘mediocre’ can be 
justified by the identification of one set of properties and on another occasion by a different 
set of properties, to paraphrase Sibley, applying the term ‘mediocre’ does not give any or 
very little indication of what these properties might be and this is the case with all of the 
terms in the first category, the solely evaluative one. 
     Secondly, although Sibley points out that the descriptive-merit terms (b) are 
straightforward property terms (even though when applied they indicate qualities which are 
valued in aesthetic matters) and that the evaluation-added terms (c) are recognised as having 
both a descriptive and an evaluative component, it appears that the second category (b) and 
the third category (c) are not very different. What is the exact difference between the two 
categories as envisaged by Sibley? One could say that Sibley’s distinction is not very clear 
and the two categories are not distinct because they both contain terms that identify qualities 
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which are thought to be valuable from an aesthetic point of view. On the other hand, one can 
argue that the descriptive-merit terms (b) are terms which are recognised as describing 
qualities which are generally regarded as valuable without an individual speaker’s approval 
or disapproval of those qualities. For example, if I understand Sibley, ‘balance’ as a 
descriptive-merit term describes something which is valued in art (certain compositional 
equilibrium) and the application of such a term does not involve the speaker’s attitude 
towards this property – ‘being balanced’ is generally considered a valuable quality of a work 
of art. While the evaluation-added terms (c) are terms which not only indicate the presence of 
a particular property in an art objects but they also (clearly) express the speakers’ favour or 
disfavour of that property.  
    However, a number of the aesthetic terms listed by Sibley in the second category appear 
problematic. One could make a good case that ‘unified’ and ‘balanced’ can be considered 
descriptive terms. However, terms like ‘evocative’, ‘witty’, ‘moving’ or ‘funny’ appear to 
have an evaluative component. To exemplify that the terms ‘unified’ and ‘balanced’ have a 
strong descriptive core, one can ‘look and see’ how these terms are used in visual art 
descriptions, in particular to the compositions of paintings.
36
 To illustrate this, here is a first 
group of paintings which display compositional balance: the fresco of The Holy Trinity (1424) 
by Masaccio (Fig.1), The London Crucifixion (1475) by Antonello da Messina (Fig. 2) and 
The Last Supper (1495-98) by Leonardo da Vinci (Fig. 3). And here is another group of 
paintings whose compositions are characterised by uniformity: Snow Storm – Steam-Boat off 
a Harbour’s Mouth (1842) by J.M.W. Turner (Fig.4), Forest (1890-92) by Paul Cezanne (Fig. 
5) and Grey Tree (1912) by Piet Mondrian (Fig. 6). One can ‘look and see’ why the first 
group of works can be described as compositionally balanced and the second group as 
displaying uniformity. In the first case the main reason is because of the spatial relationships 
between the elements of the paintings which give the composition geometrical balance and 
proportionality, and in the case of the second group of works, it is because of oneness in 
colour and composition. 
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Fig.1 The Holy Trinity (1424)                                           Fig. 2 The London Crucifixion (1475)      
 by Masaccio                                                                      by Antonello da Messina 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                          Fig. 3 The Last Supper (1495-98) by Leonardo da Vinci 
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                                     Fig. 4 Snow Storm – Steam-Boat off a Harbour’s  
                                     Mouth (1842) by J.M.W. Turner 
 
 
 
 
                                          Fig. 5 Forest (1890-92) by Paul Cezanne 
 
 
 
                                            Fig. 6 Grey Tree (1912) by Piet Mondrian 
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 Returning to the other terms from Sibley’s second list, it is difficult to see how terms like 
‘witty’ or ‘funny’ or ‘moving’ are not partially evaluative terms. The application of ‘witty’ 
for example involves not only that a property is attributed to a work but also a strong hint that 
the informed perceiver finds this property valuable and approves of it. It will be 
uncharacteristic to use the term ‘witty’ in aesthetic matters in a derogatory way or in a neutral 
way. However, Sibley claims first that such terms (the ones in the second category, including 
‘witty’) could be applied by a person who did not value such qualities and then, he recognises 
that such usage would be odd: 
 
…though [the mentioned qualities] are widely valued, it would, as I said, be unlikely 
that a person using them would not either value these qualities himself or know that 
they were valued by others in a certain way.
37
 
 
But why does Sibley insist that many aesthetic terms like ‘evocative’, ‘moving’, ‘funny’ 
‘vivid’, ‘dynamic’ are fully descriptive terms? He claims that those terms are correctly 
applied as straightforward property terms because people who apply them do not always 
‘need to know’ that the properties these terms name count as ‘a merit in something’.38 
Following Sibley’s reasoning then, to call a painting ‘balanced’ or ‘unified’ or ‘witty’ or 
‘moving’ or ‘vivid’ a viewer does not need to know that balance , uniformity, wittiness, 
expressiveness or vividness are properties which are considered merits in the painting. But is 
this so?  
     I understand that those descriptive terms, what Sibley calls ‘straightforward property 
terms’ could gain a strong evaluative force only if used in a particular way or expressed with 
a particular tone. For example, one could use the term ‘balanced’ in an emphatic positive way 
when comparing a series of works whose compositions are uneven or asymmetrical with a 
work from that series which is balanced. In this case, the comparison makes the work in 
question to stand out and this also betrays a strong evaluative stance that the viewer expresses 
– the viewer approves of the work because it is ‘so’ balanced. But, one could say that a 
composition ‘being balanced’ is always considered a positive evaluation, reflecting the 
admiration for the painter’s skill, his awareness of his predecessors’ work and the audience 
preference for such a quality in visual compositions. However, Sibley would argue that 
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‘balance’ as a formal feature of the design of the work is an objective feature of the work 
regardless of the viewer’s evaluative stance. Here is an example of how one can support 
Sibley’s reasoning: if one replaces the elements of a painting which is characterised as 
‘balanced’ with black patches, the painting will still exhibit compositional balance (albeit it 
can now be argued that it is a different painting). The point of this thought experiment is to 
show that ‘balance’ is a quality that is more dependent on the compositional structure and is 
less dependent on the viewer’s evaluation and attitude towards different aspects of the 
painting. What I mean is that ‘balance’ is a term that names a property of an object which can 
be easily identified in the object and this is the reason one can say that ‘balance’ describes 
something in the object. In the same way, a painting which is called ‘unified’ names an 
identifiable property in the painting – that of uniformity, property which is not dependent for 
identification on the viewer’s approval or disapproval of uniformity.  
     In contrast, if one tries to replace any of the elements of a funny painting, with black 
patches or even other features that match the larger composition, the painting would case to 
be funny. For example, erasing the text ‘Ceci n’est pas une pipe’ from Magritte’s painting 
The Treachery of Images (1928/29) or getting rid of the moustache from Mona Lisa’s face in 
Duchamp’s painting L.H.O.O.Q (1919) would make the application of the term ‘funny’ to 
these two paintings inappropriate. Although Magritte’s words and Mona Lisa’s moustache 
are part of the compositions, the humour of these works is related to a particular reaction that 
most of the viewers have to these elements – a particular understanding of the painters’ 
intentions. Thus, it can be said that these paintings are funny for certain viewers, the ones that 
understand the context of origin of the paintings, the place of these paintings in the artists’ 
body of work, the relation with the cultural milieu of the time of the painting, the connection 
of the paintings with the preceding artistic traditions, and most importantly for the viewers 
who like to admire and consider this sort of things.
39
 Here is one observation from the above 
discussion I would like to make: ‘funny’ appears to be a term that exhibits a stronger 
evaluative force than terms like ‘balanced’ or ‘unified’ because most people who use the term 
‘funny’ to describe the above paintings, not only refer to an objective feature of the paintings 
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but they also characterise something in the painting that people need to react to, in an 
approving manner in order to justify the application of the term ‘funny’. I would argue that 
the term ‘funny’ is a term leaning towards the descriptive more than the evaluative but it is 
not a fully descriptive term as Sibley proposes.  
     Thus one could say that Sibley’s characterisation of the second category of terms, the 
descriptive merit-terms, points out a subtle distinction between (1) expressing approval and 
(2) identifying a feature that is in general valued. To exemplify this one can think of a person 
who can say: ’This thing is F, but I do not care for things which are F’, where ‘F’ could stand 
for ‘balanced’ or ‘unified’ or ‘dynamic’. In this example the terms ‘balanced’ or ‘unified’ or 
‘dynamic’ are used as descriptive terms but Sibley is right to say that  if the things to which 
these terms are applied are works of art then the terms point out qualities that are generally 
approved by the majority of speakers.  
     But how does one explain the differences between some of Sibley’s aesthetic terms? There 
is at least one thing that can be said straightaway: Sibley’s descriptive-merit terms (b)  appear 
to be on a continuum;  some of these terms having a strong descriptive core
40
 and being 
devoid or almost devoid of any evaluative force at one end, and terms which have less 
descriptive content and more evaluative force at the other end. For example: ‘balanced’, 
‘unified’, ‘dynamic’, ‘vivid’ are at the end with a strong descriptive core and ‘witty’ and 
‘funny’ are at the other end where the descriptive core is weaker and there is a stronger 
evaluative component. What I mean here is that we are more inclined to take terms like 
‘funny’ and ‘witty’ as evaluative; we appear to approve more of objects/situations which are 
described by those terms. 
      The problem with such a continuum is that we still need to clarify a way of showing how 
one decides the position on the continuum of each aesthetic term. I think there is a more 
direct approach which explains better how we use aesthetic terms and how we can catalogue 
them. This approach considers the meaning of aesthetic terms as an indication of their 
descriptive content, evaluative force and of their correct application.
41
 For example, the 
correct application of the term ‘balanced’ indicates that the object (for example a painting) to 
which the term is applied has characteristics which can be recognised in the object, for 
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example, a symmetrical or harmonious arrangement or design of the elements of the 
composition.
42
 The meaning of the term ‘balanced’ is descriptive, referring to a particular 
physical arrangement or design of the elements of a composition. However, the particular 
way in which the elements are arranged is characterised as ‘symmetrical’ or ‘harmonious’ – 
characterisation which, one could argue betrays an attitude of approval towards such an 
arrangement or design. But again, ‘symmetry’ or ‘harmoniousness’ as properties can be 
considered objective features of a painting regardless of the individual or societal preferences. 
Thus the term ‘balanced’ and some of the other terms, ‘unified’, ‘dynamic’ and ‘vivid’ have a 
strong descriptive core and very often their use does not amount to approval or disapproval of 
the properties they name – this is the reason Sibley called them ‘descriptive’.   
     Sibley’s third category of evaluation-added property terms contains terms like: ‘elegant’, 
‘graceful’, ‘handsome’, ‘pretty’, ‘ungainly’, ‘garish’ or ‘hideous’, terms which appear to have 
both an evaluative and a descriptive component. However these terms are very unusual. 
There are two remarks about Sibley’s explanation of how to catalogue these terms: one is that 
there is acknowledgment of the importance of standards in assessments (this is Sibley’s point 
about what is recognised as valuable in ‘certain spheres’) and the second one is that the 
recognition of a property which is valued becomes reflected in the way we use the aesthetic 
language – the term which names a particular valued property is used more in a descriptive 
rather than evaluative way. With regard to aesthetic matters, Sibley says about all terms: 
 
I see therefore no overriding case for denying that we have a use for many or most 
aesthetic terms which is not only partially but wholly descriptive.
 43
 
 
     For the sake of classificatory clarity, I will call these terms, in Sibley’s third category  
(‘elegant’, ‘graceful’, ‘handsome’, ‘pretty’, ‘ungainly’, ‘garish’ or ‘hideous’), the 
‘problematic’ terms. Sibley argues that, these are terms which although have ‘some 
evaluative element […] typically present’ they are used in a descriptive way.44 I would like to 
point out that, in the above mentioned list there is at least one term that raises immediate 
concerns – the term ‘handsome’.  If this term is the masculine equivalent of the term 
‘beautiful’, shouldn’t this term be considered a solely evaluative term? When one 
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characterises a man (real or depicted in a painting) as ‘handsome’ what is one expressing? 
Sibley says that the application of a term like ‘beautiful’ will be contextually implied 
according to some properties that one values, without mentioning those properties. But if  one 
considers the term ‘handsome’ as being the masculine equivalent of the term ‘beautiful’, 
according to Sibley, ‘handsome’ should be a term applied when the speaker values some 
unspecified properties in the man. Therefore, according to this line of reasoning, the term 
‘handsome’ should be part of Sibley’s first category, that of solely evaluative terms.    
     Then, why does Sibley ultimately, catalogue ‘handsome’ in the descriptive terms category? 
Is it because ‘handsome’ indicates the presence of a particular property or a set of particular 
properties and in this way, it is very different from the solely evaluative terms like ‘beautiful’, 
which do not name any particular properties? There are a number of possible answers here: 
one is that the term ‘handsome’ is not the masculine equivalent of the term ‘beautiful’ – 
people can talk about beautiful men too even though is not very common
45
 or another answer 
is that ‘handsome’ is the male equivalent of ‘beautiful’ but when beautiful is understood in a 
very narrow way (for example, when beautiful refers only to physical attractiveness or fine 
physical form) or a third possible answer is that the term  ‘handsome’ is not a solely 
evaluative term because in common usage, there is a set of characteristics that can be 
identified and named when referring to a human being and these properties can be recognised 
and valued by the particular society that the speaker is a member of (which appears to be 
different from an evaluative term). I am going to focus on the third answer which can be 
supported by the claim that, there is more of an expected agreement about the application of 
the term ‘handsome’ (the socio-cultural standards of a particular society are the main guide to 
such applications) in comparison with the term ‘beautiful’. One can think of evolutionary, as 
well as cultural justifications for the recognition of properties which people would identify 
when calling a man ‘handsome’. For example some of those properties are: body symmetry, 
including face symmetry, a certain waist-to-hip ratio, the characteristics of a certain male 
ideal depicted in the arts of that particular period and images of successful males and 
characteristics of physical attractiveness of the epoch. The idea here is that, when the term 
‘handsome’ is applied to a man there is a sense that everyone understands what the speaker 
refers to – a good-looking man in that particular socio-cultural context where the attribution 
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takes place. Nevertheless the sceptic can rise two objections here: first, that there is not a 
clear consensus about the properties the speakers refers to when calling a man ‘handsome’ 
even if the socio-cultural context is well defined and secondly, if we could agree that there is 
such a consensus for the properties required to call a man ‘good-looking’, why are we then so 
reluctant to agree about a consensus of application for a term like ‘beautiful’? To answer the 
sceptic one needs to distinguish between criteria of application of a term and the properties 
that the term names –  a distinction which can be used to explain why the term ‘handsome’ is 
part of a different category from the term ‘beautiful’.  First, I would say that the conditions of 
applications of the term ‘handsome’ appears to be easier to discern, because the term 
‘handsome’ applies mostly to human beings (one can say that it applies mainly to men46) 
while the term ‘beautiful’ has a wider application (applies to a range of objects not only to the 
human form). Secondly, the meaning of the term handsome has to do with the appearance of 
the physical human body (attractiveness, good-looking body and face) while the term 
‘beautiful’ has a much wider meaning (it is not only about the physicality of the human form 
but it also can refer to a more profound, mental or spiritual aspect of humans or other things). 
Thus, one could argue that the term ‘handsome’ has stricter criteria of application than the 
term ‘beautiful’ and the properties it names are particular properties that are easily 
attributable to a man in comparison with a range of unspecified properties as in the case of 
the properties named by the term ‘beautiful’.47 Levinson argues in a similar vein that certain 
aesthetic terms include an evaluative component ‘irreducibly’ but: ‘….whatever evaluative 
force is carried by such terms […] there are clearly descriptive limits on their application.’48 I 
would like to propose that ‘handsome’ when applied to men is such a term: it has both, an 
evaluative component because people do admire and favour a set of qualities that the term 
names and this is reflected in the positive way it is used, and it also has a descriptive core 
because the meaning of the term (an attractive or a good-looking man) refers to particular 
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 There are however, interesting usages of ‘handsome’ that appear to fly against what I have already said. For 
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identifiable properties in a man – a fine form or figure, proportionality, symmetry, 
attractiveness of the body and face, properties which do not need to be contextually implied.  
      In the light of the above discussion we need to return to Sibley’s characterisation of 
aesthetic terms. He does end up with only two categories of aesthetic terms: solely evaluative 
and descriptive because he says, we use ‘many or most aesthetic terms’ in a descriptive 
way.
49
 The above discussion about Sibley’s initial three categories of aesthetic terms wanted 
to point out the complexities of understanding how we apply aesthetic terms should start with 
a preliminary understanding about what kind of terms these are. To exemplify, Levinson 
claims that many people think that most of aesthetic terms have a mixed character – having 
both a descriptive and an evaluative component and the most common aesthetic terms have 
an identifiable descriptive aesthetic content. Also he points out that aesthetic attribution of 
works of art:  
 
 …are based on, and obliquely testify to the occurrence of certain looks, impressions, 
or appearances which emerge out of lower perceptual properties.
50
 
 
Levinson’s position can be briefly summed up in the following way: the work of art has 
aesthetic properties which supervene on the work’s intrinsic and relational properties (those 
are its structural and its artistic features), the aesthetic properties are manifest ways of 
appearing phenomenally,
51
 and the terms used to characterise such properties have 
descriptive limits on application determined by ‘distinctive phenomenal impressions or 
appearances associated with such terms’. 52  There are different problematic issues with 
Levinson’s claim that aesthetic properties are ‘ways of appearing phenomenally’53 but what I 
would like to retain for discussion from Levinson’s account is his idea that aesthetic terms 
have descriptive limits on their application, limits which are fixed ultimately by distinctive 
phenomenal impressions associated with such terms. To shed further light on what he means, 
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Levinson gives examples of how aesthetic terms like ‘gaudy’, ‘chaotic’ or ‘flamboyant’ are 
used. He says that one can characterise a visual pattern as being gaudy or chaotic or 
flamboyant in different ways.  For example, a visual pattern can be correctly characterised as 
gaudy if there is a certain kind of appearance which according to Levinson is different from 
an evaluative reaction. The distinctive phenomenal appearance or impressions are the 
grounds for the aesthetic attribution (the visual pattern being gaudy) and the attribution has a 
descriptive, distinct aesthetic content which can be approximate in the following way: ‘bright, 
non-harmonious, eye-catching colour combination’.54 What Levinson argues for, is that when 
disputes are involved, critics can appeal to certain overall impressions of their encounter with 
a work of art as the common perceptual ground in aesthetic responses. Thus even if the 
viewers or the critics disagree if they approve or disprove of a work of art as a whole or of a 
particular property, there is an awareness of a certain look or appearance that the work has 
and there can be some inter-subjective agreement about the descriptive content of an aesthetic 
attribution.
55
  
     As already discussed a symmetrical or harmonious arrangement of elements is part of 
what it means for a composition to be balanced. How is this different from what Levinson 
argues? For Levinson the distinctive descriptive content of aesthetic attributions consists in 
the overall impression afforded by the work of art while a common sense view of how people 
apply aesthetic terms is by considering the meaning of aesthetic terms as a guide to their 
correct application. But how does one apply correctly the term ‘balanced’ to a visual 
composition? To reiterate, S. Schroeder and most Wittgensteinians would say by ‘looking 
and seeing’ that the composition has a symmetrical or harmonious arrangement of its 
elements and by knowing the meaning of the term ‘balanced’. The ‘seeing’ of this 
arrangement entitles the informed perceiver to name the composition ‘balanced’ – there is no 
mysterious overall appearance or impression of symmetry or harmonious arrangement. 
Levinson’s critics could say that somehow Levinson added another layer to the process of 
attributing aesthetic characteristics to works of art instead of just saying that one ‘looks and 
sees’ the particular composition of the work and then correctly applies the aesthetic concept 
of balance.
56
 If the aesthetic term ‘balanced’ has a dominant descriptive core that is easily 
recognised by most competent speakers as part of the meaning of the term, then the problem 
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of its application does not appear at the conceptual level (in general people do agree about the 
meaning of the term ‘balanced’ and the fact that it is considered a valued property). It can be 
argued that the problems of attributing ‘balance’ to a composition appear at the empirical 
level: the actual observation of an arrangement of elements in a visual composition. However, 
with a term like ‘balanced’ the worries are arguably, minimal – most suitably informed 
perceivers would be able to identify a symmetrical or harmonious arrangement of elements 
thus correctly attributing the concept ‘balanced’ to the  visual composition of the work they 
look at. And in the case of ‘balanced’ one could say that the evaluative component of the 
term has very little force (albeit a positive one), which is an indication of the ‘undisputed’ 
accepted standards of aesthetic characterisations within certain genres in a particular socio-
cultural context.
57
  
     Here is an observation about the way the aesthetic perception of the same property of an 
object can lead to very different uses of aesthetic characterisations: on the one hand, one 
characterisation tries to capture the more ‘descriptive’ features of the property and on the 
other hand, another characterisation tries to emphasise the overall effect of that property on 
the viewer, which could be considered a characterisation with more evaluative force. For 
example, describing a monochrome painting as ‘brilliant blue’ or describing the chromatic of 
the same painting as ‘pure energy’ appears to emphasise different aspects of the same 
property. Both of these characterizations are based on the experience of the same property
58
 
and if there is disagreement about the aesthetic of the painting, it can be argued that the 
disagreement would not be about the existence of the chromatic property as such, but it 
would be about which of the two expressions is more appropriate in capturing the unusual 
chromatic of the painting. In the above case of the monochrome painting, the first aesthetic 
characterisation focuses on the brilliance and vividness of an unusual nuance of blue, while 
the second characterisation focuses on that aspect of the chromatic of the painting which is 
considered a source of vigour or energy and which is highly valued by the viewer. If one 
reveals that this painting is IKB 3 painted by Yves Klein in 1960 (Fig.7) and the 
characterisation of the painting as ‘pure energy’59 is how Klein himself described the effect of 
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the colour of the painting, then it appears that, the same aesthetic property can be on one 
occasion characterised well by emphasising  the more descriptive aesthetic aspect of the 
chromatic  – ‘a saturate, brilliant, all-pervasive ultramarine’60 and on another occasion, it can 
focus on something about the property as well as, the artist’s reaction to this property – an 
admiration and approval captured by the expressions ‘pure energy’ or ‘poetic energy’.  
 
 
 
                                       Fig.7 IKB 3 (1960) by Yves Klein  
 
     In 1955 at the opening of his exhibition at Editions Lacoste, Klein said about the 
chromatic of his paintings:   
 
For me, every nuance of a colour is in a sense, an individual, a living creature of the 
same species as the primary colour, but with a character and personal soul of its own. 
61
 
 
This explanation in a way justifies why Klein characterises his novel nuance of blue as ‘pure 
energy’ or ‘poetic energy’ – Klein’s blue is not only a perceptual property (a secondary 
quality) but because of its particular vigour this becomes an aesthetic property. This vigour is 
the result of Klein’s many years of experimentation with pigments and his intention to give 
the chromatic of the painting a ‘character and a personal soul’ – the viewer is stunned by this 
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effect ‘akin to a double exposure’ and takes the vivid chromatic to be the main aesthetic 
property of the painting.
62
  
     Going back to other aesthetic characterizations of the colour of IKB 3 by Klein, ‘a 
sensitized image’ or ‘the most perfect expression of blue’ one can see that those are used by 
the painter to point out not only a novel nuance of blue, but to express a particular aesthetic 
outlook. Hannah Weitemeier describes in detail Klein’s technique (‘the pure blue pigment 
was painted without modulation and without a trace of personal touch’) and the way he 
presented his series of blue paintings (‘the artist deliberately mounted the canvases  not on 
the wall, but up to twenty centimetres in front of it’) and concludes that: 
 
The viewer felt drawn into the depths of a blue that appeared to transmute the 
material substance of the painting support into an incorporeal quality, tranquil, 
serene.
63
 
 
As already mentioned, Klein is famous for his determination to find a new aesthetic effect 
with his monochromes of uncut colour and  it is well documented that he worked many years 
to retain in painting the brilliancy of pure pigments; in 1960 he took out a patent of the colour 
he ‘invented’, he called the colour ‘International Klein Blue’ (IKB). I hoped that this example 
illustrates one way in which aesthetic language is used to characterise an aesthetic property –
to illuminate a certain aspect of the property (the arresting blue which has a double exposure 
effect with an energizing impact on the viewer). If the viewer chooses to use an aesthetic 
expression which has a strong descriptive core (for example, the ‘brilliant blue’ of the 
painting is easily perceived as unusually vivid blue), then it can be argued that this way of 
characterising the vigour of the colour could be more conducive of inter-subjective agreement 
about the painting’s aesthetic attributions than the characterisation ‘poetic energy’, 
expression which captures the same property. It needs to be pointed out that what I mean by 
‘inter-subjective agreement’ refers here to the existence of a certain aesthetic property, in this 
case the brilliant blue, and it does not imply inter-subjective agreement about the value of the 
painting. To some extent Levinson is right when he says that even though people agree about 
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the perception of an aesthetic property in a work, they still can disagree on their evaluation of 
the work.
64
 I also say ‘to some extent’ because I think certain aesthetic terms impose a 
particular evaluative stance through their meaning – my earlier examples of aesthetic terms: 
‘balanced’ or ‘unified’ are such terms which are mainly used as positive evaluations, 
characterisations  which would contribute in the end to the overall aesthetic evaluation of the 
work. To return to Klein’s own terminology, it can be argued that ‘poetic energy’ has a strong 
evaluative force – the artist appears to emphasise his subjective feelings about the chromatic 
of the painting, thus making the viewer who hears his characterisation to think about the 
chromatic of the painting in a particular way – as having lyrical invigorating powers. The fact 
that the same property of a work of art can be successfully characterised by a ‘descriptive’ 
term, as well as the term having a more evaluative dimension does not preclude one of being 
an aesthetic realist – the aesthetic property of brilliant blue is in the work (albeit depending 
on normal conditions of perception) and different uses of aesthetic language only contribute 
to enriching the aesthetic characterisations of IKB 3. Another consequence of this way of 
thinking about aesthetic attributes is that the viewers are influenced in their language choices 
by ‘the looking’ and ‘the seeing’ of one or more aesthetic properties or aspects of aesthetic 
properties. What I mean is that according to the perceived property (for example, if the 
chromatic of the painting has a strong visual characteristic like an intense unusual nuance of 
blue, which one looks and sees as ‘unusual’), the informed perceiver can choose to 
characterize this property with an aesthetic expression which has a strong descriptive core. 
The expression ‘brilliant blue’ suggests that there is an intense nuance of blue in the painting 
and this is the aesthetic property that viewers point to when they encounter the painting.
65
 
Here I think is important to mention that the chromatic is perceived as unusual, because 
otherwise any perceiver could maintain that the painting is, purely and simply, of a certain 
nuance of blue, which would amount only to a description of the colour of the painting as a 
secondary quality. Another way of looking at the distinction between an aesthetic property 
and a secondary property, like the colour of a painting, is to paraphrase Zemach and to argue 
that the attribution of ‘brilliant blue’ to Klein’s painting is an attribution of an aesthetic 
property while the attribution of ‘brilliant blue’ (as described on an emulsion paint bucket) to 
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a surface is not.
66
 In addition, one can suggest that what makes this particular blue unusual is 
two fold: one, is that the viewing of International Klein Blue (the particular colour ‘invented’ 
by Klein) attests to the perception of an arresting colour, which is an unusual nuance from 
what one would have commonly seen in every days encounters with the colour blue and the 
second, is that the whole painting, the way it is painted, its texture, being monochromatic and 
the way it is hanged could give the viewer a new experience, an aesthetic one. Thus the 
appropriate aesthetic perception of International Klein Blue in Klein’s painting means that the 
informed perceiver is prompted to have an aesthetic experience when looking at IKB 3. The 
naming of the chromatic of the painting as ‘brilliant blue’ characterises the property which 
the viewer perceives in the painting thus this characterisation has a strong descriptive content. 
On the other hand if the viewer (in this case the painter himself) characterises the chromatic 
of IKB 3 as ‘poetic energy’ he tries to capture something about both: the painting itself and 
the strong visual impact that the chromatic of the painting has on him – a vigorous lyricism 
felt by the artist while looking at the painting. This is something the artist wants to share with 
the others and he uses the expressions ‘pure energy’ or ‘poetic energy’ as an indication of his 
feelings, and one could add as an indication of his aim. The artist’s aim in using such an 
expression could be to attract attention to the power of the painting’s chromatic to be 
experienced in a certain way. 
     If one agrees that most aesthetic concepts display both a descriptive and an evaluative 
aspect in varying degrees, then an informed perceiver can choose to use one aesthetic 
concept/expression rather than another according to different aspects of the property. It could 
be also said that this preference for one expression rather than the other rests upon the 
viewer’s aims: to describe the work’s property in neutral way in order to justify his aesthetic 
characterisations/judgements or to express an approval or disapproval of the property 
encountered. Although people appear often to use the terms like: beautiful’, ‘ugly’, ‘bad’, 
‘lovely’ etc., (Sibley’s solely evaluative concepts) because they only want to express their 
approval or disapproval of the works encountered, there are more complex aesthetic 
characterisations than this. First, informed perceivers (art critics, artists and art lovers in 
general) tend to use a more varied aesthetic language in order to capture well the aesthetic 
properties of the works viewed and criticised. Secondly, the informed perceivers are 
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interested in inter-subjective agreements about aesthetic attributions and the overall value of 
works. By choosing to use aesthetic characterisations which have a strong descriptive core, 
the informed perceiver can justify his aesthetic attributions and he can ask the other informed 
perceivers to recognise in the work the aesthetic properties that his aesthetic terms name. The 
art or literary critic has a similar role: to be able to point out aesthetic qualities in works and 
one of the best ways of doing this is to use aesthetic language that is conducive to identifying 
certain properties in a work. However, this does not mean that aesthetic characterisations 
which use aesthetic concepts with strong descriptive core are sufficient for aesthetic 
evaluations. A number of aestheticians would consider that the most apt aesthetic 
characterisations are using both types of aesthetic terms (the ones which are more descriptive 
as well as the ones with stronger evaluative force).  Aesthetic characterisations with strong 
descriptive core can create solid grounding for inter-subjective agreement about the 
identifications of the properties encountered in the work and this is the reason that they are 
very important. Aesthetic characterisations could become arid if one uses only ‘neutral and 
purely descriptive’ aesthetic concepts. However rich aesthetic characterisations use complex 
aesthetic language: descriptive, evaluative, imaginative, metaphorical and affective.
67
  
    To sum up, I discussed how Sibley divides aesthetic terms and I looked at different ways 
of understanding how aesthetic terms are applied. Now I would like to propose an amended 
account of aesthetic terms, with two main categories
68
:  
 
i. Purely evaluative terms (like: beautiful, ugly, sublime, good, bad, striking, splendid, 
excellent, mediocre, miserable or execrable)   
ii. Terms with mixed character which are on a continuum: at one end terms with a 
substantial descriptive core and minimal evaluative force and at the other end terms 
with strong evaluative force and a basic descriptive core.  Examples of the terms on 
this continuum are: ‘unified’, ‘balanced’, ‘ideal proportion’, ‘chaotic’, ‘dynamic’, 
‘moving’, ‘evocative’, ‘true-to-life’, ‘distorted’, ‘elegant’, ‘original’, ‘conservative’, 
‘tightly knit’, ‘witty’, ‘funny’, ‘grotesque’, ‘powerful’, ‘repulsive’, ‘ephemeral’, 
‘joyful’, ‘sad’,… 69 However, some would argue that there is a number of aesthetic 
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terms which are purely descriptive: sombre
70
, vivid, gaudy, flamboyant, dynamic, 
chaotic or the earlier discussed terms like ‘balanced’ and ‘unified’. I would say that 
these terms have a very strong descriptive core and a minimal evaluative force, with 
terms like ‘balanced’ and ‘unified’ at the descriptive end of the continuum.   
 
An in depth analysis of each term would be necessary if one wants robust distinctions 
between different types of aesthetic terms (descriptive and mixed character terms). However, 
at this moment I opt for a continuum where one of the ends is occupied by terms with strong 
descriptive core and minimal evaluative force and the other end is occupied by terms with a 
stronger evaluative force.   
     I would like to exemplify how an aesthetic term like ’graceful’ is a mixed character term 
with a strong descriptive core. Characterising a dancer as ‘graceful’ one could say that the 
term alludes to certain features of the movement or the style of the dancer: flowing style or 
elegant or harmonious movement. The meaning of the term ‘graceful’ is a pleasing, attractive 
movement, or a movement which has elegant proportions or refinement. It appears that 
appropriate application of the term ‘graceful’ would mean that these characteristics are 
identified in a dancer’s movements. If these characteristics – pleasing, attractive or flowing 
movement – are described as such, and these descriptions represent the descriptive core of the 
term ‘graceful’, then what it is its evaluative component based upon? Why saying that a 
dancer is graceful expresses a positive evaluation? An immediate answer comes from the 
explanation of the meaning of the term ‘graceful’ which contains characterisations of the 
movements of the dancer that are positive in character: pleasant, attractive, harmonious or 
refined. One could take a different explanatory route and argue that a movement or a style of 
a certain kind is ‘graceful’ depending upon what is considered ‘graceful’ by the 
contemporary dance scene (if one is assessing a contemporary dancer). The evaluative part of 
the term ‘graceful’ appears to be determined by the standards of what is upheld in 
contemporary dance, for example an extremely skilled and harmonious movement.
71
 Also a 
mixed character term like ‘graceful’ has in contemporary dance different levels of agreed 
application; certain good making features will make the application easier and certain bad 
making features will make the application inappropriate. Common understanding of the 
meaning of the term ‘graceful’ points to a positive evaluation. However, because of the 
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recognised standards in contemporary dance, the term appears to be used easily by art critics, 
regular dance spectators and the dancers themselves as a descriptive term. This is the reason 
why Sibley gives examples of aesthetic terms, like ‘graceful’, ‘pretty’, ‘elegant’, ‘ungainly’ 
or ‘hideous’, which although, he says, originally are ‘evaluation-added quality words’ they 
become mainly used in a neutral and purely descriptive way. I think Sibley’s observation 
about this phenomenon is accurate because if one follows his reasoning what makes those 
terms aesthetic is their context of application not their descriptive meaning. Nevertheless, 
technically speaking, I still think the term ‘graceful’ and those other terms should be 
categorised as terms with mixed character and not fully descriptive terms. Even though these 
terms have an identifiable descriptive core they also have a strong evaluative component (in 
the case of ‘graceful’ the evaluative component is the approval of such a property, which is 
implied in the positive usage of the term).   
    My justification of the claim that the ‘problematic’ terms are part of the mixed character 
category and not fully descriptive terms, as Sibley would say, is based on a discussion about 
how one learns to apply different aesthetic concepts. For example, the discussion about the 
application such a term would be the way a child learns to use the word ‘pretty’ when 
characterising a quality in human beings. A simplified version of such a process would be 
that the parents teach the child to use the term in an ostensive way, by pointing to different 
pictures of princesses or girls or by pointing out a real girl or if the child is a girl herself by 
pointing out this quality in her. This application of the term ‘pretty’ by the parents implies 
most of the time a form of admiration or positive evaluation. However, the parents will not 
always give an explanation of what quality this term picks out. If there is a justification of the 
application by the parents then it would comprise a variety of qualities recognised in that 
particular socio-cultural context as valuable, for example: certain type of hair and eyes, 
proportionate body, nice face etc.  What Sibley could say here is that the child learns to use 
the term ‘pretty’ very early by applying it to girls with a certain look (what is recognised as 
valuable appearances by the parents and the others) and in this way the term starts being used 
almost in a descriptive way. In addition, after many applications, the child will know the 
meaning of the term ‘pretty’.  
     But how does the child learn later to apply the term ‘pretty’ to other things? Two quick 
answers come to mind: one is that the child learns by multiple examples – which particular 
persons in different instances (in real life, photographs, paintings, on a stage, etc.) are 
considered pretty, and the other is that the child starts recognising the property of ‘prettiness’ 
not only in other girls but also in pictures (‘pretty portrait’), objects (‘pretty house’) or even 
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some animals (‘pretty dog’). Of course the learning is acquired in both ways. For the 
aesthetician the interesting question is what aspects of a person (real or depicted) make up 
what is ‘prettiness’ and how ‘real’ are these aspects, while the philosopher of language is 
interested in  the meaning of the term and its application. 
     To reiterate, Sibley says that once the person (the older child) recognises that something 
has a quality like ‘prettiness’ and calls it as such, then the term ‘pretty’ can be used to 
characterize ‘a particular aesthetic quality of an object or an art-work’ in a purely descriptive 
way.
72
 Sibley mentions that terms of this type (like ‘pretty’ and ‘elegant’, ‘graceful’, 
‘handsome’, ‘ungainly’, ‘garish’, ‘hideous’)  have an evaluative component and also that they 
are learnt in relation to aesthetic matters. For example, the older child learns to use and apply 
the term ‘pretty’ initially by learning that there is something admirable about a particular 
property that the term describes. The problem with Sibley’s argument is not that such terms 
become used in a descriptive way; the issue here is that Sibley says that such terms name 
particular properties. What is the particular property that the term ‘pretty’ names? It is of 
course, ‘prettiness’, but is there any agreement about what is this property or what are the 
properties that the term names? The  justifications of why someone applies the term ‘pretty’ 
to a person usually is because that person has a number of aesthetic qualities that can be 
subsumed under the term ‘pretty’ and most people would use the term ‘pretty’ in a positive 
way – admiring some qualities in a certain person. Nevertheless there are disagreements 
about which qualities are constitutive of what makes a person pretty because an aesthetic 
property cannot be reduced to non-aesthetic properties; it is commonplace that two viewers 
can look at the same person and express two different opinions: ‘she is pretty’ and ‘she is not 
pretty’. This type of disagreement is one of the most debated issues in aesthetics since Hume 
and Kant. However, here I am interested to explore the idea that the term ‘pretty’ has a 
descriptive content which could be identified. The term ‘pretty’ is a term with mixed 
character (having both a descriptive core and an evaluative component) and that its problems 
of application are linked to its descriptive core not to its evaluative aspect. If one could say 
that, in general, people do approve of prettiness and the term ‘pretty’ is commonly used in a 
positive way then this means that the evaluative level is not disputed (if a perceiver 
characterises a person as pretty without other qualifications and in a normal conversational 
context, the term is a laudative one but never considered a negative one). It might be objected 
that one can give an example from pictorial art and think of a painting of a landscape 
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characterised as ‘being pretty’ – in this case ‘pretty’ could express disapproval from an 
aesthetic point of view. To illustrate this, one could imagine that such a painting will be small 
in size, having delicate pastel colours, having an attractive and unthreatening natural setting.  
One viewer could characterise such a painting as ‘pretty’ because this painting, in his view, is 
what he calls ‘chocolate box art’:  not a very high quality painting which although pleasant, 
lacks originality and rests upon the uncritical emotional responses of the viewer. In this case 
the term ‘pretty’ is still used in an evaluative way, but not a positive one;  the use of the term 
‘pretty’ is derogatory and expresses disapproval of the ‘prettiness’ of the painting. The above 
example is an account of a peculiar use of the term ‘pretty’ and one would need to know the 
context in which the painting is evaluated and maybe to be present while our viewer 
expresses his views in order to get the disapproving stance of the viewer. Let us now focus on 
the identification of the descriptive content of the term ‘pretty’ One alternative is to look at 
the meaning of the term: ‘attractive in a dainty or graceful way; attractive to the eye, ear or 
aesthetic sense’ (when applied to women or children)73 and take this as a starting point for a 
descriptive content of the concept. One can assume that most competent speakers would 
agree with the idea that there is a minimum descriptive level of the term ‘pretty’; this can be 
qualified as something which has to do with attractiveness or looking good in a familiar, 
homely way and maybe, it has to do with delicacy or something small in size. I suggest that 
the minimum descriptive core of the term ‘pretty’ comprises two characteristics: 
attractiveness and delicacy and these are the main qualities that a speaker considers when 
wanting to correctly apply the term ‘pretty’ to a woman or a child. To return to the initial 
discussion about the application of the term ‘pretty’, let say that, one viewer describes a little 
girl as ‘pretty’ and the other as ‘not being pretty’ and the little girl is Shirley Temple (Fig 8).  
Is one of the speakers applying the term ‘pretty’ incorrectly? If this exchange takes part in the 
context of the 1940s in USA with its the standards of perfection and beauty then most people 
will agree that Shirley Temple is pretty (most people will go even further and say she was 
beautiful
74) then the speaker who said that Shirley Temple is ‘not pretty’ has a problem 
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 The Concise Oxford Dictionary, OUP, Oxford, 1985, p. 814. 
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 Toni Morrison in her novel The Bluest Eye (published in 1970) gives wonderful explanations of people’s 
attitudes to Shirley Temple’s media promoted beauty.  
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 in justifying his answer.
75
  
 
 
 
                                                 
                                        Fig. 8 The child star in her signature pose,  
                                    Shirley Temple (1930) 
 
     Is the disagreement of these two speakers due to the confusions about the meaning of the 
term ‘pretty’ or due to the naming of a certain set of properties that the little girl has? If both 
speakers appear to be competent speakers, then here are three alternative answers: one 
possibility is that the speakers understand the term ‘pretty’ in slightly different ways – this 
will be a linguistic disagreement, the other possibility is that the disagreement is at the 
empirical level – the speakers identified or fail to identify properties in the little girl that they 
consider make up prettiness and the third answer is that both speakers have different 
standards of agreeing what combination of properties constitute ‘prettiness’. To illustrate here 
is Speaker A’s aesthetic characterisation: ‘Pretty means attractive and delicate. Shirley 
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 The problem is that the speakers discuss ‘prettiness’. If they would discuss about beauty then Kant and his 
sensus communis should be the beginning of such discussion. Thierry de Duve his paper ‘Do Artists Speak on 
Behalf of All of Us?’ explains that Kant’s concept of sensus communis ‘testifies to a universal shared faculty of 
agreeing’ (The Life and Death of Images eds. Diramuid Costello and Dominic Willsdon, 2008, p. 141). But 
characterising something as ‘pretty’ is a judgement of the agreeable, Kant would say, and this means that 
‘prettiness’ appeals to most people but not to all of them, thus justifications for approval or disapproval of 
prettiness are different from the ones about beauty.  
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Temple has definitely both: beautiful blond hair, blue eyes and delicate features.’ And this is 
what Speaker B says: ‘Pretty means attractive but not necessarily small or delicate. Shirley 
Temple has nice blond hair and big blue eyes and a cute face but her head is too big and her 
legs too short. Also she is too dynamic, loud and mercurial and her presence on screen is 
overwhelming. Nothing delicate, here! She gives me a headache. Pretty should be sweet and 
familiar.’ Both speakers appear to disagree about different aspects of  the descriptive core of 
the term ‘pretty’ and they also disagree about a number of the properties this term names in 
Shirley Temple. In order to settle their disagreement (let us suppose that the speakers are 
willing to try) both speakers can agree first, about the minimum characteristics for a 
descriptive core of the term ‘pretty’ and secondly about identifying a number of aesthetic 
qualities in the little girl that they can agree upon. If one takes it that attractiveness and 
delicacy are the two characteristics which one can consider as constituting the descriptive 
core of the term ‘pretty’, then Speaker A is from a linguistic point of view right, if the little 
girl has these two qualities. Issues arising from the descriptive level of a concept are not 
irresolvable; there is the possibility of inter-subjective agreement for the characterisations of 
a descriptive core. Most of the time competent speakers recognise the minimum 
characteristics which constitute the descriptive core of a concept in a particular context of 
discourse – I would argue that these minimal requirements are usually of a definitional kind 
(like in the case of the term ‘pretty’ the two minimal descriptive requirements are 
‘attractiveness’ and ‘delicacy’). I think the main aesthetic disagreements start at the empirical 
level, when one has to identify certain properties in an aesthetic object. In addition one might 
add that the problems start multiplying when one tries to justify aesthetic judgements not only 
by using aesthetic concepts and the properties they name, but also by appealing to non-
aesthetic properties and people’s strong emotional responses to those. Thus, the important 
requirement for correctly applying the term ‘pretty’ is knowing the meaning of the term and 
understanding the context of discourse when using this term – knowing its minimum 
descriptive core and knowing its positive evaluative dimension.  Secondly, when applying an 
aesthetic term to a person, animal or an object one would try to justify its application by 
looking for properties in the person or in the object; moreover one needs to try to point some 
properties out to other people if he is looking for aesthetic agreement.
76
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 Of course, this is not the casual way we apply the term ‘pretty’. Observation comes first (noticing certain 
characteristics in the person) and then the naming (although in most cases there is no time lag as such between 
observing and naming). One is aware of many debates from philosophy of language about how we learn and 
name things but this will be another discussion. 
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     To sum up, terms like ‘pretty’, ‘elegant’, ‘graceful’, ‘handsome’, ‘ungainly’, ‘garish’, 
‘hideous’ – the problematic terms, are terms with mixed character, with a minimum 
identifiable descriptive core (of a definitional kind) and with an evaluative component. In the 
category of terms with mixed character,  there are a number of aesthetic terms that are used 
as descriptive terms (‘balanced, ‘unified’, ‘evocative’, dynamic’, ‘handsome’, ‘graceful’, etc.), 
depending on the strength of their descriptive core. However, I maintain that with the 
exception of the solely evaluative terms (‘beautiful’, ‘ugly’, ‘striking’, ‘splendid’, excellent’, 
‘mediocre’, ‘miserable’, ‘execrable’) all aesthetic terms have mixed character and they are 
situated on a continuum where their descriptive content fluctuates from strong to weak.  
     In this chapter I looked at a number of important changes in the evolution of the concept 
of the aesthetic and its different uses. First, I would like to propose an initial working concept 
of the aesthetic which uses a wider sense of the concept which goes beyond the beautiful and 
the ugly. In addition, despite that fact that the aesthetic is applied to different ‘objects of 
perception’ and ‘modes of consciousness’ and appears vague, as Shusterman says, the 
concept has at least five important characteristics that are, I think, indisputable: 
 
1) The concept is linked to the perceptual77  
2) Whenever applied, the concept invokes a relation between a perceiver and an object 
(the object can be natural, a work of art or an everyday object)  
3) Understanding the concept and its uses involves understanding the distinction and the 
relationship between the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic and the fact that this 
dependence of aesthetic on non-aesthetic is not, in Sibley’s terms, condition governed.  
4) Aesthetic concepts can be divided between pure evaluative and mixed concepts, 
where mixed concepts have two dimensions (evaluative and descriptive) which can 
fluctuate greatly forming a continuum  
                                            
77
 The claim that the aesthetic is linked to the perceptual is a traditional view rooted in early philosophical ideas 
(e.g. Aristotle, Plato), and in 18
th
 century discussions about aesthetic judgements of beauty as having ‘the 
immediacy of straightforwardly sensory judgements’ (Shelley calls this view ‘the immediacy thesis’ in ‘The 
Concept of the Aesthetic’, 2009). This view culminated with the artistic formalism developed at the end of 19th 
century and beginning of the 20
th
 century. However, the link with the perceptual was indirectly challenged by 
artists creating newer art forms (in particular, conceptual art) and directly by critics and philosophers who 
become dissatisfied with the limitations of the idea that attributing aesthetic properties to works of art 
necessarily depend on properties being  perceived by the five senses. I will argue for a concept of the aesthetic 
construed in a wider sense where the ‘perceptual’ does not refer only to the engagement of five senses but it also 
refers to the phenomenal aspect of the perception (I will come back to this discussion in Ch. III, where I look at 
Lamarque’s conception of the appreciative experience, his view that perception is important in aesthetics and 
also his distinction between aesthetic and artistic properties). 
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5) The term applies to a variety of things and one of the most important classes in this 
variety is that of aesthetic concepts. 
 
Secondly, in any aesthetic attribution or judgment it is imperative to understand the linguistic 
expressions we use when we make such attributions or judgments. Thus the meanings of 
aesthetic concepts shed light on the way we interpret our responses and appreciation of 
aesthetic objects; we use a complex aesthetic vocabulary in our aesthetic judgements, our 
characterisations of aesthetic experiences and the naming of aesthetic properties. I am aware 
of Zangwill’s warning that Sibley cast aesthetic issues at the linguistic level not at, what 
Zangwill calls, the ‘level of thought’ – the level of aesthetic judgements and responses.78 
Nevertheless it seems to me that the ‘level of thought’ cannot be invoked without the support 
of a solid conceptual framework – which means that an analysis and evaluation of aesthetic 
concepts is mandatory for an investigation of aesthetic experiences. 
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 Zangwill does mention Sibley’s footnote from ‘Aesthetic Concepts’ about Sibley’s concern with aesthetic 
uses of aesthetic terms, but he thinks that Sibley and followers focused too much on the linguistic level.  
‘Aesthetic Judgement’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), 
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CHAPTER II 
Aesthetic Properties 
 
 
Alan Goldman suggests that there are three important concepts in aesthetics which are inter-
definable: the aesthetic attitude, the aesthetic properties and the aesthetic experience, and 
often contemporary aestheticians define one of these concepts in relation to the others, thus 
ending up with a circle.
79
 He proposes that one should take one of these three terms as ‘basic’ 
in order to avoid the circularity trap. Without doubt some of the most interesting 
developments of 20
th
 century aesthetics were due to different proposals to take one of the 
three mentioned aesthetic concepts as central.
80
 I think fundamental to Lamarque’s 
essentialism is his conception of aesthetic properties and how a number of these properties 
contribute to both the identity of a work of art as art and the appreciative experience of that 
work.  
     One way of tackling the question about aesthetic properties (some would argue, a very 
conventional way) is to try to see what all aesthetic properties have in common. The quest for 
common features of aesthetic properties can be divided into: first, an account of the aesthetic 
attitude and the identification of the aesthetic properties that are the focus of such an attitude, 
second an attempt to directly identify what all these properties have in common and third, the 
direct characterization of aesthetic experience.
81
 However an analysis of the theories which 
tried to explain the aesthetic attitudes in terms of intrinsic qualities and of the theories which 
took aesthetic properties as having a common factor suffered lots of setbacks in the last 
decades.
82
 Moreover the third alternative – trying to characterize the aesthetic experience 
directly – appears to collapse into discussions about the aesthetic attitude or about the 
aesthetic properties which are the objects of aesthetic experience. However, I believe that 
there is still room for a robust analysis of the nature of aesthetic experience as long as one has 
a clear methodological and conceptual framework.
83
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 For example, one should distinguish between different levels of discussion: generic, epistemic, semantic and 
ontic and also one should be clear about the senses used for the main culprits in this debate – aesthetic objects, 
properties, attitudes, experiences, judgements and values. 
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    Returning to the question about common features that works of art, or aesthetic properties, 
or aesthetic experiences could have, one cannot escape the Wittgensteinian warning from the 
middle of the 20
th
 century about the misplaced hope in an essentialist approach to define 
certain terms. In addition to this warning, Sibley’s influential work after the 1940s showed 
that there is an ‘almost endless variety’84 of aesthetic concepts and of the properties they 
name, which would suggest that finding common features that aesthetic properties have is an 
almost futile task. Despite this, Goldman points out that Sibley does not initially try to give a 
definition of aesthetic concepts but provides:  
 
a list that he takes ostensibly to indicate the extension of the concept. His list 
includes: being balanced, serene, powerful, delicate, sentimental, graceful and garish. 
He assumes that, having grasped this list, we could easily extend it, showing a grasp 
of the general concept of an aesthetic property.
85
  
 
Most aestheticians would agree that Sibley did not offer a definition of aesthetic properties 
with necessary and sufficient conditions, but what he offered was: ‘a description or a 
clarification of the ways these terms are used or of the nature of these properties’.86  
     In order to be able to discuss aesthetic properties and their role in the aesthetic character of 
a work of art one needs a guide through the complex myriad of different types of properties. I 
suggest two initial working tools: one a very brief characterisation of aesthetic properties 
(inspired by Sibley, Levinson and Lamarque) and the other a preliminary list of different 
types of aesthetic properties. First, aesthetic properties are properties or qualities attributed to 
works (cultural objects, including works of art)
87
 or natural objects. Because in this thesis I 
am interested in works of visual arts, I ignore natural objects and the questions of aesthetics 
of nature. When applied to works of art, aesthetic properties refer to appearances of objects or 
ways of appearing or perceptual or experiential ways of presentation and their role is to 
contribute to a certain rewarding artistic/aesthetic experience of competent perceivers and to 
the aesthetic value of the works they belong to. On the one hand, one reading of the above 
characterisation of aesthetic properties is that the value of a work of art as art is the value of 
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the experience and this experience is the perception of the relevant aesthetic properties (this is 
a form of empiricism about the aesthetic value). On the other hand a different reading is that 
the value of a work of art is intrinsic – aesthetic properties are part of the content of the work 
of art and they are the ones we appreciate in a work of art (this is a kind of aestheticism).  
     The second working tool which I use as a preliminary guide is Goldman’s list of different 
types of aesthetic properties:   
 
(1) pure value properties: being beautiful, sublime, ugly 
(2) emotion properties: being sad, joyful, sombre 
(3) formal qualities: being balanced, tightly knit, loosely woven, graceful  
(4) behavioural properties: being bouncy, daring, sluggish 
(5) evocative qualities: being powerful, boring, amusing 
(6) representational qualities: being true-to-life, distorted, realistic 
(7) second-order perceptual properties: being vivid, dull 
(8) historical relate properties: being original, bold, conservative, derivative88 
 
 
     In what follows in this chapter I focus mainly on Sibley’s account of aesthetic properties 
(conception which is one of Lamarque’s main influences), in particular the two-fold 
relational character of aesthetic properties: aesthetic properties are dependent upon non-
aesthetic perceptual properties
89
 and they are response dependent (there is a relation they 
have to qualified observers). This relational account of aesthetic properties suggests both an 
ontological dimension and epistemological one. The two main sections of this chapter are: the 
dependence of aesthetic properties upon non-aesthetic perceptual properties (Section 1) and  
the relation of the aesthetic properties to informed perceivers (Section 2).   
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Section 1: The dependence of aesthetic properties upon non-aesthetic perceptual 
properties 
   
    Sibley in the first part of ‘Aesthetic Concepts’ argues that, there is a relation of dependence 
between aesthetic properties and non-aesthetic features, but: 
 
…Whatever kind of dependence this is, and there are various relationships between 
aesthetic qualities and non-aesthetic features, what I want to make clear […] is that 
there are no non-aesthetic features which serve in any circumstances as logically  
sufficient conditions for applying aesthetic terms.
90
  
 
This emphasises the fact that when applying aesthetic terms to different objects or works of 
art there are no conditions or rules that normally govern most concepts. But Sibley shows that 
one can make at least one concession when talking about conditions or rules which could 
govern aesthetic concepts application – the negatively governing types:   
 
If I am told that a painting in the next room consists solely of one or two bars of very 
pale blue and very pale green set at right angles on a pale fawn ground, I can be sure  
that it cannot be fiery or garish or gaudy or flamboyant.
91
 
 
Indeed, knowing the meaning of concepts like ‘fiery’ or ‘garish’ or ‘gaudy’ or ‘flamboyant’ 
one should know that the correct application of these aesthetic concepts to a painting cannot 
involve the description offered by Sibley.  However, even if most aestheticians would agree 
with Sibley here, there is still the problem of how to characterise the relation between non-
aesthetic properties and aesthetic properties and how to explain the application of aesthetic 
terms to different works of art. The contemporary orthodoxy is that most aesthetic properties 
or features of a work of art are dependent upon non-aesthetic perceptual features of that work 
but the nature of this dependency is still one of the most puzzling issues in aesthetics.
92
  
     A dependency relation between two sets of properties could be characterised in different 
ways: causal, emergent, supervenient or dispositional. There is a clear consensus that the 
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relation between non-aesthetic properties and aesthetic properties in Sibley’s argument is not 
causal, there is no logical or inductive relation between an object’s non-aesthetic properties 
and this object possessing certain aesthetic properties. Indeed, one cannot make inferences 
from judgements about non-aesthetic properties to judgments about the aesthetic properties, 
but as Sibley says, one could show that a description of a work with certain non-aesthetic 
properties can involve inferring that the work is not having certain aesthetic properties. It can 
be said that Sibley saw the relation between aesthetic properties and non-aesthetic properties 
as one of supervenience or emergence. Supervenience can be characterized as the relation 
between two sets of properties where one set depends on the other in such a way that a 
change in one set would produce a change in the other set. In aesthetic matters this translates 
as aesthetic properties supervening or depending upon lower level perceptual properties and 
any change in aesthetic properties must be due to a change in the base, non-aesthetic 
properties. For example, a few lines or blobs on a painting might make no difference to the 
aesthetic properties of the painting (its balance or chromatics), but any change in its aesthetic 
properties must be due to a change in its non-aesthetic properties. 
     There are a lot of controversial issues over the characterization of supervenience which I 
am not going to go into details in this thesis, but with regard to Sibley’s account, the 
traditional interpretation was that the dependence of aesthetic properties on non-aesthetic 
properties was one of supervenience. But more recently this interpretation has been re-
assessed. For example, MacKinnon argues that Sibley ‘is not so much inclined towards or 
away from supervenience as he is indifferent to it’93 and Lamarque points out that the relation 
between the two sets of properties is ‘far from clear’ and he suggests that the question of 
supervenience is a ‘red herring’ in aesthetics.94   
     It needs to be added that although Sibley did not clearly qualify the nature of this 
dependence, he used the concept of emergence to describe the dependence between aesthetic 
properties and non-aesthetic properties (‘aesthetic qualities are emergent’95). This is how I 
understand emergence: properties are emergent if they are novel and distinct properties 
arising from the lower level properties of an object at a certain time and these properties will 
exist insofar as the particular lower level properties exist in that particular way. Thus to me it 
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is not clear if Sibley would have liked to call the dependence of aesthetic properties on non-
aesthetic features one of supervenience.
96
 The two main reasons why this is so, are: first, 
because supervenience does not tell us anything about the nature of the aesthetic properties 
and secondly, because Sibley does not say that changes in the work’s aesthetic character 
‘result only from changes in its non-aesthetic qualities.’97 This reading of supervenience has 
an interesting ramification pointed out by MacKinnon, who says that it is not clear if Sibley 
believes ‘that aesthetic character can change if non-aesthetic features remain the same while 
contextual factors shift.’98 A conventional reading of Sibley’s account suggests that Sibley 
argued for the aesthetic character of a work as being the result of the perception of its non-
aesthetic features (a combination of them). In principle this conventional reading should 
support the supervenience thesis: ’No aesthetic difference without a nonaesthetic 
difference’.99 Maybe Sibley would agree with the supervenience thesis if one would only 
look at the dependence between, what Sibley calls, the descriptive aesthetic properties and 
the non-aesthetic features of works. Thus any change in the non-aesthetic features of a work 
would impact directly on the descriptive aesthetic properties resultant form those lower level 
non-aesthetic features. In contrast, one could say that Sibley could reject the supervenience 
thesis because of the existence of pure evaluative aesthetic properties. This can be justified by 
remembering what Sibley says about solely evaluative terms. He insists that when applying 
evaluative terms to works of art, there is no indication of what particular properties are 
attributed to the works. In this case, because one is not able to identify ‘exactly’ the 
perceptual non-aesthetic features responsible for attributing evaluative aesthetic properties to 
a work, it is not clear if and what kind of change in the perceptual non-aesthetic features will 
amount to an aesthetic change. Simply, one cannot say.  
However, many aesthetic concepts reflect the competent users’ approval or disapproval of a 
work or some aspects of that work. For example, concepts like ‘repulsive’ or ‘ephemeral’ or 
‘grotesque’ suggest an element of disapproval, while concepts like ‘pretty’ or ‘elegant’ or 
‘original’ suggest approval. In Chapter I, it was argued that there is also the possibility of the 
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characterisation of and the agreement about the descriptive core of an aesthetic concept; the 
agreement could happen through the identification of some of the non-aesthetic perceptual 
features of the work which are responsible for the attribution of that aesthetic concept, by the 
parties involved in the aesthetic appraisal of a work. Thus, the speakers’ agreement in using 
one aesthetic concept or other could to some extent be justified by the speakers’ identification 
of some non-aesthetic properties in a work. This assumes that the speakers know the meaning 
of the aesthetic concept and are able to distinguish features of the descriptive core of the 
aesthetic concept.
100
  
     This being said, one can only go along with the idea of emergence rather than 
supervenience because of the difficulty mentioned earlier – it is difficult to point out that 
aesthetic change is always the result of changes in the non-aesthetic features of a work. 
Moreover, one can suggest a well known reason why one can dispute the characterisation of 
the dependence as supervenient: envisaging cases in which changes in the aesthetic character 
of a work can take place, even if the non-aesthetic perceptual properties of that work remain 
the same. These cases have been presented by Arthur Danto (his indiscernibles) and Kendall 
Walton (his examples of the impact of art categories in aesthetic evaluation). Of course, 
Danto’s cases are disputed but what they try to suggest together with Walton’s examples, is 
that the non-aesthetic perceptual features of a work are not the only reason why one 
characterises aesthetically a work of art. Thus, all of these discussions surrounding the debate 
about emergence make one aware that the clarification of the nature of the relation between 
aesthetic properties and non-aesthetic properties will prove essential to the understanding of 
aesthetic experience and aesthetic value. 
     To return to Sibley’s view, this is what he says about the dependence of aesthetic 
properties upon non-aesthetic properties: first, he points out that aesthetic properties could 
not exist without the non-aesthetic properties; secondly that non-aesthetic properties 
determine aesthetic properties and changes in non-aesthetic properties would affect the 
aesthetic properties, in other words aesthetic properties are emergent from non-aesthetic 
properties (he thinks that this a general truth); thirdly that the aesthetic character of something 
can result from the totality of its relevant non-aesthetic properties (he calls this ‘total specific 
dependence’) and fourthly that certain salient features of a work would notably contribute to 
the aesthetic character of the work (he calls this ‘notable specific dependence’).101 There are a 
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number of points arising from Sibley’s account of the relation between aesthetic and non-
aesthetic properties: aesthetic properties are perceptual properties because one sees, hears or 
notices them. These are emergent properties and this implies a kind of aesthetic realism.  
Another point is that, in order to see, hear or notice the relevant aesthetic features of a work, 
one needs aesthetic sensitivity or needs to exercise taste. Lastly that there are particular 
features which are ‘notably’ responsible for the aesthetic character of individual works, with 
the caveat that these are not condition ruled. I deal with these points in reverse order.  
     The last point is about the aesthetic character of individual works. Sibley argues that 
describing the aesthetic character of a work could involve both: reference to the totality of the 
relevant non-aesthetic features of the work and reference to one particular feature of that 
work, and this is not contradictory. Here is what he says in support of the former: 
 
Everything that could possibly be relevant seems on examination so exactly 
              calculated that it plays a vital part in the work.
102
  
 
What he means here is that a critic describes the aesthetic character of a work by ‘isolating 
and pointing out what is (notably, mainly, in part) responsible’ for the achievement of 
aesthetic effects.
103
  In other words, by looking at the interactions between non-aesthetic 
elements and/or interactions of different aesthetic properties of the work one sees how all of 
these are combined or ordered. Sibley also underlines that sometime, for certain works, small 
changes even in the ‘unimportant details’ can affect the overall aesthetic character of those 
works.
104
 However, Sibley is aware that most critics emphasise the importance of one 
particular feature which is responsible for the character of an individual work. He says: 
We do indeed, in talking about a work of art, concern ourselves with its individual 
and specific features. We say that it is delicate not simply because it is in pale 
colours but because of those pale colours, that it is graceful not because its outline 
curves slightly but because of that particular curve.’105  
 
For Sibley, certain salient features being responsible for the aesthetic character of an 
individual work, is considered a particular truth. If I understand Sibley right, each aesthetic 
                                            
102
 Frank Sibley, ‘Aesthetic and Non-aesthetic’, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 74,  No. 2 (Apr., 1965), p.140. 
103
 Ibid., p.140. 
104
 Ibid., p.139. 
105
 Frank Sibley, ‘Aesthetic Concepts’ in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art eds. Peter Lamarque and Stein 
Haugom Olsen, Blackwell, Oxford,  2004, p. 133. 
52 
 
object has a distinct aesthetic character because of a specific combination of non-aesthetic 
properties or because of an important salient non-aesthetic feature.
106
 This Sibleyan 
characterisation of individual works of art influenced a host of aesthetic arguments: aesthetic 
particularism, aesthetic realism and to an extent Lamarque’s aesthetic view.  
     The second point arising from Sibley’s account is that aesthetic properties require taste or 
sensitivity in order to be perceived. Taste or sensitivity means for Sibley an ability to notice 
or to see or tell that things have certain qualities. Sibley was inspired by a Humean and 
Kantian tradition that taste is a kind of special faculty similar to moral intuition but he 
disagreed with Hume and Kant that aesthetic properties are subjective. I am not going to 
insist on the problem of taste because there are many criticisms of Hume’s original argument 
of taste and of Sibley’s proposal107 but the issue of perception of aesthetic properties is 
something that I am going to mention. I would like to briefly discuss Sibley’s positive 
argument that the detection of aesthetic properties requires training of perception through 
experience and exposure to works of art. This is not a controversial claim; most artists and 
literary critics, as well as art lovers, in general, would agree that the more encounters with art 
one has, the more chances of increased aesthetic enjoyment and artistic discernment one has, 
which suggests a continuous development of capacity or sensitivity to aesthetic objects. Also 
Sibley adds the importance of the role of the critic in sharpening of our aesthetic sensitivities, 
through the critic’s activities: explanations and perceptual proofs.108  
     There are a number of important criticisms of the view that the perception of aesthetic 
properties requires special sensitivity and some of the most ardent critics of Sibley’s view are 
George Dickie, Ted Cohen and Peter Kivy.
109
 However, here I think the elephant in the room 
is the qualifier ‘special’ because it is taken that Sibley understood aesthetic sensitivity as a 
different capacity or ability from other ordinary abilities. At the beginning of his ‘Aesthetic 
Concepts’(1959) Sibley says about aesthetic sensitivity or taste with regard to aesthetic 
concepts: first, he says that taste is a rarer capacity than other capacities, and secondly that 
almost everybody can exercise this capacity to a certain extent and in certain matters. Here is 
the passage in question: 
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Thus taste or sensitivity is somewhat more rare than certain other human capacities; 
people who exhibit a sensitivity both wide-ranging and refined are a minority. [...] 
But almost everybody is able to exercise taste to some degrees and in some 
matters.
110
 
 
Sibley suggests that people could lack sensitivity ‘at least in some measure’, and although 
people with a ‘wide-ranging and refined’ sensitivity are a minority, aesthetic sensitivity is a 
feature or tendency of human intelligence that can be encouraged and developed.
111
 Sibley 
talks about taste as the ability to correctly apply aesthetic concepts and he argues that when 
one tries to justify his aesthetic remarks or judgments he does often refer to ‘features which 
do not depend for their recognition upon an exercise of taste’.112 One can be bewildered by 
this: on the one hand, Sibley appears to talk about aesthetic sensitivity as a linguistic ability 
(knowing how to correctly apply aesthetic concepts) and on the other hand, he says that the 
justification of aesthetic judgments makes reference to the detection of non-aesthetic 
properties, which means that aesthetic sensitivity is a perceptual capacity. It seems that 
aesthetic sensitivity is both about a ‘correct’ aesthetic attribution and the justification of such 
attribution. There is not a lot of disagreement about a normal perceiver discerning non-
aesthetic properties but there are disagreements between informed perceivers trying to give 
reasons for the aesthetic character of a work of art. If we say that one needs to exercise taste 
in order to discern aesthetic properties and to make aesthetic evaluative judgements then we 
need to explain in detail this ability. Is this ability a matter of degree which starts with the 
detection of non-aesthetic perceptual properties and ends up with the attribution of complex 
aesthetic properties or is it a new type of ability which is distinct and above the simple 
detection of non-aesthetic properties? Sibley is mainly telling us about the ability to use 
aesthetic language and about different types of aesthetic concepts but not about what 
aesthetic sensibility or taste is.  
    There are different suggestions about the ability to discern or perceive aesthetic properties: 
some argue that it is a kind of rational intuition (e.g. W. Wollaston and S. Clarke), others that 
it is something to do with sensing or sentiment (e.g. Earl of Shaftesbury, F. Hutchinson and D. 
                                            
110
 Frank Sibley, Aesthetic Concepts’ in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art eds. Peter Lamarque and Stein 
Haugom Olsen, Blackwell, Oxford,  2004, p. 128. 
111
 F. Sibley, Aesthetic Concepts’, in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art eds. Peter Lamarque and Stein 
Haugom Olsen, Blackwell, Oxford, 2004,  p. 128. 
112
 Ibid, p. 129. 
54 
 
Hume) and others that it is an intuition (G.E. Moore, D. Ross).
113 Thus, I think instead of 
talking about a special faculty it would be better to talk about aesthetic sensitivity as an 
ability to distinguish salient aesthetic features in objects worthy of attention as aesthetic 
objects, and give up the traditional concept of taste which is heavy loaded. Moreover, it can 
be said that there is at least one undeniable characteristic of aesthetic sensibility – the fact that 
this sensibility can be refined and developed continuously as a result of particular encounters 
with aesthetic objects and aesthetic training.   
     Lastly because Sibley says that aesthetic properties are emergent from the perceptual non-
aesthetic properties, one can argue that Sibley is a realist with regard to properties. He 
characterises most aesthetic properties as descriptive and perceptual. For example, he says 
about the balance of a picture that regardless of the fact that a perceiver sees or does not see 
the lack of balance of a painting, there is a fact of the matter that the placing of a certain 
figure in the picture makes it unbalanced.
114
 Thus what makes the painting unbalanced is 
directly related to a non-aesthetic property; the central figure in the painting. Sibley says that 
this central figure is something ‘discernible without any exercise of taste or sensibility’.115 
Talking about aesthetic properties in this way, indeed, manifests a realist stance with regard 
to aesthetic properties. According to aesthetic realism aesthetic properties are in the works of 
art.
116
 That means that aesthetic properties are instantiated in works of art independently of 
human judgments which ascribe the properties to the works and independently of the values 
and perceptions which constitute the basis of these judgments.
117
 But what does ‘mind-
independent’ mean here? John W. Bender, for example suggests the following realistic 
account of aesthetic properties (as mind-independent):  
 
Aesthetic properties are not mind-independent properties of the physical world in the 
sense that they are true of objects no matter what anyone thinks or how anyone 
reacts, but they may be true of those objects independently of how any particular 
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person might respond to them. So in this sense they are not just subjective 
reactions.
118
  
 
Then one can opt for a kind of ‘realist’ position which argues that: 
 
There can be objective facts of the matter regarding humans’ responses to certain 
objects, and consequently there can be real, if relational, properties ascribable to 
those objects.
119
 
 
Even if one takes Bender’s perspective about aesthetic realism,  there are at least two 
important challenges facing a strong realist: one is the acceptance that there are pure 
evaluative aesthetic properties (e.g. beauty, ugliness, loveliness ...) and the other is the 
existence of aesthetic disagreements even between critics with the similar qualifications and 
sensibilities.  Regarding the former issue, it appears difficult to reconcile a realist position 
with the idea of pure evaluative aesthetic properties because if Sibley is right that intrinsically 
or solely evaluative terms like ‘beauty’, ‘ugly’ or ‘lovely’ are contextually implied and they 
cannot name a particular property of an object but they name a range of properties, then how 
can one say that the property of beauty is in a particular work? Maybe ‘beauty’ is not a 
property as such. Here one is reminded of one of the initial difficulties mentioned at the 
beginning of Chapter I, that Sibley chose in the end to use the term ‘qualities’ instead of that 
of ‘properties’. Thus when one discusses evaluative concepts then maybe what these concepts 
name should be refer to as qualities rather than properties. But if one is still adamant about 
using the term ‘properties’, then it can be said that Sibley’s view about a pure evaluative 
property like beauty seems to be something like this: there is a certain combination of non-
aesthetic properties detected in a particular work and for each work of art this combination 
varies and by responding appropriately to a particular combination of non-aesthetic properties 
and to other aesthetic properties emergent from this combination, a qualified observer can be 
prompted to attribute beauty to the work. Sibley argues that only certain looks and feels can 
be grounds for aesthetic admiration, and one could say that the informed perceiver would 
appropriately respond to certain looks (appearances) of the work. If one takes this line of 
reasoning, without the usual aesthetic complications (the appropriateness of the response, the 
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level of competency of the observer, or the detection of certain non-aesthetic properties and 
the ignorance of others) then beauty can be said to be in the work (albeit not in the 
straightforward way that secondary properties are).  
     But again, one has the problem of the nature of the relation between higher-order 
properties, like the aesthetic ones, and the lower level non-aesthetic properties: if there is a 
change of one or more of the lower level non-aesthetic properties would this always mean 
that the emergent property of beauty cease to be in the work? One tentative answer to this 
question can be linked with the idea that there are certain salient features of a work that 
would determine the aesthetic character of that work. For example, appropriately attributing 
beauty to a painting would depend on different saliencies detected in that particular painting 
by a competent viewer (the saliencies would be both non-aesthetic ones as well as aesthetic 
ones). Thus changing one or more of the non-aesthetic perceptual properties could affect the 
overall attribution of beauty to a work if those non-aesthetic properties are important ones. 
An informed perceiver/competent viewer would recognise the change and respond 
accordingly. This way of characterising the attribution of an aesthetic property like beauty, 
attempts to bridge the gap between subjectivism and objectivism in aesthetics – there must be 
a direct link to a subjective response when one talks about beauty, as well as, beauty being 
considered the result of the detection of certain properties of the work (both non-aesthetic and 
aesthetic). In addition to this, Sibley in his article from 1959 ‘Aesthetics and the Looks of 
Things’ says something very Kantian in relation to how we talk about beauty: 
 
If one wanted to give sense to sayings like "beauty is in the object" and "beauty lies 
in mere appearances, in the eye of the observer," the case of art tends to favour the 
former, that of nature the latter.
120
 
 
On a first impression this looks Kantian because Kant says that a perceiver ‘will speak of 
beauty as if beauty were a property of the object’.121 But Kant is a subjectivist and beauty is 
not a property in the object. Interestingly Sibley points out that we tend to speak of beauty in 
different ways with regard to art and respectively to nature, while Kant does not distinguish 
‘two’ ways of talking about beauty, albeit he was mostly discussing aesthetic  judgements of 
nature. In addition Sibley, in comparison with Kant, is not a subjectivist or an anti-realist. If 
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most aesthetic properties are descriptive and emergent from perceptual non-aesthetic 
properties as argued by Sibley, then they are perceptible and it can be argued that this 
justifies a realist position that aesthetic properties are in the works. One other way of 
interpreting Sibley’s characterisation of how we talk about beauty is to think about the role of 
the artist or creator of the work of art. The work is an intentional object which has certain 
features which are largely determined by the artist’s skilfulness of portraying his creative 
ideas and by being recognised and evaluated as such.  
     For example, a number of the non-aesthetic properties of a visual work (like its colours) 
are the ‘ingredients’ used by the artist to create a particular painterly configuration and they 
are part of the intrinsic nature of the work. This appears to justify the viewer’s belief that an 
aesthetic property like beauty (for example, the work’s chromatic splendour) is in the work. 
However, a viewer might say that when he attributes beauty to a painting he does refer to 
things in the painting even though it is difficult to point out exactly what these things are. He 
would insist that beauty is more of a diffused aesthetic property than other aesthetic 
properties but it is a real and perceivable property. Sibley would say that identifying some of 
the work’s most important aesthetic properties would be the result of detecting combinations 
of non-aesthetic properties or detecting salient features of the work. It can be said that, to a 
certain extent, the competent viewer’s response to non-aesthetic properties and to other 
salient features of the work would have been envisaged by the artist and thus pursued in the 
creative process. A very good artist could attempt to elicit a viewer’s response of a certain 
type if his rendering of the work is successful. However, some would argue that the 
conundrum of pure aesthetic properties like beauty or ugliness still remains for the realist, if 
by ‘pure’ aesthetic properties one means like Sibley, properties which are only evaluative. To 
reiterate for Sibley evaluative aesthetic properties only suggest the viewer’s response of  
approval or disapproval of the work in discussion.
122
      
    Until now I have mainly discussed one aspect of the relational character of aesthetic 
properties, the relation that aesthetic properties have with non-aesthetic properties, the ones 
that are emergent from. However, one can think of another type of relation that some 
aesthetic properties have – the relation with other aesthetic properties. In what follows I also 
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look at this other type of relation and discuss an application to a work from visual art in order 
to illuminate a number of aspects about aesthetic properties. 
     One can use as a starting point the idea that aesthetic properties have different relations 
with other properties. On the one hand, aesthetic properties can have a vertical relation with 
non-aesthetic properties – they emergent from the non-aesthetic properties, and on the other 
hand, they can have a horizontal relation with other aesthetic properties. Here is an example: 
if a painting is characterised as balanced this can be explained by pointing out a number of 
non-aesthetic features in the painting, like: the symmetry of its composition, the 
synchronization of colours and lines and maybe the reflection of the golden rule in the 
arrangement of its main elements. The relation that the property of balance has with some of 
the non-aesthetic properties from which it emerges can be characterized as a vertical relation. 
It needs to be emphasised that Sibley was right when he argued that the application of any 
aesthetic property is not condition-governed – there are no necessary and sufficient 
conditions for applying the term ‘balance’ to a painting. The non-aesthetic features I have 
mentioned, like the symmetry of the composition and the synchronization of colours, are very 
generic non-aesthetic features. What I mean here, is that for each painting to which one 
correctly attributes the property of balance there will be a particular composition which 
exhibits certain kind of symmetry or equilibrium.  
     In addition, one can see that there are other aesthetic properties which are even more 
difficult to identify and to describe than ‘balance’; for example, the characterisation of a 
woman in a painting as being graceful. The important question about this attribution is ‘What 
properties of the painting as a whole or of the woman depicted contribute to the attribution of 
grace to the woman?’ Goldman classifies being graceful as a formal property and many 
others also consider grace a descriptive aesthetic property which means that the formal 
appearances of a painting or of an aspect of a painting can give rise to this aesthetic formal 
property . This line of thinking suggests that being graceful is an emergent property from 
other formal non-aesthetic properties of a work or of one of its aspects.  However one is 
aware that this explanation is not entirely satisfactory. One reason is that there might be other 
properties beside the non-aesthetic properties that can contribute to the application of the 
term ‘graceful’ to a work or to an aspect of a work. Moreover because the application of a 
term like graceful can be disputed by informed perceivers, this suggests that there is more to 
this aesthetic term than its ‘formal’ or descriptive aspects. In order to explain how the 
property of gracefulness is applied to a person depicted in a painting, I use as an example the 
woman in Degas’ painting After the Bath, Woman Drying Herself, 1890-95 (Fig. 9). 
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              Fig. 9 After the Bath, Woman Drying Herself  (1890-95) by Degas  
 
    The subject of Degas’ pastel is a straightforward domestic portrait of a woman drying 
herself after her bath. The space of the painting is delineated by two aspects: the diagonal line 
of the floor meeting the vertical line of the back wall (towards the right hand side corner), and 
the conjunction of the three main elements of the painting: the woman, the wicker chair she 
sits on and the tin bath. The justification of attributing gracefulness to the woman in this 
painting is the result of a combination of things and I suggest that the most obvious one is the 
attribution of certain aesthetic properties which are emergent from the non-aesthetic 
properties of the woman depicted. 
    First, the most relevant non-aesthetic properties of the painting and in particular of the 
central figure in the painting can be grouped into:  
60 
 
- compositional properties: the diagonal central positioning of the woman’s body, the 
leaning forward of her upper torso with her right arm on the back of the chair and drawn at an 
obtuse angle 
- movement properties: the movement of her left arm, the curve of her back with a slight 
muscle tension,  the woman’s bent head, the interplay between repose (her right arm) and 
movement (her left arm drying her hair)  
- chromatic  properties: warm colours reflecting a domestic interior, the red of the woman’s 
hair, soft dark lines to emphasise the contour of her body and the supple combination of 
colours of her spine, small touches of greens and blues reflected in the white of the towel, the 
contrast between the touch of dark green under the line of her  breast and the soft colour of 
her flesh 
- textural properties:  rich pastels for the room’s surroundings (carpet, armchair and 
curtains), smooth pastels for the woman’s flesh which makes her body almost transparent, 
mixture of cross-hatching to suggest the curvature of her back, soft textures for the towel and 
the white sheet. 
     Secondly, analysing the painting an informed perceiver could easily find ‘perceptual 
proof’, to use Sibley’s term, for at least three emergent aesthetic properties: a balanced 
composition, sumptuous textures and a luminous domestic interior (these are what I would 
like to call ‘basic’ aesthetic properties).  But there are other aesthetic aspects in this painting 
which could be noted by an informed perceiver:  the woman’s radiant body, an atmospheric 
interior imbued with feminine intimacy, the woman’s elegant and effortless posture despite 
the woman’s realistic movement of drying herself and the capturing of absolute absorption 
and solitude in such mundane activity as drying after bathing. It can be argued that the above 
aesthetic features require a more sustained aesthetic attention than the noticing of the 
previous three aesthetic properties which I called ‘basic’. Thus the answer to the question: 
‘Which ones of those properties are responsible for the attribution of gracefulness to the 
woman in the painting?’ appears to be more complicated than initially suggested. One 
possible answer to this question is linked to the way Degas depicted the woman’s posture and 
movement: the woman’s torso leaning slightly forward in an assumed stability, the dynamic 
created by her right arm which although gripping the chair for balance is depicted in a 
feather-like position on the back of the chair, the movement of drying the back of her neck 
with a delicate touch, and her whole body in an elegant and effortless posture. As Sibley 
would say, being graceful in this case is dependent upon that particular angle of her body, of 
that particular curve of her back, of that suggestive delicate movement of her left arm using 
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the towel to dry, of that particular drawing of her right arm resting more than gripping the 
chair. In contrast, one can argue that if Degas did not use those particular smooth pastels 
colours and those rich textures for the painting’s interior (the carpet, the walls, the chair or 
the towels) – all of which suggest warmth and balance – then the depicted woman might have 
not been graceful. If the chromatic of the painting would have been darker and more violent, 
maybe the woman’s movements and body would have lost their elegance. One could imagine 
how such a change in colours or in the textures of the interior depicted could make the 
woman’s movements almost grotesque. In addition there are other aspects that one needs to 
consider when talking about the aesthetic character of the painting and the attribution of 
gracefulness to the depicted woman. One such example is Degas’ skilful portrayal of such an 
intimate act which makes the viewers part-taking in a voyeuristic activity. However I would 
argue that the woman is graceful not because her movements are unconstrained but because 
the artist’s gaze and hand imbued her movements with self-assurance and elegance and the 
resulting image can be characterised by a highly stylized voyeurism.  Another aspect of 
Degas’ depiction can be linked to the influences which Japanese prints had, at the end of the 
19
th
 century on French art. For example, the dark lines surrounding the woman’s body, which 
were suggestive of the lines from the woodblocks the Japanese prints were made from,
123
 
make the woman’s body stand out from the background and make it almost weightless, thus 
making her posture and movements effortless. An in depth analysis could reveal which 
particular combination of non-aesthetic and aesthetic properties justify the attribution of 
gracefulness to the woman in the painting (e.g. the role of the chromatic and textures of the 
interior depicted, or the emotive suggestions conjured by such a subject, or the art historical 
influences on the subject of the painting). It can be suggested that being graceful is a complex 
aesthetic property and this type of property could be explained through a double relation with 
other properties: one with some of the non-aesthetic properties of the work and the other with 
other aesthetic properties of the work. The relation of an aesthetic property with other 
aesthetic properties seems more difficult to ascertain; also it is not clear how being graceful is 
emergent from other aesthetic properties. But if one could see or be persuaded that the 
depicted woman has an elegant posture and she also has delicate movements maybe this can 
lead to other aesthetic attributions like the one of gracefulness. Thus one could argue that 
because one notices some non-aesthetic features (chromatic, textural or compositional) as 
well as the elegance of woman’s posture and her delicate movements this leads to the 
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attribution of the aesthetic property of grace. It needs to be said that in a actual encounter 
with a painting this process of attribution can happen instantaneously or it could happen later 
after some contemplative deliberation – this would depend on the viewer’s acquaintance with 
art, the category under which the work is perceived, the condition of perception, the context 
of the work’s provenance, history etc.  Furthermore Sibley’s account of aesthetic attributions 
points out that a critic could single out ‘what may serve as a kind of key to grasping or seeing 
something’124; in this case the critic might say that the ‘key’ to grasping the gracefulness of 
the woman, is the perception of her elegant and effortless posture and movement.
125
  
     The above analysis of the painting showed that aesthetic properties have different relations 
with other properties and might not be emergent only from the non-aesthetic ones but also 
from other aesthetic properties. Thus it can be very useful on occasions to try to disentangle 
some of those relations (with non-aesthetic and with other aesthetic properties) for 
explanatory and critical reasons.    
 
 Section 2: The relation of the aesthetic properties to informed perceivers/competent 
viewers
126
 
 
    Aesthetic properties of works of art are complex and partly evaluative properties and one  
of their most important aspects is the relation they have with informed perceivers – how they 
are identified and appreciated in appropriate encounter with works of art. As already 
mentioned, for Sibley the discussion of the encounter with works of art or other aesthetic 
objects is a discussion about perceptual ability. According to Sibley aesthetic encounters 
require perceivers to have both ‘normal eyes, ears and intelligence’ and to be able to exercise 
‘taste, perceptiveness, or sensitivity, or aesthetic discrimination or appreciation’. Goldman 
thinks in the same fashion that: 
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Thus, aesthetic properties are to be analyzed in terms of the shared responses of 
competent subjects with particular tastes to the intrinsic (usually formal) properties 
of objects.
127
  
 
There is consensus in aesthetics that aesthetic properties are relational properties but there is 
disagreement about how to characterise the responses of the competent perceivers to works of 
art if those viewers have particular sensibilities or tastes. Although it is difficult to see how 
one can be an aesthetic realist about aesthetic responses, the view put forward by aesthetic 
realists is centred on the role of aesthetic properties. If one is a property-realist he believes 
that aesthetic properties can be detected by a competent observer because these properties are 
in the works; in addition, the ‘detection’ of those properties depends upon the appropriate 
response of the competent observer and the key element is here ‘appropriate’. Lamarque 
thinks that this position is not unattainable and he points out that: 
 
it has not been thought inimical to defences of aesthetic realism that an element of 
response-dependence should be acknowledged’.128 
 
    
 
This discussion about the response-dependent character of aesthetic properties brings us to 
the objectivist’s way of justifying a realist position about aesthetic properties: aesthetic 
properties are objective properties of works of art. First, K. Walton notes that: ’what aesthetic 
properties a thing seems to have may depend on what categories it is perceived in’ and this 
fact ‘raises a question about how to determine what aesthetic properties it really does 
have’.129 If there are aesthetic properties in the work then they should elicit detection by the 
critics or other competent observers. But what if two critics fail to see or notice the same 
properties or what if they disagree with each other about the role these properties have in the 
aesthetic evaluation of the work? One suggestion could be that Walton’s predicament could 
be addressed by using Lamarque’s distinction between two apparently irreconcilable 
positions regarding properties of works: the realist position (properties are in the works and 
they can be revealed by interpretation) and the constructivist position (properties of the works 
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are not in the work, they are constituted by interpretation).
130
 He argues both that one has 
realist intuitions about properties of works as part of the works’ identity (these properties are 
discovered through ‘revelatory interpretation’) and that one also has anti-realist intuitions 
about properties of works, properties which are generated by responses of informed observers 
(these intuitions are rooted in artistic practices – this is ‘creative interpretation’).131 Lamarque 
believes that there are insights in both positions that ought not to be abandoned, and that one 
needs to retain a ‘robust realist notion of works while acknowledging their grounding in  
cultural conditions and intentional properties’132. What makes some intentional properties 
important in a work of art is the interplay between the features in the work aimed at an 
audience and the response of the audience when detecting these properties.  
     Lamarque defines intentional properties as: ‘a property something possesses in virtue of 
how it is taken, or thought to be, or perceived’133 or ‘involving the thought of an object 
under-a-description’.134 For Lamarque the crucial point here is that aesthetic properties a 
subclass of intentional properties.
 
He says that works possess different types of intentional 
properties, for example artistic, aesthetic or representational.
 135
To elaborate on this, one can 
think of a well known painting like Guernica by Picasso which is a cubist painting. Let’s take 
the aesthetic property of the painting: its cubist style. The intentionality of aesthetic 
properties in general, resides in the idea that works of art express the artist’s psychological 
state or artistic intentions. One can argue for example, that the cubist style has a geometric 
outlook, depicts semi-abstract elements, has multiple viewpoints, represents a fragmented 
composition, etc. One can add that the cubist artist wanted to express a particular revolt or 
indignation and/or to suggest contradictions and tensions, and one of the ways for the artist to 
achieve this was through his cubist style. Thus the aesthetic property of having a cubist style 
is an intentional property, which ‘demands’ to be thought of in a certain way. A basic 
understanding of the demand of an appropriate response, starts with the simple recognition 
that the object encountered, the painting needs to be perceived as a work of art. Once the 
work is perceived as such, the viewer/informed perceiver should recognize what kind of 
painting it is and what appropriate response is demanded by the encounter with that work. To 
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emphases what I mean here, one can think of different possible counterexamples to an 
appropriate response to a cubist painting: sentimentality, serenity, piety or romanticism and 
how these will be inappropriate.  
         So far I argued that aesthetic descriptions (e.g. attributing a cubist style to a painting) 
are dependent upon the informed perceiver’s level of linguistic competence136 and cultural 
background but I want to emphasize that the appropriate viewer’s perception is circumscribed 
to the existence of certain aesthetic properties existent in the work. For example, Lamarque  
distinguishes clearly between a mere object and a work of art and he argues that because 
works of art are different from ordinary objects – works of art are cultural objects with certain 
properties – some of the realist assumptions involved in their characterization are different 
from normal realist assumptions. Moreover, he says that when one characterizes a work of art 
one both ‘reveals pre-existent properties of works’ and constructs ‘new saliencies and 
creative readings’.137  This last suggestion is an attempt for Lamarque to bridge the gap 
between realist and constructivist characterization of works of art: some properties are in the 
works and others are imputed to works by the interpretative process. This reconciliatory 
solution is based on the idea that acceptable interpretations of any kind are constrained by the 
properties that the object has in itself, the properties possessed by the object which identifies 
the object as an object of attention. Again, here is a trace of realism. There are acceptable 
interpretations of works of art because these works have properties that help a qualified 
observer to identify the works as works of art. One example which Lamarque uses is that of 
King Lear. If the play belongs in the category of tragedies then the play has the aesthetic 
character of being tragic. Lamarque insists that this is not just an epistemic reading of the 
play but the statement that ‘King Lear is tragic’ is necessarily true. The most appropriate 
interpretation of the play is that it has tragic properties, thus one is constrained in this 
interpretation by at least this fact that the identity of the work is determined by one of its 
salient features, tragic. If the aesthetic property of the play King Lear being tragic is not 
perceived in the appreciative experience of the play then one is not experiencing the play in  
an appropriate way as a work of art.
 138
                                                                                                      
     One could illustrate the role of the distinction between revelatory and creative 
interpretation by going back to the painting by Degas and trying to show which of its 
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aesthetic properties are ‘prior’ to particular interpretations, being in the painting and which 
are properties imputed through creative interpretation. To take one example, the aesthetic 
property of being balanced could be considered an intrinsic, objective property of the painting. 
One can justify this aesthetic attribution by arguing that the perception of particular non-
aesthetic properties in the painting (e.g. numbers and arrangement of the elements of the 
painting, their position with regard to central axis, the arrangement of colours, the distribution 
of brushstrokes, etc.) together with the knowing of the correct meaning of the term ’balance’ 
could lead an informed viewer to attribute the property of ‘balance’ to a painting. One is 
aware that there are many difficult questions about the perception of non-aesthetic properties, 
for example: ‘Does one notice the symmetry of the composition and the synchronicity of 
colours straightaway or after some contemplation?’ or ‘Is there any doubt that these non-
aesthetic properties are in the painting?’ or ‘Is the level of competency that the viewer needs 
to notice the aesthetic properties different from a normal ability to perceive non-aesthetic 
properties?’. These questions are interesting from a philosophical or art-historical point of 
view and attempts to answer them usually enrich our understanding of how we attribute 
aesthetic properties to works. However, an art lover or an informed perceiver would respond 
to certain features of a work of art and a number of these features would be considered by the 
viewer as if in the work while others would be revealed through an in-depth analysis, or by 
accumulation of more background knowledge about the history of the work, its provenance or 
its immediate context. In other words, if one is a property-realist with regards to aesthetic 
responses to works of art then it can be said that the pre-existent non-aesthetic features of a 
work are mind-independent (they do not depend of any particular viewer’s idiosyncrasies) 
and they would contribute to the correct attribution of aesthetic properties, in particular the 
ones that have a strong descriptive core, like balance. Indeed, saying that a painting like 
Degas’ After the Bath, Woman Drying Herself is balanced, it does not depend on a particular 
viewer’s perception of it. The way the elements and the colours of the painting are arranged 
by the artists can be detected by any informed viewer through a firsthand appropriate 
experience of the painting. This is what Lamarque characterises as the power of these types 
of aesthetic properties to elicit a normative response from the viewer; in other words, to 
respond to the aesthetic character of the work in a certain way because the nature of work 
demands it. 
139
 Moreover, some would insist that the informed viewer’s perceptual ability for 
noticing non-aesthetic features of the painting and in turn noticing that the painting is 
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balanced is usually articulated through the correct understanding of the meaning of the 
concept of balance and thus through the appropriate application of this concept to the painting.    
     What the previous discussions have shown is that to some extent Lamarque supports a 
particular kind of aesthetic realism, property realism, where the aesthetic properties of a work 
of art are a subclass of intentional properties and they are partially dependent on the informed 
observers’ responses. 
     Until now I discussed the competent perceivers’ responses to encounters with works of art 
and their salient features. Briefly I want to touch upon the role of the artist in anticipating 
some of the perceivers’ responses in his creative process. It can be suggested that to a certain 
extent a very good artist attempts to elicit a certain type of response. Moreover, if his 
rendering of the work is successful then his aim is closely achieved. There are two possible 
comments with regard to the perceiver’s response which are outside the artist’s ‘jurisdiction’: 
first, an increasing number of artists argue that their creative process is not bound to any 
putative viewers’ responses and the responses to their work are not circumscribed to the 
artists’ aims and secondly, the viewer needs background knowledge and an appropriate 
cultural context in order to respond appropriately to the work. Even so, the link between the 
artist, the artistic and aesthetic properties of the work and the viewer’s response is undeniable.  
     The interdependence between the existence of aesthetic properties and an ability to 
perceive them is to some extent paradoxical: on the one hand, some aesthetic properties (at 
least the ones named by aesthetic concepts with a strong descriptive core) are said to be in the 
work as objective features of the work, but on the other hand, their ‘existence’ seems to be 
dependent on being perceived as aesthetic properties by informed observers.  This 
puzzlement is about the approach one has to aesthetics: supporting a realist or an anti-realist 
position about aesthetic properties. Goldman suggests that both realist and anti-realists have 
something to agree about in relation to the nature of aesthetic properties: to ascribe aesthetic 
properties to works is the subject’s reaction to the ‘objective structural properties of the 
works’ and such responses have a perceptual as well as an affective and evaluative 
character.
140
 This position is similar to Lamarque’s and other aestheticians who at least agree 
that certain aesthetic properties are in the work of art – they are ‘objective’ features of the 
work.                      
     Before presenting Lamarque’s main characteristics of aesthetic properties in the next 
chapter, I would like to mention one realist theory that influenced Lamarque’s view of 
                                            
140
 A. Goldman, ‘Realism’, Encyclopaedia of Aesthetics, ed. Michael Kelly, OUP, published online, 2008. 
68 
 
aesthetic properties, namely Jerrold Levinson’s. 141  Levinson’s realism with regard to 
aesthetic properties is centred on the relation aesthetic properties have with qualified 
observers and also by the appeal to a distinction between a descriptive component of aesthetic 
properties and an evaluative one.
142
 Levinson argues that aesthetic properties: 
 
are higher-order ways of appearing depending in systematic fashion on lower ways 
of appearing but not conceptually tight to them or deducible from them
143
  
 
Levinson explains that ‘ways of appearing’ are what ‘others call manifest properties that 
reveal their nature in and through their appearances’ and that, in general, all ways of 
appearing have a  relational character, they are perceiver-related and condition-related:  
 
Ways of appearing are, first, ways of appearing to perceivers of a certain sort; and 
second, ways of appearing in certain conditions.
144
 
 
Levinson’s ‘perceivers of a certain sort’ are people who ‘view a work correctly’ by being 
aware of the work of art’s context of origin, its place in the artist’s creation, its relation to art 
tradition and the cultural context. This is not far from a common way of characterizing an 
informed perceiver and most contemporary aestheticians would agree with this, even though 
a number of contemporary artists would want to dispense with the idea that there is a correct 
way of perceiving a work of art. However I think those contemporary artists confuse the idea 
that there are no fixed rules in art (in creating and experiencing a work) with the idea that a 
viewer does need artistic sensibility or knowledge in order to fully appreciate a work of art. I 
suggest that this confused way of thinking is based on a misunderstanding of what is an 
‘appropriate’ perception of a work of art or an authentic response to a work of art. In 
addition, in contemporary aesthetics the appeal to informed or qualified observers is common 
place and I would like to emphasise that when I talk about aesthetic responses to works of art 
I usually prefer to use the qualifier ‘appropriate’ instead of ‘correct’ because of the rigid 
dimension that a term like ‘correctness’ could have in an aesthetic discourse.  
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    To return to Levinson’s view, when he talks about ‘perceivers of a certain sort’ and the 
need for ‘certain conditions’ for aesthetic properties to make themselves manifest, one cannot 
help thinking of Hume’s good critic and his five virtues. On the other hand, there is indeed a 
main difference between Hume and Levinson, which is of metaphysical nature: Hume rejects 
the idea that aesthetic properties are objective, he is a subjectivist while Levinson is a realist 
believing that aesthetic properties can be detected by qualified observes who correctly 
perceive a work of art. Lamarque points out that Levinson accentuates the importance of 
work-specific facts about the work’s provenance and its art-historical context which is 
different from Hume’s view which emphasises the importance of the critic’s receptivity and 
experience; for Levinson the responses are grounded in the ability to see the work 
correctly.
145
 The main reason I have mentioned Levinson’s view is because Levinson’s view 
is very influential in the analysis of Lamarque’s aesthetics, in particular what it means to be a 
realist with regard to aesthetic properties.  
    Thus, I agree with the view that most aesthetic properties with a strong descriptive core can 
be detected in works of art by informed observers when the work is appropriately perceived. 
As there are degrees of sophistication in perception of colours or smells, it can be said that 
there are degrees of sophistication in appropriately perceiving different aesthetic properties. 
The more exposure and experience one has of works of art, the better the discernment of 
aesthetic properties in a work (as already mentioned, this is nothing new – it is the traditional 
argument of the development of aesthetic education that can be found in Hume, Kant, Sibley 
and Walton) and the better aesthetic justifications of the value of works of art.  
    To round up the discussion about the relation of aesthetic properties to appropriate 
perceivers, I use Lamarque’s apt characterisation of this relation, that perception of aesthetic 
properties is ‘imbued with thought’. 146This statement suggests that in order to appropriately 
perceive aesthetic properties one would have certain degree of knowledge about the object 
being perceived and its art context. Presumably this does not mean that the appropriate 
perception of aesthetic properties has only a cognitive content because an aesthetic 
perception/appreciation is a complex process which involves cognitive, affective and 
imaginative elements. The appropriate perceiver needs the background knowledge in order to 
have an art experience which is rich in phenomenology as well as content. 
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CHAPTER III 
Lamarque’s account of aesthetic properties – Key features 
 
 
    So far I argued that both Sibley and Lamarque are realists about aesthetic properties,
147
 and 
both discuss the relation that aesthetic properties have with their non-aesthetic base properties 
– while Sibley emphasises the emergence of aesthetic properties from non-aesthetic 
properties, Lamarque rejects supervenience and only suggests a kind of dependence of 
aesthetic properties on non-aesthetic/base properties without specifying what kind of 
dependence one is talking about.
148
 Also both philosophers consider that aesthetic properties 
are relational, resting on ‘modes of responses from qualified observers’149 and this involves a 
particular type of perception – a ‘special epistemic access’ for Sibley and the ‘perception 
imbued with thought’ for Lamarque (even though sometime the aesthetic is not perceptual150). 
     Thus on the one hand, Lamarque’s view of aesthetic properties has a lot of common 
characteristics with other aestheticians’ views (e.g. Sibley, Walton, Levinson) but on the 
other hand, there are there are a number of features that set Lamarque apart from these other 
aestheticians. In the first section of this chapter I go over the main characteristics of aesthetic 
properties that Lamarque shares with other thinkers and also the characteristics which set 
Lamarque apart from others (Section 1). In the second section of this chapter I discuss in 
detail the difference between aesthetic and artistic properties. This distinction is important in 
discussions about the aesthetics of conceptual art (Section 2) 
 
Section 1: Main characteristics of aesthetic properties that Lamarque shares with other 
aestheticians  
 
First here is a summary of the main key features of aesthetic properties which Lamarque  
shares with others (e.g. Sibley, Walton, Levinson) and which I touched upon in the previous  
chapters: 
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a) Aesthetic properties are mainly perceptual or experiential properties: ‘Aesthetic qualities 
are those qualities towards which aesthetic experience is directed’. 151  There are two 
observations to discuss immediately here about the concept of the perceptual and the concept 
of the experiential. First, saying that aesthetic properties are perceptual features is a 
traditional safe claim, and this was touched upon when discussing the history of the concept 
of aesthetic in the first chapter and also when evaluating Sibley’s account. Secondly, 
Lamarque makes a distinction between the perception of aesthetic properties in works of art, 
like the visual arts, which are perceptual arts and in literary works (he considers that works of 
literature are non-perceptual works that are ‘open to aesthetic description’152).This is one of 
the reasons he talks about experiential features as well as perceptual features. Towards the 
end of this section I discuss Lamarque’s account of appreciative experience of literature 
because this is one of the characteristics which set Lamarque apart from the other thinkers 
mentioned.  
 
b) Aesthetic properties are perceived by exercising aesthetic sensitivity. This is what most of 
the aestheticians mentioned believe, including Lamarque.  However, Lamarque adds that 
aesthetic properties depend for their perception on a complex array of factors related to the 
perceivers’ beliefs, to art-historical background knowledge, to the work’s context of creation. 
Thus aesthetic sensitivity for Lamarque is something like a viewer’s receptivity to aesthetic 
properties in encounters with art – experiential encounters which are ‘informed by knowledge 
about the object being experienced’153. 
 
c) Aesthetic properties have intentional and relational character. The relational nature of 
aesthetic properties is explained by the fact that aesthetic properties are ‘grounded in a 
relation between the work’s lower-level properties and the responses of a class of ideal or 
appropriate perceivers’.154 Their intentional character as mentioned earlier means that they 
should be recognised as objects to be perceived or thought of as representing, expressing, 
showing, depicting or symbolising certain beliefs or attitudes.  
 
d) Aesthetic properties are named by concepts which have descriptive and evaluative 
components and as mentioned before, Lamarque is influenced by Sibley’s and Levinson’s 
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accounts in making this distinction.  Moreover, all three philosophers believe that most 
aesthetic attributions are descriptive. The perception or experiential encounter of aesthetic 
properties in a particular work can be justified to a large extent by the existence of non-
aesthetic perceptual base properties from which these aesthetic properties emerge. The 
reminder here, is the Sibleyan stipulation that the aesthetic properties cannot be reduced to 
their base properties and there are no rules governing the relation between non-aesthetic and 
aesthetic properties.
155
 Thus as mentioned in Chapter I and II, aesthetic properties can be 
divided into properties which can be characterised by a concept with a strong descriptive core 
(these properties are conventionally called descriptive) and aesthetic properties, which are 
called pure evaluative properties because their perception mainly expresses the perceiver’s 
approval or disapproval of those particular properties. Examples of the two extremes of this 
dichotomy are: formal properties like being balanced, or unified, or dynamic, etc. and pure 
evaluative properties like being beautiful, mediocre, good, bad, lovely etc.  
     However, as already argued in the previous chapters, I would like to maintain that most 
aesthetic terms are part of a continuum and suggest that many of them have a mixed character, 
a descriptive as well as an evaluative component. The two extremes of the continuum are 
determined by the strong dominance of one or the other component: the descriptive at one 
end and the evaluative at the other. To reiterate form Chapter I: first, when in aesthetic terms 
the descriptive core is dominant (as in a term like balance) one is justified in characterising 
these terms and the properties they name as descriptive. Secondly, all the pure evaluative 
terms have a clear evaluative dimension and an indeterminate descriptive character. For 
example, terms like ‘beautiful’, ‘masterly’, ‘good’, ‘nice’ are always used to show approval 
while terms like ‘ugly’, ‘bad’, ‘mediocre’, ‘obnoxious’, ‘disgusting’ are used to show 
disapproval and all these terms do not name a particular property in an object (they can refer 
to a range of properties in different contexts). Thirdly, the evaluative component of a certain 
descriptive aesthetic term can, on occasion, shift its value – the term can used either as a sign 
of the speaker’s approval or as a sign of disapproval; the shifting happened in accord with the 
speaker’s affiliation to a community, or with certain artistic context, or in relation to different 
types of audiences.  I would like to elaborate here what I mean by ‘shifting’ its value. 
     For example, ‘being balanced’ is considered a descriptive term. In addition one could 
argue that a large majority of people would say that, when they use this term to describe the 
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composition of a painting
156
 as being balanced, this term is used to show approval of this 
property. However, in different artistic discourses on some occasions, this term can be used 
to show the speaker’s disapproval of balance as a characteristic of a composition. In such 
cases, there is a ‘calibration’ of aesthetic terms in accord to the weight of the evaluative 
component within each term. By speaking of ‘calibration’ I am not proposing a new way of 
characterising a linguistic mechanism; I am only suggesting that there are occasions in which 
the evaluative component of a term can shift, changing its emphasis within that term. What I 
mean is that an aesthetic term can be used for a long time with the evaluative assumption that 
everybody recognises as having a positive value – e. g approval of the property that the term 
describes. However, because of the fluidity of the artistic discourse and its continuous 
innovative tendencies, an aesthetic term which was used to show approval of a property could 
in newer contexts start being used to express a disparaging attitude towards that property. 
Another way of explaining why this is the case, is that the property of being balanced is a 
descriptive property which can adopt different values according to the speaker’s context of 
communication –its stable core is that of the descriptive and not of the evaluative.  
    To illustrate the above proposal, for example one can look again in more detail at the 
application of a term like ‘balance’ to a particular painting and argue that the application can 
be justified to a large extent by the detection of a symmetrical composition, the equilibrium 
of its chromatic elements and the uniformity of textures or mark making features of the 
painting. Being balanced describes a particular painting and regardless of the liking or 
disliking of this property by a viewer, or of the viewer’s taste or his idiosyncrasies, this 
property can be considered as being in the work – a descriptive property. As mentioned in 
Chapter I, there are a number of descriptive features of a composition that can be recognised 
in a particular work of art by different competent viewers and this could lead to the 
possibility of inter-subjective agreement about the existence of a number of descriptive 
aesthetic properties within that work. In general, if there is a possible agreement about a 
certain descriptive aesthetic characterisation of a composition, one could insist that 
descriptive terms, like ‘balanced’, ‘unified’, ‘dynamic’ or ‘evocative’ do not have an inbuilt 
positive or negative evaluation in their meaning.   
     On the one hand, it can be said that when using aesthetic descriptions in every day 
characterisations, e.g. charactering a composition as ‘being balanced’, it is usually accepted 
that the speaker approves of this property – the viewer who talks about this property could 
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say that he likes the painting because it is very well structured, it has a symmetrical 
composition, it shows an awareness of the golden ratio, its elements sit in a harmonious 
relation to each other, it has chromatic uniformity or it breaths an atmosphere of calmness, 
equilibrium. On the other hand, on some occasions (in the context of an avant-garde 
movement or a particular artistic outlook) if one characterises a particular painting, or 
drawing, or installation, as ‘being balanced’ this could express the speakers’ disapproval of 
that property in the work of art – it could mean that the painting is boring, has no dynamism, 
no tensions between parts, there is no bold combinations of colours, and it does not show 
courage in the arrangements of its elements. Even though there is this possible difference in 
the way the evaluative component of an aesthetic term impacts in the use of the term 
(approval or disapproval), there is at least one thing which most competent perceivers agree 
about in an artistic discourse: the term ‘being balanced’ has a strong descriptive core which 
describes features or properties that the viewers could possibly identify in the composition of 
a work. Moreover, if the viewers are part of the same community of speakers or they refer to 
the same artistic context then they will most likely use the aesthetic terms in the same way – 
thus agreeing about the direction of the evaluative component.  
     For theoretical and methodological reasons sticking to characterising some properties, like 
being balanced as descriptive is a safe bet. The approval or disapproval of such a property 
will transpire in the way the speaker attributes the property to the work under the influence of 
contextual features related to the work or related to the speaker’s community.   
    On a different note, it should be mentioned that one can add to the above mentioned 
descriptive terms their conceptual counterparts, for example: ‘unbalanced’ to ‘balanced’, 
‘chaotic’ to ‘unified’, ‘static’ to ‘dynamic’ etc. The continuum of aesthetic terms and the 
properties they name starts with descriptive terms and ends with evaluative terms but it also 
includes all the pairs of aesthetic concepts. Here by pairs of aesthetic concepts I do not mean 
the viewer’s response of approval or disproval of the named properties but a conceptual 
opposition of properties, which means that a work is having or not having certain 
characteristics. For example, in a pair like ‘static’/‘dynamic’ when applied to describe the 
composition of a visual work of art, the static could refer to: not representing movement, 
and/or not portraying change, and/or suggesting stillness, and/or presenting equilibrium of 
shapes, elements, and/or depicting lifelessness, and/or having chromatic or textural 
uniformity, flatness, etc. On the other hand the property of dynamic would refer to features 
like movement, change, tension between shapes or elements, chromatic boldness, clash of 
textural features, engaging perspective, etc.  
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     One analysis of the pair ‘static’/’dynamic’ could show that that both terms suggest 
alternating evaluative stances: disapproval for a work of art which is described as static but in 
some cases the approval of the viewer and the other way around for dynamic. Looking at two 
important works from contemporary photography one can show how the two concepts static 
and dynamic are applied to describe the works and how one can make an argument that, they 
both express the approval of the viewer for the two properties they name, even though from 
an evaluative point of view, static and dynamic are opposite properties. The two photographs 
are Andreas Gursky’s The Rhine II, 1999, (Fig. 10) and Jeff Wall’s A Sudden Gust of Wind 
(after Hokusai, 1983, (Fig. 11).  
 
 
 
  
 Fig. 10 The Rhine II, 1999, by Andreas Gursky 
 
     I discuss first Gursky’s photograph which was produced in an edition of six chromogenic 
prints and the print that I am interested in, it is owned by Tate Modern and it is the fifth in the 
series; its image size is 1564 x 3083 mm. Before arguing for the characterisation of this 
composition as static, one needs to know a number of important facts about Gursky’s 
photography. The artist is a German photographer who works with medium format cameras 
and who digitally manipulates his works, mainly being interested in creating places without 
specificity, almost abstract and depersonalised, and usually with strong formal elements. The 
subject of The Rhine II is the river Rhine outside Düsseldorf and although this subject is very 
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prosaic when the work is encountered in a gallery (a large scale print like the one in Tate 
Modern) the image has an arresting impact on the viewer. The most important features of the 
photograph are its formal features and the chromatic of the picture. The formal features are 
the strong horizontal elongated bands of grass, footpath and water and these are situated in 
the lower half of the composition and the other half (almost equal in size) is a greyish sky. 
The way the grass is horizontally split by the narrow footpath and the wider body of water in 
the lower half of the picture, creates an almost abstract composition. Moreover, one can argue 
that the only colour in the picture, which is green, is mixed with neutral colours (black, grey 
and white) and this reduces to the minimum the chroma of the image, resulting in a 
combination of tints and tones which create a sense of uniformity and coherent atmosphere. 
Because the way the image is manipulated (Gursky eliminated a lot of elements which he 
considered unimportant, like walkers or far away buildings), and because of its green, grey, 
silver and metallic nuances and their ordered horizontality, the image initially conjures up a 
sense of bleakness, lifelessness and alienation. However after a longer contemplation one 
notices the velvet like texture of grass, the perfect order of the natural features in the 
horizontal layout, the peacefulness of the river and the vastness of nature – all these aesthetic 
features which impose a different feeling on the viewer, that of calmness and stability.   
    My claim is here that The Rhine II’s static composition is one of the main factors which 
contribute to the aesthetic and artistic purpose of the photograph: to capture the essence of a 
contemporary Rhine as imagined by the artist. Gursky says about the purpose of the image: 
  
I wasn’t interested in an unusual, possibly picturesque view of the Rhine, but in the 
most contemporary possible view of it. Paradoxically, this view of the Rhine cannot 
be obtained in situ; a fictitious construction was required to provide an accurate 
image of a modern river.
157
 
 
Gursky’s explanation about his artistic intention betrays a preoccupation with a certain 
artistic outlook. He is interested in portraying idealised urban landscapes (urban because of 
the role of the asphalted footpath in the foreground). However, here one can also refer to his 
other works which depict strong urbanized landscapes which are quintessentially about the 
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people’s imprint on the world. His images are views of the globalised monumental (e.g. 
monolithic architectural structures, industrial landscapes, office buildings, airports, etc).  
     The idealisation in The Rhine II is not about perfection or a certain kind of out of this 
world beauty, it is about capturing the essence of things which are heavily anchored in both 
reality and our understanding of them. Thus, I think how Gursky portrays the Rhine is the 
ultimate urban river. He says: 
 
A visual structure appears to dominate the real events shown in my pictures. I 
subjugate the real situation to my artistic conception of the picture.
158
 
 
    One could say that, describing the composition of The Rhine II as static reflects the 
viewer’s approval of this property because of the above mentioned admiration for both non-
aesthetic and aesthetic elements. Also because of its static and non-perspectival composition 
the landscape has a uniformity that allows the eye of the viewer to slowly roam on the main 
elements of the image without a need for direction or a vanishing point. There is no ‘stage 
directions’ in this image and the viewer discovers a reflective freedom in the visual aesthetic 
which is very rewarding. Such a characterisation of the elements of the image and the 
reference to artists’ intention leads one to the conclusion that the viewer has a positive 
aesthetic appreciation of the depiction of the landscape; and the encounter with the 
photograph offers a rewarding experience. Therefore the static composition is here a valued 
feature of the work which has a powerful impact on the viewer’s aesthetic experience.  
    In addition to this, one could argue that changing the size of Gursky’s The Rhine II, from     
1564 x 3083 mm to 1560 x 3079 mm would not change the work’s identity and its reception. 
But if the photograph’s size is reduced dramatically to an A4 size, or if one changes the 
rectangularity of the work to a square image, then it can be argued that these changes will 
affect the appreciative experience of the work – the effectiveness of means to ends, to use 
Lamarque expression, would be negatively affected. The ‘end’ in Gursky’s The Rhine II is 
the shaping of a subject matter – the Rhine, around the artist’s contemporary vision of an 
idealised urban river; the means used by Gursky are aesthetic properties like a static 
composition of a certain size. Now that we have suggested that one essential aesthetic 
property of Gursky’s photograph is ‘a static composition of a certain size’, it can be argued 
that loosing this particular property it will definitely transform the photograph into a different 
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work with a different aesthetic response. The crux of the matter here is about the actual size 
of the print in Tate Modern: Can the size of The Rhine II be an essential aesthetic property? 
One could maintain that, the size of the image is not important as long as the proportions and 
the rectangularity of the image are preserved. However, I would argue that for Gursky’s 
works the size of the prints are important and one could argue that the large scale of the The 
Rhine II is an essential aesthetic property of this work. Gursky talks in an interview about the 
importance of large scale print for his works; he says that certain images ‘can’t be read in 
small size’ and that such images develop their power ‘in a bigger format’.159 In order to have 
the appropriate experience of the work as the work it is (the work as intended by the artist 
and the work which captures something contemporary urban about the banks of the Rhine) 
one needs to encounter this work on a large scale print as presented by Gursky. A much 
smaller print will not have the immediate impact of the large horizontal elongated bands of 
atmospheric, river like, reality. Thus in the case of The Rhine II the size of the photograph as 
chosen by the artist is an aesthetic property of the work and an essential one (this discussion 
can be extrapolated to other of Gursky’s works whose large scale are an essential aesthetic 
feature).  
    The second photograph I look at is by Jeff Wall and is called A Sudden Gust of Wind (after 
Hokusai, 1983, (Fig. 11) and it is a well known homage of the Canadian artist to Hokusai’s 
famous woodcut colour print Eijiri in the Provice of Suruga, 1832 (Fig. 12). This photograph 
by Wall is a digitally manipulated image displayed as a colour transparency in a light box 
(light boxes are Wall’s artistic signature).  
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Fig. 11 A Sudden Gust of Wind (after Hokusai), 1983, by Jeff Wall 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 12 Eijiri in the Province of Suruga, 1832, by Hokusai 
80 
 
    In the first encounter with Wall’s A Sudden Gust of Wind (after Hokusai), the photograph 
suggests a subject which is close to the subject of Hokusai’s original work: a gust of wind 
disrupting people’s daily routine. However, Wall’s image is an unusual landscape with a 
stronger vanishing point created by the canal in the middle of the picture which bends 
towards the left and also by the bending towards left of two trees in the foreground. What I 
mean by ‘unusual’ landscape is that the image presented to the public has three unsettling 
juxtapositions: in the foreground the almost urban scene (two of the people in the picture are 
formally dressed – a woman with a scarf and a man in a suit which together with the 
papers/documents flying about, could be indicative of a scene from the interior of an office 
with an open window, the small metallic bin suggesting a close by human habitation), in the 
middle ground a hybrid landscape (from left to right: an rural scene with a man working the 
land, a canal, a post industrial scene with a derelict bridge, a few abandoned buildings and 
many telegraph poles aligned as if they border the end of civilisation), and in the background 
a city landscape (the outlines of a  few tall buildings, steam and a polluted atmosphere). Wall 
constructed the image as a tableau, as a striking arrangement of all the above mentioned 
elements to create a sense of alienation or dislocation. The most important elements in this 
arrangement are the people in the foreground who both appear individually frozen in their 
movements as well as being part of the same windy and derelict landscape with floating 
papers and bending trees. The way in which Wall digitally manipulated these elements and 
their juxtaposition generates a powerful aesthetic and an interesting artistic narrative. First, 
the strong artistic narrative of the picture is revealed by a sense of alienation and a rupture in 
the fabric of the viewer’s expectations with regard to a depiction of an industrial farming 
landscape: the town people in smart dress appear teleported in this setting and even the other 
two people, who wear more appropriate clothing for such a scenery, appear out of place 
through their gestures and positioning which does not related to any other elements in the 
picture. Nevertheless, what gives this picture a strong unified aesthetic coherence and 
integrity is the dynamic of its composition which is created by the gust of wind which 
‘carries’ the scarf of the woman in the foreground, other people’s clothes and their gestures, 
the leaves of the trees, the papers and other debris, towards the vanishing point at the far end 
of the canal. Again, even though the people in the foreground and other elements of the 
landscape appear incompatible, Wall gave the whole landscape the same atmosphere through 
strong post-industrial earthly colours, a very realistic sense of proportions and a naturally 
diffused light of an industrial farming land before a storm. To develop further the idea of a 
complex and dynamic composition of A Sudden Gust of Wind (after Hokusai) one can think 
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of another juxtaposition: on the one hand , that of the gust of wind (representing spontaneity, 
having an opened direction – in this case towards the vanishing point of the picture and 
suggesting forces beyond human control) and on the other hand that of the individual frozen 
characters in the foreground (suggesting defensive movements, closed gestures – even the 
man whose arms are stretched wants to catch the papers, to bring them towards him and the 
theatricality of the whole human ensemble). One can characterise this juxtaposition as a 
symbol of people’s small world preoccupied with quotidian tasks, with a sense of urgency 
and centred on oneself (a lot of Wall’s works are about the shiny and the commercial 
contemporary world) and the power of nature where a gust of wind represents an 
uncontrolled flowing of both the physical and the temporal elements. 
     The two above examples of photographic works showed how two aesthetic concepts like 
static and dynamic can be used to describe properties which are considered aesthetically 
valuable this expressing the viewers’ approval, even though the two terms are a pair of 
aesthetic opposites.
160
 Thus the two terms name two aesthetic properties with a strong 
descriptive core, which could lead to inter-subjective agreement about the detection of the 
two aesthetic properties in the photographs but on the other hand the evaluative elements of 
the two concepts can vary (approval or disproval) suggesting that in an aesthetic discourse 
this needs to be specified in the aesthetic discourse. 
 
e)  In addition to the broad dichotomy of descriptive-evaluative Lamarque also uses a fine- 
grained distinction between different traditional types of aesthetic properties: 
representative
161 , expressive, formal or affective. Lamarque mentions Margolis’s wide-
ranging list of intentional properties that works of art have: representational, semiotic 
symbolic, expressive, stylistic, and historical.
162
 A number of these mentioned properties will 
be considered by aestheticians as being aesthetic properties, but not all of them. Also some of 
these properties will be essential properties.
163
 Lamarque suggests that certain kind of 
expressive and representational properties are ‘more naturally thought of as “objectively 
                                            
160
 In the same manner one can think of works of art in which the evaluative stance in using the terms static and 
dynamic, expresses aesthetic disregard, when the two terms are used to show disapproval of the compositions of 
two works.  
161
 In Note 13 on p. 101, Lamarque points out what he means by ‘aesthetic representational properties’: the 
properties that involve interpretation or are symbolic or thematic’( P. Lamarque, W&O, 2010, p.101) 
162
 Ibid., p.61, note 8. 
163
 I discuss in detail Lamarque’s distinction between essential and inessential aesthetic properties in the next 
chapters. However, I need to mention here very briefly what Lamarque considers an essential aesthetic 
properties: the property without which the work will not be the work of art it is.  
82 
 
possessed” by the works concerned’. 164  Because according to Lamarque, these types of 
properties, in particular the representational, the expressive and the formal ones, are the most 
important in the class of essential properties, one can understand why they directly contribute 
to, what Lamarque calls, the aesthetic character of a work (this is part of Lamarque’s 
individual essentialism).  
    These are the main characteristics of aesthetic properties that Lamarque shares with others 
(I did not insist in mentioning again of that for all these thinkers aesthetic properties are 
objective properties found in the works and all these thinkers are realists about aesthetic 
properties rejecting a subjectivist view of aesthetic properties). To return to the initial 
proposal of this section, in what follows I am mentioning two distinctive features of 
Lamarque’s view of aesthetic properties: 
 
 i)  Aesthetic properties reward a particular attention, characterised by Lamarque as ‘aesthetic 
experience’ in the case of visual arts165  and as ‘appreciative experience’166in the case of 
literature. He argues that in the case of literature we do use our perception as traditionally 
understood – we perceive the sensuous aspects (‘fine writing, mellifluous prose, elegant 
phrases, vivid images,...’) and formal features (‘structure, organization, and unity’) of a 
literary work.
167
  However Lamarque proposes that literary appreciative experience involves 
more that the perception in the narrow sense, it involves attending to the aesthetic features of 
a literary work in a deeper sense. He suggests that when reading literature, we think about the 
consonance of means to end: ‘how the sensuous and formal aspects are used to achieve a 
literary purpose’.168 Another way of explaining this experience is, according to Lamarque 
thinking about the imaginative reflection involved in reading literature.    
     But how is Lamarque’s account of aesthetic appraisal of literature different form the 
aesthetic perception/experience of a painting? Lamarque says that both the perception in the 
case of visual arts and the appreciative experience in the case of reading literature have in 
common the experience of art as art.
169
 When a competent viewer encounters Guernica he 
does attend to the formal, representational, expressive and symbolic properties of the painting 
in a deeper sense and he does ‘ask’ how aesthetic properties contribute to the aesthetic 
purpose of the work. I want to point out that the ‘asking’ here is not an activity in literary 
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sense, it is something like wondering ‘what is the point of the painting?’, or ‘what is the 
meaning of the painting?’ and this is not necessarily a question directed to someone.  I think 
the subtle difference, which Lamarque tries to point out between the two ways of 
aesthetically appreciating a work of literature and appreciating a work of visual art, consists 
in the extent to which the senses are involved. Lamarque claims that the aesthetic is not 
necessarily perceptual, if by ‘perceptual’ one refers to only sense perception. In the case of 
literary works the appreciative experience is not centred on the sense responses as much as in 
the case of visual arts (of course, the senses are involved, otherwise, how could we access 
any literary text or work?). In other words, the viewer’s sensual experience could have in the 
case of the visual arts a higher phenomenal content (being pleasant, disturbing, vivid) in 
comparison with the literary appreciation where the intentional content is dominant (here 
intentional content refers to the experience as what is thought to be of)
 170
. But one needs to 
emphasise here that an appreciative experience of art and literature, according to Lamarque 
involves both phenomenology and an intentional content and the phenomenology and the 
intentional content weigh differently in the experience of different art forms. My reading of 
Lamarque is that in the literary appreciation the aesthetic pleasure comes from an 
understanding and admiration of consonance of means to ends. The concept of consonance is 
important here. The reader ‘sees’ how the author achieved his literary purpose and this is a 
kind of aesthetic experience. While in the case of visual arts the aesthetic appreciation has a 
more direct route through sense perception, with an emphasis on its phenomenal character. 
The viewer ‘sees’ the aesthetic/artistic intention in a more literary way than in the case of 
literary works. The crucial point is here the interplay between the intentional content and the 
phenomenology of the experience of literature and other arts.  
    Thus for Lamarque, the ‘perception’ of works of art and literary works involve an 
appreciative experience, the experience of art as art – an experience ‘permeable to 
background knowledge’.171 This is where Lamarque’s account differs from the other thinkers. 
I am not going here into the discussion of non-perceptual works of art and their experience, 
because Lamarque’s conception of aesthetic appreciation will be discussed in the chapters 
dedicated to his aesthetic essentialism. 
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ii)  Lamarque employs a conception of the aesthetic which is wider than traditionally 
understood. Aesthetic properties (the representational, the expressive, the formal or the 
affective ones) are located in a continuum with art-historical properties.
172
 There would be 
also other properties which would be relevant to how a work is perceived/experienced, thus 
relevant to its aesthetic appreciation. For example, some of these properties can be linked to 
certain factors related to the history of the work, its context or provenance.
173
 The example I 
use in the next section of this chapter is the art-historical property of ‘being first Cubist 
painting’ referring to Picasso’s Les Demoiselles d’Avignon.    
        Also, Lamarque briefly discusses Berys Gaut’s broader sense of ‘aesthetic value 
properties’ that a work has qua work of art.174 Although Lamarque mentions that the use of 
artistic or historical properties to describe a work (e.g. to describe it as a sonnet or as alluding 
to Marvell) is the result of classification or interpretation not of perception, in some cases if 
one adopts Gaut’s wider sense of the aesthetic then some of these properties can become 
aesthetic properties.
175
 Maybe, in this wider sense ‘being a sonnet’ can in some circumstances 
be an aesthetic property if this ‘is a quality that a work has qua work of art’. 176 The form of 
the poem (sonnet) could be considered relevant to the aesthetic experience of the poem. 
Lamarque suggests that some properties that do not appear to have an aesthetic character but 
can become aesthetic qualities.  Not many would agree with the claim that a sonnet can 
sometimes be considered an aesthetic property. However, I think, without going into too 
much detail, that the strict poetic form of a sonnet which combines images and sounds, can in 
some cases be relevant to the presentation of the sonnet’s theme and thus relevant to the 
appreciative experience of the sonnet. One needs to insist here that the form of a particular 
sonnet, its fourteen lines and its four quatrains could be considered a part of what Lamarque 
calls the aesthetic means and noticing this property along with other aesthetic properties and 
with the poetic purpose of the sonnet, will create a consonance of means to aesthetic ends. 
    Here, I want to emphasise again that, Lamarque sees aesthetic properties and art-historical 
properties as situated on a continuum
177
 because works of art are cultural objects embedded 
in an art-historical context and their perception is permeated by the knowledge of that 
particular context and the art practices that produce the works. There will be circumstances in 
which the art critic or art practitioner or the competent viewer can argue for an art-historical 
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property to be considered an aesthetic property because of its relevance to the aesthetic 
experience of the work.
178
 However, this should be argued for case by case and if new 
saliences of a work are found in this way then the work in question could be seen in a new 
light. 
 
Section 2: The distinction between aesthetic properties and artistic properties 
 
    The first impulse when tackling the distinction between aesthetic and artistic properties is 
to look at different lists compiling various aesthetic properties and artistic properties 
respectively. However, this appears to be easier for aesthetic properties and more difficult for 
artistic ones. In general, artistic properties are considered to be related to art historical 
backgrounds and details about the creation and the context of the work, while aesthetic 
properties have to do with ways of perceiving and experiencing a work of art. For example, 
some artistic properties are: being part of modernism, being the first cubist painting, being a 
sonnet, being the result of many preparatory drawings, looking square, being written during 
WWI, being a Renaissance painting, etc.  Examples of some traditional aesthetic properties 
were presented earlier in Alan H. Goldman’s list: pure value properties, emotion properties, 
formal qualities, behavioural properties, representational qualities or evocative properties. 
Even though, the concepts of art and the artistic are much older than the concept of the 
aesthetic, the main reason why the discussion about artistic properties is slightly more 
difficult than the one about aesthetic properties, is because philosophical discussions of 
aesthetic properties have received a sustained attention since the 18
th
 century, while the 
philosophical focus on artistic properties is more characteristic of the 20
th
 century and the  
rejection of aestheticism.
179
  
     The distinction between the aesthetic and the artistic become acute when the concept of 
the aesthetic became more and more attacked for its ‘inability’ to account for 
characterizations of the development of newer artistic forms (e.g. conceptual art, social 
sculpture, performance art, body art etc).  According to Carolyn Korsmeyer the problem of 
the aesthetic can be summed up in the following dilemma: 
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either “aesthetic” means something fairly precise but does not accommodate the 
range of artistic value we feel it is appropriate; or “aesthetic” is defined in terms of 
art, is expanded to include all sorts of artistic qualities and looses whatever 
precision…180 
 
Korsmeyer’s characterization of the aesthetic is echoed by B. Gaut’s warning that a too 
inclusive treatment of aesthetic properties ’allows the aesthetic to balloon out so as to cover 
an extensive chunk of our mental life’.181 Both Korsmeyer and Gaut appear to agree that a 
distinction between the aesthetic and the artistic is paramount in contemporary philosophical 
discussions about the notion of the aesthetic, but their reasons for this adjustment in our 
conception of the aesthetic are different. For Korsmeyer the change is due to the theoretical 
difficulties that mushroomed out after Dickie’s institutional theory of art while for Gaut the 
adjustment is necessary in a larger scheme when one needs to give an account not only of 
aesthetic values but also of the ethical values of works of art.  
     One general way of trying to disentangle different accounts of the distinction between the 
aesthetic and the artistic is to look at different usages of the terms. The terms ‘aesthetic’ and 
‘artistic’ characterize different kind of things: objects, properties, experiences, judgements, 
etc. In what follows, first, I am going to focus briefly on the distinction between aesthetic and 
artistic objects. Secondly, I discuss in detail the distinction between aesthetic and artistic 
properties.  
     First, I introduce Marcia Muelder Eaton’s characterization of objects that are characterized 
by the two terms. She suggests four possible interactions between the class of aesthetic 
objects and the class of artistic objects.
182
 Before mentioning these alternatives one needs to 
briefly characterize an aesthetic object. An aesthetic object is an object which can be viewed 
or assessed from an aesthetic point of view. Thus, potentially any object could be viewed 
aesthetically, which means that the object is perceived or experienced based on the impact of 
its appearances (visual, auditory, haptic, or gustatory).  
    Here are Eaton’s four alternatives: 
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1) The class of artistic objects and aesthetic objects are identical (all objects that are of 
aesthetic interest become works of art). Eaton argues that although people’s talk reflects 
this idea, this is an imprecise use of language.
183
 Indeed, nowadays one can hear people 
expressing their admiration for aesthetic objects in the same way they express admiration 
for art, for example: ‘Beckham’s kick was beautiful!’ or ‘His Ratatouille is a 
masterpiece’ or ‘The Grand Canyon displays a spectacular chromatic palette’ (my 
examples). However, one can argue that these expressions are used in a figurative way.
184
  
 
2) The class of artistic objects and aesthetic objects are not identical, nevertheless they 
intersect. This means that some aesthetic objects are not works of art (most of the natural 
objects) and that some of the works of art are not aesthetic objects. This alternative is 
supported by many who reject aestheticism and think there are works of art that should not 
be assessed from an aesthetic point of view. This position could be illustrated by appeal to 
some well known pieces of conceptual art or performance art that are considered as having 
have an aesthetic appeal.  
 
3) The class of artistic objects is strictly included in the class of aesthetic objects but is not 
identical to the class of aesthetic objects. In this case all works of art are aesthetic objects 
but not all aesthetic objects are works of art. This is the view that Eaton supports. This is a 
traditionalist view where the artistic is defined in terms of the aesthetic. It is well captured 
by P.F. Strawson’s view that a judgement of a work of art as art needs to be from an 
aesthetic point of view. Strawson’s claim had a strong antecedent in Monroe Beardsley’s 
view that a work of art has an aesthetic function which couples the artistic with the 
aesthetic.
185
 
 
4) The two classes are totally discrete (this is possible form from a logical point of view). 
Eaton argues that there are no supporters of this view although someone could make an 
attempt to explain that Kant’s aesthetic/artistic distinction falls in this category. However, 
because Kant does consider that the aesthetic pleasure of natural beauty is similar to that 
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which people feel when they experience art then, Eaton suggests that Kant adheres to the 
second or the third alternative.
186
  
 
    Eaton thinks that Kant was one of the first to distinguish between the aesthetic and the 
artistic with his arguments about the experience of free and adherent beauty (the experience 
of natural beauty and respectively the pleasurable experience of art). Eaton’s discussion of 
different alternatives of the relation between the aesthetic and the artistic is about the class of 
objects that are aesthetic and the class of objects that are artistic. Although one could use the 
same procedure to characterise the relation between aesthetic properties and artistic 
properties, there are more problematic issues when one attempts to classify artistic properties 
in relation to aesthetic ones. For example, if one has a more traditionalist view and considers 
that all works of art are aesthetic objects, then one appears to have problems with 
accommodation the works of conceptual art. I emphases ‘appears’ because this is a problem 
only if conceptual works are not considered aesthetic objects or if more radically, they are not 
considered art objects. I do not subscribe to the idea that art is not aesthetic; here I agree with 
Eaton’s traditional view that the class of works of art is included in the class of aesthetic 
objects. Nevertheless I disagree with Eaton’s claim that conceptual art is not art. In the last 
chapter of this thesis I discuss certain examples of conceptual works and show that these 
particular works can be considered aesthetic objects because they possess essential aesthetic 
properties.  
      Another way of trying to explain the distinction between the aesthetic and the artistic is 
by looking at how the two terms are characterizing properties. For example, the already 
mentioned Carolyn Korsmeyer proposes that the two concepts of the aesthetic and the artistic 
overlap but are not congruent and she believes that one should not attempt to construct a 
theory of art and to explain artistic properties and values through a limited notion of 
‘aesthetic’. Her argument rests on the one hand on a strong criticism of the attitude theories, 
which stretch the notion of “aesthetic” until it becomes indistinguishable from “artistic”, and 
on the other  hand, on a sympathetic analysis of George Dickie’s institutional theory which 
promotes a theory of artistic perception freed from ‘the theoretical shackles of the 
aesthetic’.187 However, Korsmeyer focuses her analysis on the criticism and evolution of the 
concept of the aesthetic without actually identifying characteristics of the artistic. The only 
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clear clue from Korsmeyer about the distinction is that aesthetic qualities are dependent upon 
the nature of the object in consideration and these qualities are: ‘[….], elements like 
composition and balance, imagery and coloration, sensuous arrangement of forms, and the 
like’.188 She also says that artistic qualities ‘extend beyond the narrowly aesthetic’ which 
probably means that artistic qualities can characterize aspects of works of art which are not 
directly linked to the perceptual. 
    Another important view of the distinction between aesthetic and artistic characterizations 
of works is discussed by Lamarque. He says:  
 
To describe a work as elegant or finely balanced or unified or beautiful is to 
characterise its aesthetic nature, but to describe it as a sonnet or alluding to Marvell 
or symbolizing hope is to offer an art-related or more broadly literary 
characterization.
189
 
 
He argues that aesthetic qualities rely on perception whereas other qualities like artistic or 
historical ones are related to classification or interpretation.
190
 Even though this seems an 
appropriate characterization of the distinction, Lamarque himself thinks there are still 
difficulties in how others distinguish between aesthetic and artistic. He suggests that the 
problems lie with two false assumptions that characterise professional people’s reactions to 
art and the aesthetic: 
 
The critics are assuming that art is necessary aesthetic, the artists that the aesthetic is 
necessary perceptual.
191
 
 
Lamarque is right that one should consider a wider sense of the concept of the aesthetic, 
which goes beyond the traditional belief that the aesthetic is only perceptual. His conception 
of the perceptual/experiential encounter with works of art or literature suggest a wider 
understanding of the aesthetic and this will have implications for understanding the aesthetic 
value of a work of art. Moreover, his suggestion that the aesthetic is not necessary perceptual, 
will help to solve some of the theoretical difficulties that are prompted by discussions of non-
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perceptual art like literature or by discussions about conceptual art works. Thus I agree that 
the aesthetic is not necessarily perceptual. Nevertheless, I do not agree with what Lamarque 
says about art and the aesthetic. One can say that the aesthetic involves the perceptual, as well 
as, other experiential aspects which are not directly perceptual. For example, literary works 
and maybe other newer art forms like conceptual art can be assessed from an aesthetic point 
of view if the aesthetic is understood in a wider sense. Here Lamarque’s consonance of 
means to ends comes to mind. A work of literature can be appreciated aesthetically not only 
because of its sensuous writing and formal aspects, but also because the reader experiences 
the harmonious effect of the way in which the writer used those sensuous and formal 
elements to achieve a literary purpose.  Therefore, one can claim that all art forms (including 
the so called ‘non-perceptual’ arts) are necessarily aesthetic.  
     Thus to round up this discussion I think that all works of art are aesthetic objects (because 
they can be aesthetically appreciated). In other words, the class of works of art is included in 
the class of the aesthetic objects. Works of art are objects which require for their appreciation 
an aesthetic engagement (or contemplation or attention)
192
 which is conscious of the 
intentionality of art (works of art as human creations are ‘demanding’ certain kind of 
responses when appropriately perceived or experienced as art). On the other hand, the class 
of aesthetic properties and the class of artistic properties intersect and the class boundaries are 
not fixed. For example, some artistic properties can be considered as aesthetic properties if 
they are aesthetically relevant to the experience of the work. For example, referring to a 
painting as ‘looking square’ is an artistic property, but in some cases this can become relevant 
to the aesthetic appreciation of the painting and then such a property becomes an aesthetic 
property of the painting).  If one uses a wider sense of the aesthetic, like Lamarque, then this 
slightly changes how one thinks about aesthetic terms. In what follows, I give an example of 
a work that I hope briefly illustrates my position about the ‘distinction’ between aesthetic and 
artistic properties.  
     Here are some characterizations of a work: it is an oil painting, its final version was 
created 1907, it is painted by Picasso and is called Les Demoiselles d’Avignon (Fig. 13). The 
painting has a rectangular shape of 243.9 x 233.7 cm, the colour scheme is a combination of 
monochromatic and contrastive colours, it represents five female figures in nude, the 
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nakedness of the figures is provocative, it looks unfinished, it looks square, it was shocking 
for Picasso’s contemporaries, it was a radical painting, it is considered the first Cubist 
painting, it is dynamic and powerful, it is a bold statement about a new iconography and it is 
beautiful. From this list, some of the characterizations of the painting are factual – about its 
history, context and creation and some of the characterizations are artistic and aesthetic.   
 
 
                                   
                       Fig. 13 Les Demoiselles d’Avignon, 1907 , by Picasso 
 
The painting has a ‘rectangular shape’ and its ‘final oil version was created in 1907 by 
Picasso’ are factual descriptions of Les Demoiselles d’Avignon. These descriptions are not 
considered aesthetic but one could make a case for considering two of these characterizations 
as artistic: ‘being an oil painting’ and ‘being painted by Picasso’. In the visual arts the 
medium is an important choice for artists and painting in oils is a respected choice. An 
informed perceiver would claim that oil paint represents an artistic property of a painting; 
some of the reasons given by the informed perceiver for this claim are: it is considered that 
the most versatile medium for depicting human flesh is oil paints, or it is considered a sign of 
92 
 
artistic maturity to use oil paints, or that most of the greatest painters used oils. The 
mentioning of the medium of a painting can be described as both: a non-aesthetic property 
 and an artistic property depending of the context of description.
193
 Looking at the second  
characterization – the painter’s name – one could argue that this is again not only an 
historical fact but also an artistic property. The name ‘Picasso’ has a particular resonance by 
being associated with certain artistic standards (e.g. experimental, unconventional, radical or 
simply genial) – thus it can be said that, ‘to be painted by Picasso’ it is an artistic property. 
Pushing this line of argument even further, one could consider what Sibley said about 
evaluation-added terms: they name a quality that is widely recognised as being of value in 
certain sphere. Then one can think how Sibley’s predicament can be used to characterise the 
painting as having the quality artistic quality of ‘being by Picasso’. Saying that the painting is 
‘by Picasso’ could be even more, it could be an expression of recognition of value from an 
aesthetic point of view. The term that we sometimes use to describe figures by Picasso and in 
Picasso’s Cubist style is ‘Picassoesque’. Thus the evaluation added to the name ‘Picasso’ 
makes the term ‘by Picasso’ a descriptive-merit term in a certain sphere (in the artworld as 
Arthur Danto would say). My characterization of Les Demoiselles d’Avignon names different 
properties of the work and my view is that, there is indeed a continuum between the 
properties that are non-aesthetic, artistic and aesthetic and sometime the boundaries between 
these become blurred according to background knowledge, ways of perceiving and socio-
cultural contexts of the viewer who appreciates the work. Here is a possible arrangement of a 
number of the properties of Les Demoiselles d’Avignon, on such a continuum: 
 
non-aesthetic properties                  artistic properties                   aesthetic properties 
 
● a rectangular painting                     ● looking square                       ● unusual visual effect          
● yellows, browns, greys,                  ● monochromatic and               ● disruptive blue within 
   blues, blacks                                       contrastive colour                     earthy/fleshy colours 
● Hellenistic figure                         ● traces of iconography             ● new visual language  
● painted in 1907                               ● first cubist oil  painting          ● Picassoesque 
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The aesthetic properties mentioned above are some of the aesthetically relevant properties of 
Guernica. This list could continue but it is possible that many of the artistic properties can 
‘migrate’ to the next category when used in aesthetic assessments, becoming aesthetic. For 
example, the property of the painting ‘looking square’ can be both an artistic and an aesthetic 
property. Artistic because it is applied to a painting and aesthetic because although the 
painting is actually rectangular, the effect on the viewer is disconcerting appearing square 
which has an impact on how the painting is aesthetically appreciated (in particular if one 
thinks of the phenomenological aspects of this appreciative experience). This is what 
Carsten-Peter Warncke says about the rectangularity of the painting works: 
   
The marginal difference between the height and the breath is significant because 
it leaves us irresolute. […] Everything in this picture teaches us of the inadequacy 
and randomness of customary concepts in visual representation.
194
 
 
    Here one can bring Lamarque’s previously mentioned example of an artistic property of a 
work being described as a sonnet. To elaborate against an objection that says that being a 
sonnet is not an aesthetic property, one can think of another type of poem whose form can be 
show to be essential to its aesthetic experience and value: a haiku. The elements of such a 
Japanese poem (its juxtapositions of images or ideas, it 17 syllables and its temporal 
reference to a season) are circumscribed to this particular form which works beautifully in an 
accomplished haiku. This description of a poem as a haiku or as a sonnet is similar with 
describing Les Demoiselles d’Avignon as a cubist painting. The descriptions of the style of 
the works (the poems and the painting) could be considered both: art-historical or artistic 
properties (having to do with how we classify such works) and they also can be considered 
aesthetic properties, which reflect a particular way of perceiving or experiencing those works. 
Moreover, qualifying Les Demoiselles d’Avignon as ‘the first cubist painting’ could have 
aesthetic resonance for the contemporary viewer. On one hand, the qualifier ‘the first cubist 
painting’ could only add to the aesthetic appreciation of the painting as being daring, stirring 
and being original. On the other hand, the viewer could be moved by the powerful effect that 
such a qualifier can have on one (this effect could be an imaginative transference into the 
shoes of the first viewers of the painting).  
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     The intention of this chapter was to identify different terminological differences between 
Lamarque and other thinkers and to look at a number of different conceptions of the aesthetic 
and that of the artistic, in order to clarify some of Lamarque’s aesthetic architectonic and in 
order to be able to build a defence of his aesthetic essentialism.    
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Chapter IV 
Lamarque’s Individual-Essentialism 
Part 1: New-Object Theory 
 
 
 
     Lamarque defends a version of aesthetic essentialism in which aesthetic terms are 
construed in a realist manner, ‘as standing for properties’ and in which some of those 
properties play a crucial role in the description and identity of works of art. He claims that 
some works of art have necessarily and essentially a certain aesthetic nature or character and 
some aesthetic descriptions of works of art are necessary truths that identify that aesthetic 
character.
195
 Thus, according to Lamarque some works of art possess some aesthetic 
properties essentially and these contribute to the works’ distinct aesthetic character.  
    There are many questions one needs to address when evaluating such an aesthetic 
essentialist view, but I think an urgent one is a general question about essentialism and its 
terminology. In this chapter I am going first to present a general introduction to essentialism 
(Section 1) and secondly I introduce Lamarque’s argument of individual essentialism (Section 
2).  
 
Section 1: Introduction to Essentialism 
 
     In order to evaluate Lamarque’s aesthetic essentialism I introduce the main terminology of 
the essentialist framework and I characterise an aesthetic essentialist view of art. The 
question about essentialism is an ontological question about what makes a thing the thing it is, 
and according to this doctrine the answer is based on a belief in the existence of essences. 
Although there is a long history of the concept of essence, starting with Plato and Aristotle 
and then continuing with J. Locke, G.W.F. Hegel and 20
th
 century philosophers like G. 
Santayana, G.E. Moore, R.G. Collingwood and
 
S. Kripke
196
, what interests me here are 
contemporary usages of the concept of essence. There are two main approaches in 
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philosophical literature with regard to the concept of essence: one is the conception which 
follows the model of definition, and the other one follows the model of modal attribution.
197
 
But what does this mean and how is it useful to the current discussion?  
     The first approach suggests that ‘essences’ are used in the definitions of concepts (for 
example, essences of an object are those essential properties/attributes of the object which are 
inherent in the definition of the object), while the second approach is a modal account which 
is important for the metaphysics of identity (essences are those essential properties/attributes 
that make the object necessarily being that way).  
     In order to have a clearer terminological framework for the analysis of Lamarque’s 
aesthetic individual essentialism, in what follows I briefly look at the above mentioned two 
approaches: the definitional characterisation of essences (1.1) and the modal characterisation 
of essences (1.2). 
 
 1.1 The definitional characterisation of essences 
 
    The first approach is inspired by an Aristotelian view of essence: ‘a definition is a phrase 
signifying a thing’s essence’.198 This approach links the concept of essence to the concept of 
definition. According to Aristotle when one gives a definition, he characterises the essence of 
the thing being defined. However, Bertrand Russell’s analysis of the Aristotelian conception 
of essence points out that: ‘In fact, the question of “essence” is one as to the use of words’. 
Russell emphasises that the discussion about ‘essence’ is ‘purely linguistic: a word may have 
an essence, but a thing cannot’. 199  Russell’s observation that the notion of essence is 
‘muddle-headed’200 is also echoed by Wittgenstein’s attack on essentialism.  As far as I 
understand, the Orthodox interpretation of Aristotle is that he is discussing definitions 
because he is interested in what things are really like not in the way we use words. For 
example, Marc Cohen underlines that, when Aristotle discusses the notion of essence he does 
not talk about words but he defines things.
201
 Agreeing with Cohen does not solve a lot and 
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some would argue that even though someone is interested in what things are like, this cannot 
be attempted without a clarification of the terms used. Indeed the scope of this section is to 
try to clarify different terminological essentialist views not to muddy the waters even more. 
Nevertheless, if the temptation to refer to essences of things is intuitively too powerful one 
can think of a less problematic approach and opt for the term ‘essential property’ instead of 
‘essence’. In some sense this will be a better option but, before I go on, it is a good idea to 
mention that the concept of essential properties is considered a ‘misnomer’ by some, because 
it is argued that it confuses ‘the idea of a thing’s essence with that of its properties’. For 
example this is argued by David Oderberg whose argument springs from a defence of 
Locke’s characterisation of properties of an object as ‘those features that “flow” from its 
essence’.202 Thus, I choose to use the term ‘essential properties’ instead of ‘essences’. There 
are three main reasons for my choice. First, because I am aware of Oderberg’s warning and I 
do not want to say that works of art have ‘essences’ (‘essence’ is a very heavily loaded term 
and when used with respect to art, it has almost mystical connotations).  Secondly, because 
the term ‘essential property’ is a common usage in contemporary aesthetics and most 
arguments of aesthetic essentialism incorporate this usage. Thirdly, because by ‘essentials 
properties’ I simply understand the most important or significant properties without which the 
object would not be what it is – in the case of essential aesthetic properties these would be 
significant for the aesthetic character of the work.
203
                                                                                                           
      I would like to make two observations about the above mentioned approach – the 
definitional characterisation of ‘essences’, in relation to the discussions about arts: 
i) One should be wary of strong essentialist views with regard to definitions of art or works 
of art which promote analytic definitions (necessary and sufficient conditions for something 
to be a work of art). Indeed the definitional characterisation of works of art suffered 
significant setbacks after the Wittgensteinian turn. But, if one still opts for the concept of 
essential aesthetic properties, then what kind of essentialism are we talking about here? If the 
question is about concepts, according to Severin Schroeder there are two avenues for the 
essentialist: one is that the essentialist could try to look at the formation of a concept without 
talking about defining properties, and the other is that the essentialist should think about the 
model of family resemblance or that of a cluster concept when using concepts like game, 
                                            
202
 D. Oderberg, Essence and Properties, Erkenntnis, Vol. 75, No. 1, July 2011, pp. 85-86. 
203
 This is the sense used by Lamarque in his writings with the caveat that he opted for the term ‘aesthetic 
qualities’ instead of ‘aesthetic properties’. 
98 
 
science or work of art.
204
 I would go along with the suggestion that one needs to treat 
differently the formation of a concept and its use, but one needs to note here that an 
essentialist would still insist that he is primarily interested in the nature of things ‘out there’ 
in the world. For example, someone like Lamarque is interested in individual existent works 
of art and not only in the way words describe or characterise those things; but necessarily 
conceptual investigations are part of Lamarque’s whole architectonic.  
ii) The second observation is linked to the above remark that, there are two different levels of 
discussions about essential properties: the semantic one and the metaphysical one. Although 
many Wittgensteinians would complain that any metaphysical claims are ‘incomprehensible’. 
For example, Severin Schroeder attracts attention to the fact that even Wittgenstein’s work 
contains ‘a fair amount of metaphysics in his Tractatus.205 Thus, I want to clarify that I am 
mainly interested in the ontological level of discussion (discussions about the nature and the 
identity of existent things out in the world – in particular, works of art existing in the 
artworld). However, I am aware that without a solid understanding of the meaning and the 
use of the main concepts in aesthetics the ontological approach will be a hard road to travel.  
 
1.2  The modal characterisation of essences 
 
    The second account of the concept of essence
206
 ‘the modal approach to essentialist 
metaphysics’ is very much favoured in contemporary debates and the essentialist claims are 
considered under de re modality.
207
 Broadly the distinction between de re/de dicto modality 
can be described like this: ascribing ‘de re’ modality is about what is essential or accidental to 
an object, while ascribing ‘de dicto’ modality is about a proposition having a certain property 
(for example, being necessarily true).
208
 Even though there are different conceptions of the 
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 de re/de dicto distinction (syntactic, semantic and metaphysical),
209
 as already mentioned, I 
am more interested in the metaphysical conception because in aesthetic disagreements, critics 
are not only quarrelling about the meaning of the terms they use and their correct application 
but often they disagree about attributing certain aesthetic properties to works of art and about 
the importance of some of these properties to the work of art’s identity. Thus, understanding 
the de re/de dicto characterisation is important if one wants to stay away from the murky 
waters created by the confusion between on the one hand, propositions or what has been said 
about works of art and their properties, and on the other hand, existent individual works of art 
and their properties.
210
 And again, thinking of Russell’s warning that the properties of 
language should not be confused with properties of the world, I would argue that one still can 
use the concept of ‘essence’ in metaphysical characterisations if one makes it clear that by 
‘essences’ he means essential properties of objects out in the world without which the object 
could not be what it is. Of course, in the case of works of art one would have to explain what 
these essential properties are (this assumes that works of art have such things as essential 
properties). In addition, a basic understanding of the de re/de dicto distinction is useful 
because this distinction appears in Lamarque’s argument for aesthetic individual essentialism, 
in particular when Lamarque discusses essential properties as de re necessities.                       
     To return to the initial question about essentialism, from different readings of the 
essentialist positions I think there are two ways of looking at essentialism: one is what I 
would call ‘object-based’ and the other ‘property-based’. What I mean here is that one way of 
looking is centred on grouping objects according to their essential properties and the second 
one is dealing with the distinction between different types of essences/properties.  
   Thus the first perspective encompasses many types of essentialism. Here are some of the 
most important ones: kind essentialism, origin essentialism and sortal essentialism. Very 
briefly this is how these three types of essentialism can be characterised: if one refers to 
kinds, natural ones (plants, animals or natural substances) or artificial ones, and believes that 
these have at least some essential properties, then this position is called kind essentialism; 
origin essentialism argues that an object could not have a very different origin from the one it 
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actually has, while sortal essentialism means that the object could not be very different in 
kind from what it is.  
   The second perspective is characterised by the way in which one divides essences, for 
example trivial essences and individual essences, or by the way one contrasts essential 
properties with other properties, in particular with accidental properties. One uses the term 
‘trivial essences’ when referring to the properties of ‘being that object’ or ‘not being that 
object’ and the property of an object being self-identical. But if one refers to specific 
individuals (people, artefacts or works of art), it is said that existent individuals have special 
kinds of individual essences. The individual essences are the properties/features which make 
an individual the individual it is and moreover it is considered that the individual essence of 
an object cannot be possessed by another object.
211
 However, this type of essentialism should 
not be confused with what Lamarque means when he argues that some works of art possess 
aesthetic properties essentially. Although Lamarque’s individual essentialism (I-essentialism) 
suggests that individual works of art have essential individual properties, this does not mean 
that each work of art has a ‘special’ individual essence which no other work of art has. For 
example, an aesthetic property like ‘being tragic’, which for Lamarque is an essential 
property of the last scene in King Lear, can be possessed by different works of art as well: the 
description of Anna Karenina’s last moments is tragic, the depiction of the father’s and his 
sons’ struggle in the sculpture Laocoon and His Sons is tragic or Robert Cappa’s ‘Death of a 
Loyalist Soldier’ captures the tragic moment of the end of a soldier’s life.212 Lamarque’s 
proposal is that an aesthetic property like ‘being tragic’ can be essentially possessed by 
different works of art – in other words in some cases, ‘being tragic’ can define the aesthetic 
character of some works of art.
213
  
    The above remarks bring us to the discussion towards another important distinction in 
characterising essentialism, the one between essential and accidental properties. This 
distinction is: 
 
                                            
211
 Most of these characterisations of different types of properties are inspired by Teresa Robertson and Philip 
Atkins, ‘Essential vs. Accidental Properties’, in Stanford Encyclopedia, online 2013. 
212
 Interestingly, since 1975 Cappa’s photograph is surrounded by a huge controversy about its authenticity 
because of its assumed location, the name of the soldier in the picture and moreover even because its authorship.  
But this still not deters from arguing that the image depicts a tragic moment. 
213
 I return to this discussion in Chapter IV when I analyse Lamarque’s view of essential aesthetic properties in 
individual works of art. 
101 
 
currently most commonly understood in modal terms: an essential property of an 
object is a property that it must have while an accidental property of an object is one 
that it happens to have but that it could lack
214
 
 
     The distinction between essential and accidental properties is important in understanding 
Lamarque’s own terminological choices with regard to aesthetic properties. For example in 
his argument for aesthetic    I-essentialism, in particular his distinction between works of art 
and mere objects, he uses ‘inessential’ properties and not ‘accidental’ properties. This is what 
he says about the two types of properties: essential properties of works are those properties 
that help to determine the work’s identity215 and if these properties are lost then the work is 
lost,
216
 while inessential properties are those properties which an object could lack or could 
lose and remain the same object
217
. One notices that this distinction between essential and 
inessential properties looks very much like the classical above mentioned distinction between 
essential and accidental properties. But, one could argued that Lamarque’s terminological 
choice of the term ‘inessential’ instead of ‘accidental’ is more appropriate in the artistic 
context because, as mentioned in Chapter II, Lamarque claims that aesthetic properties are a 
subclass of intentional properties. Intentional properties are characterised in a traditional way 
by Lamarque, as the properties: 
 
deriving from the attitudes, desires, thoughts and fears they invoke in human beings: 
desirable, frightening, inspiring, dangerous
218
 
 
If one accepts that works of art are cultural objects designed by artists to be desirable or 
inspiring then, one could argue that using the term ‘accidental’ to characterise aesthetic 
properties is indeed inappropriate. The rejection of using the term ‘accidental’ for aesthetic 
properties, I think, can be justified in different ways. One way is the undeniable role that the 
creator of a work of art has in the production of the work, in particular in the creative 
aesthetic choices the artist makes and the way these choices would be determined by the skill, 
materials and imaginative creation of the artist – in other words, the artist chooses most of his 
non-aesthetic means which could contribute to the emergence of aesthetic properties. Thus, 
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aesthetic properties are to a certain extent ‘intended’ by the artist, they are not there by 
accident.  
     Lamarque’s term ‘inessential’ rather than ‘accidental’ is a more fitting choice for the 
characterisation of some of the aesthetic properties of works. This does not mean that some 
actual accidental properties (a small blob of paint dripped by accident in the creative process 
on a canvas, or an unintended extra line in a drawing or a certain crack of the canvas of a 
painting, or a missing nose of a sculptured figure) could not be considered from an aesthetic 
point of view. Such particular properties could be characterised as aesthetic – they can be 
paid attention to and be assessed from an aesthetic point of view, but I would argue that they 
would be inessential, in the sense that these properties although analysed from an aesthetic 
point of view are not essential to the aesthetic character of the work (without them the work 
would remain the same work, in Lamarque’s words, the work will have the same aesthetic 
character).
 219
  
     
Section 2: Lamarque’s Individual Essentialism  
 
     So far I have introduced a number of basic terminological tools used in the debate on 
essentialism because my main aim was to introduce a particular essentialist approach in 
discussing works of art. In aesthetics the main motivation of the essentialist is linked to the 
attempt to answer the question ‘What is art?’ Also springing from this, is the preoccupation 
about the role of aesthetic properties in determining the aesthetic character of a work of art. 
Trying to answer the question about the nature of art or trying to define art through the 
employment of essences or essential properties is an essentialist approach to art. A number of 
essentialists are concern with the question about works of art having their aesthetic properties 
essentially – this is what is usually called ‘Aesthetic Essentialism’220. The contemporary 
picture of an essentialist persuasion is though very diverse because there are different 
essentialist views: works of art as aesthetic objects (general aesthetic essentialism), the 
importance of the origins of works of art (Levinson’s artistic origins essentialism), works of 
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art as part of a historical tradition (Danto’s historical essentialism), all works of art as 
members of a class (class-essentialism) or about individual works of art having essential 
aesthetic qualities (Lamarque’s individual-essentialism). 221 
     Lamarque points out that there are different types of essentialist theses in aesthetics and 
the most common ones are based on attempts to define art in terms of the properties that 
works ‘must possess to be works of art’222. According to Lamarque one such essentialist 
thesis is ‘class essentialism’ (C-essentialism), a thesis which is characterised in the following 
way: 
 
               There is at least one property that all works of art possess necessarily. 
223
 
 
This thesis assumes that there can be at least one property which is the same for all works of 
art. If one asks what this ‘one property’ could be, then a myriad of philosophical answers 
engulf the concept of a work of art. Traditionally many of these answers are focused on 
essential aesthetic properties as candidates for a common trait that all works of art could 
have. Examples of such traditional aesthetic properties are: certain representational 
properties, the property of being beautiful or sublime, expressive properties or formal 
properties like significant form, unity or coherence (to mention only a few). However, in the 
last century newer candidates claimed the role of a common property that all works of art 
could have; for example, such properties are ‘being part of an art tradition’ or ‘being related 
to art genres or art-history’ or ‘being part of an artistic creation’ (historical property), or 
‘being part of the artworld’ (institutional property), or ‘being directed at an art audience’ 
(intentional property), or ‘being related in a certain way to the perceiver’s responses’ 
(relational properties). Which one of those does Lamarque consider worthy of attention in the 
attempt to answer the question about a common trait that all works of art could have?  
     First, it needs to be said that Lamarque does not fully endorse C-essentialism, although he 
thinks that such a thesis is most likely true. Secondly, if there is ‘at least one property’ which 
all members of the class ‘works of art’ necessarily possess, he says, this property (or 
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properties) is not an aesthetic property or an intrinsic property of the work, but a type of 
historical or relational or institutional property.  One could draw here two quick observations, 
one is that Lamarque’s preference for ‘some species of relational, historical or institutional 
properties’224 as candidates for a specific property which all members of the class ‘works of 
art’ possess is a good option, even though, to some this would appear to be too inclusive. The 
other observation is related to the impossibility of identifying clear boundaries of such a class 
of objects – the class of works of art (both conceptually and epistemically). This last point 
comes to mind when one thinks of W. E. Kennick’s ‘large warehouse, filled with all sorts of 
things’. 225 Kennick proposed a thought experiment which makes one to consider rejecting 
the idea that works of art form a class of objects; the premise of such a class of objects is 
based on the idea that all the objects in this class have in common some specific property as a 
condition of their membership to this class. Also, one could add here the fact that class 
membership can be a matter of family resemblance. To return to Kennick’s thought 
experiment, one is asked to imagine a large  
warehouse full of different objects: 
 
….pictures  of every description, musical scores for symphonies and dances and 
hymns, machines, tools, boats, houses, churches and temples, statues, vases, books 
of poetry and of prose, furniture and clothing, newspapers, postage stamps, flowers, 
trees, stones, musical instruments.
226
 
 
     Kennick indicates that when one is instructed to go in the warehouse and to bring out all 
the works of art it contains, this person (an ordinary person) would mostly succeed in such a 
task. According to this scenario, Kennick argues, a person is able to identify the works of art 
because he or she simply knows English – not because the person has the ability to define art 
or knows what the common nature of all works of art is. One of  Kennick’s conclusion is that 
traditional aesthetics makes a mistake when it assumes that all works of art possess ‘some 
common nature, some distinctive set of characteristics which serves to separate Art from 
everything else’.227 To me this thought experiment does not eliminate the possibility that 
works of art could have a common nature and hence form a class of objects but it points out 
two possibilities. One is that the boundaries of such a class of objects are impossible to be 
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firmly pinned down because of the innovative dimension that art has and its dependence of 
socio-cultural contexts. The other possibility is that the search for a definition for such a class 
of objects could be replaced by Wittgenstein’s idea of family resemblance. For example, 
Schroeder argues that: 
  
a family resemblance concept (or one might also call it a ‘cluster concept’) must be 
taught by giving a sufficiently long list of example of different types and 
instances.
228
 
 
     Schroeder also suggests that the possibility of newer, unusual works in art ‘is no hindrance 
to our definition of our current concept of art’. Indeed, he is right to point out that what one 
needs doing from time to time, is to update the definition of art in the same way one already 
does with definitions form other domains (in particular the ones from the scientific and legal 
domains).
229
  
    Returning to Kennick’s thought experiment, Oswald Hanfling suggests that one weakness 
of this experiment is that an establishment of art experts had always had an influence in 
identifying more challenging examples of objects which later would be recognised as works 
of art – which means that the ordinary man is successful in identifying works of art only if, 
the works in the warehouse would conform to ‘existing notions and paradigms’ which would 
be known to him as an ordinary speaker of the language.
230
  
     I mentioned Kennick’s thought experiment to support the idea that although a class of 
objects like works of art is very interesting to consider as a whole, what seems to be 
impossible is to try to identify a specific common property that all members of this class 
have.
231
 However, Kennick wanted to make a point about the definition of a term like ‘art’ 
and emphasised that we “know quite well how to use the word ‘art’ and the phrase ‘work of 
art’ correctly”232 even though we cannot give an example of one property which all and only 
works of art have. Moreover, Lamarque himself does not try to defend the idea of C-
essentialism even though, as already mentioned, he suggests that some species of relational, 
historical or institutional properties can be good candidates for the role of common properties 
that works of art have.  
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     On the other hand, what Lamarque defends is a particular type of essentialism: ‘individual 
essentialism’ (I-essentialism), which, as far as I know, was coined by him in Work and Object 
(2010) in relation to his ontology of works. A general reading of I-essentialism as presented 
by Lamarque is that certain aesthetic descriptions of some works of art are necessary 
truths.
233
 This type of essentialism promotes the idea that individual works of art which have 
a certain aesthetic character possess some of their aesthetic properties essentially. This 
essentialism also suggests that, the aesthetic character of some works is identified when we 
attribute aesthetic properties to these works (for Lamarque to attribute aesthetic properties to 
works of art means to aesthetically describe the works of art).  There are two main premises 
that Lamarque discusses in support of his I-essentialism: the first is the distinction between a 
work of art and the object that embodies it
234
 and the second is about the close relation 
between aesthetic properties and the work of art. The first premise reflects the classical 
ontological preoccupation with the nature of works of art and the second premise is a more 
controversial proposal about the role of some aesthetic properties in the identity of individual 
works of art. I said ‘more controversial’ because Lamarque ultimately argues that ‘some 
works have some aesthetic properties essentially’ 235  and ‘objectively’ 236  even though 
aesthetic properties are response-dependent properties.
237
 
     In the rest of this chapter I am going to discuss Lamarque’s first premise that works of art 
are new objects which are different from the material base/the object that embodies them (he 
calls this view new-object theory). I deal with the second premise and with the application of 
Lamarque’s I-essentialism to works of visual art in the next chapter. However I need to 
mention here that the two above mentioned premises are very much intertwined and their 
separate analysis is mainly a methodological devise.  
 
2.1. Lamarque’s conception of works of art 
 
     Ontological enquiries deal with what kind of things are in the world and in the case of 
ontology of art the philosophers’ main preoccupations are about the distinction between 
                                            
233
 P. Lamarque, W&O, 2010, p. 95. 
234
 Ibid., p.104. 
235
 Ibid., p. 19. 
236
 Ibid., p. 60. 
237
 Ibid., p. 20. 
107 
 
works of art and other objects and the form and the mode in which works of art exist.
238
 
Lamarque in Work and Object (2010) concentrates his ontological investigation on the 
analysis of the main differences between artefacts (in particular, works of art) and mere 
objects, and the main core of this investigation is about aesthetic properties and the role these 
play in the identity conditions of works. 
    One can start with Lamarque’s very basic ontological distinction: ‘natural’ (or ‘ordinary’) 
objects are different from works (cultural artefacts) because ordinary objects do not depend 
for their existence on our perception or interpretation of them as artefacts do.
239
 In order to 
understand Lamarque’s ontological view, one needs to give four terminological clarifications 
from the onset: one is about the use of the adjective ‘ordinary’, the second is about how 
Lamarque sees cultural artefacts, the third is about the different divisions within the category 
of works of art, and the last one is about the term ‘mere objects’.  
     First, I would like to propose that one is in a better position if one chooses to use the 
adjective ‘ordinary’ instead of ‘natural’ when characterising the ontological status of most 
objects in contrast to the term work of art – very often Lamarque uses those two adjectives 
interchangeably. There are two reasons for this: one is that Lamarque himself means by 
‘ordinary’ objects more than natural objects (ordinary for him are plants, animals, planets, 
mountains, and ‘even those constituting the materials of paintings and sculpture’240) and the 
other is that Lamarque mentions that the pigment of paints and many sculpture materials are 
manmade and thus ’products of human artifice and invention, thus, arguably, not separate 
from human culture’241, thus not ‘natural’, yet ordinary. 
    The second clarification is about how Lamarque divides artefacts; for him there are two 
main types: cultural artefacts, which he calls ‘works’, and ‘other artefacts’, which are defined 
by their function, like tools and machines.
242
 Lamarque talks about the differences in identity 
between works (cultural artefacts) and other artefacts due to reception conditions – what 
works are taken to be or how they are perceived is an important feature of work-identity and 
this makes the works to be different from other artefacts or other ordinary objects. Here is 
Lamarque’s view: in a doomsday scenario works of art could not exist because their identity 
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is strictly linked to conditions of reception (he speaks about the role of ‘uptake’243), on the 
other hand other artefacts like: screwdrivers, CD players or wheel barrows could survive 
because their identity is bound up with their function.
244
 Although I agree that there is clear 
difference between works of art and other artefacts in their dependence on people’s 
responses, I slightly disagree with Lamarque’s view concerning the role of the difference 
between non-cultural artefacts (screwdrivers, CD players or wheel barrows) and works of art 
in a doomsday scenario. As far as I understand, for Lamarque all tools and machines possess 
their function as a disposition if there are no people around thus they still could exist as tools 
or machine even when there are no people around. To some extent this is true, but only if one 
accepts that there are fine-grained differences within this category. What I mean is that, the 
way tools and machines work, they have different degrees of functionality – they depend in 
different ways upon people’s intervention in making them work and in sustaining them in 
working. For example, a nutcracker as a devise for cracking nuts, it has the disposition to 
crack nuts if used in a certain way, but the conditions for manifesting this disposition are to a 
large extent dependent on people’s intervention. I would argue that a similar case is that of 
the disposition to function of a screwdriver. For example, both tools retain their disposition if 
there is a total lack of human intervention. However, Lamarque is probably right about a CD-
player which could still work in a world without people. However, I think the disposition to 
function/to work is in some ways is stronger in the CD-player, than in the screwdriver or the 
nutcracker. If the CD-player is solar powered it could function even if there are no people 
around. What I want to emphasise here, is that not all tools and machines have the same 
intensity of power to manifest their function. There are different degrees of functioning.
245
 
Thus my quarrel with Lamarque’s view is when talk about ‘other artefacts’ and works of art 
one needs to be aware of functioning degrees of freedom or fine-grained distinctions in their 
dispositional power. If Lamarque talked about functions as dispositions then maybe the 
enumerated tools, screwdrivers, CD players or wheel barrows could survive as tools (even if 
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not ever used) because they are not reception. Lamarque claims that works of art could not 
survive as works of art because their dispositions are reception bound. However, do works of 
art stop existing in a doomsday scenario because their identity is reception bound? Does the 
Guernica stop being a painting because there are no people around? Some would consider 
this suggestion implausible. The extreme doomsday scenario of an Earth, where there will 
never be people again, is an interesting case. When one imagines Earth with all the physical 
objects intact, but without a human presence there is at least the point of view from where the 
imagining happens. This bird’s eye view is the person’s who imagines this world, always the 
putative viewer who does the imagining. Thus, what one thinks about the doomsday scenario, 
can be described because there is the putative person who imagines what objects are left on 
Earth after people. Does the person who imagines this think that those tools somehow retain 
their disposition to function but works of art do not?  
     Maybe here a comparison between a functionalist view of art and that of Lamarque’s is 
helpful. The functionalist says that it is important that a work of art is designed to be 
perceived in a certain way, and most functionalist believe that the function of art is to 
produce (pleasurable) aesthetic experience. However, Lamarque makes the claim that works 
of art are public and perceivable (‘they can be seen, heard, touched, as appropriate, and by 
different perceivers’246) and it is part of their nature to demand a response from the public. Is 
Lamarque’s position very demanding? If there is a certain novel, or a painting or a musical 
score of a symphony which has never been seen by a public, is this object not a work of art? 
If one adds that such a novel is by Kafka, such a painting by Monet and such a musical score 
by Beethoven, would Lamarque still say that these undiscovered works were not works of art 
(some of these artists are reported to have destroyed or having wanted to destroy some of 
their works)? Lamarque’s answer could not be that these were not works of art. However, 
Lamarque wants to show that there is a particular distinction between the bigger class of 
artefacts and works of art. He insists that a work of art could not exist as a work of art in a 
world without people because works of art are ontologically different from other artefacts. 
This last point links with Lamarque’s argument that a work of art is not identical to its 
constituting material because it has ‘fundamentally different identity and survival 
conditions’247, an argument which I will tackle later in this section. Lamarque has a more 
demanding view of works of art than of other artefacts. As already mentioned, some of the 
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works of art desiderata are to be public and perceivable.
248
 Lamarque does not defend these 
desiderata but he considers them commonsensical. But, is Lamarque saying that if the work 
of art is public and perceivable, the artist creating the work is not a sufficient receptor for the 
work? Does the work need to be seen and responded to by at least another person? For 
example, let us assume that one does not know if the undiscovered novel, or painting, or the 
musical score of a symphony were ever seen by someone else other than the artist. If they 
were not, does this preclude them of being works of art? If the answer is that works which 
will never be discovered by the public are not works of art, then this will be a very unusual 
view of works of art. I think that Lamarque is right to some extent that works of art should be 
public and perceivable. If the works are not continuously public and perceivable, this should 
not preclude the works existence as objects/entities disposed to require a certain art response 
from people. However, as I understand Lamarque, the conditions for survival of a work of art 
are’ inextricably bound up’ with condition of reception of that work thus in a doomsday 
scenario there will be no reception thus no survival of the work. 
     The third clarification is about Lamarque’s view about the category of works. Although 
Lamarque speaks of ‘works’ in general, he points out that there are two classes of works: a 
narrower class containing works of art and a wider one containing simple tunes of popular 
music, folktales, children’s stories, genre fiction, amateur drama, run-of-the-mill paintings, 
sketches and sculptures.
249
 He mentions that the two classes do not have clear boundaries but 
he alludes to the fact that the narrower class is pinned down by the relation that its objects 
have with value – in other words, works of art are objects evaluated in a particular way 
(aesthetically, artistically or as art). The concept of a work of art has a strong honorific 
dimension which other concepts like works do not have.   
     The last clarification is about the distinction between ordinary objects and mere objects. 
‘Mere real object’ is a term introduced by Danto in his book The Transfiguration of the 
Commonplace: A Philosophy of Art (1981) when he discussed perceptually indiscernible 
objects (for example Danto discusses the difference between two urinals which, he says, are 
physically identical but one of them is a work of art while the other is not).
250
 Danto 
ontologically contrasted mere real things with works of art by emphasizing that works of art 
are about the world (they require to be interpreted) while mere objects are not
251
 and also 
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ordinary objects are part of the physical world while works of art have a wealth of features 
that ordinary objects do not. 
     I suggest that after more than three decades since the publication of Danto’s book 
(1981)
252
 and after G. Dickie’s institutional theory and all the subsequent developments of 
Danto’s ideas, there are two ways in which the term ‘mere objects’ is used: in a wider way in 
which the term covers all objects other than works of art (other artefacts and all other 
ordinary objects) and a narrow way in which, it refers to the underlying constituting material 
of a work of ar.  For example, if one thinks of the doomsday scenario, then the object by 
Picasso which hangs in the Reina Sofia Museum in Madrid and which people called 
Guernica, becomes a mere object. In the doomsday scenario, the mere object which embodies 
the painting Guernica would be the canvas and the paints with its other physical features 
which could be scientifically recorded by a robot. This mere object would not have anymore, 
any cultural wrappings, as Lamarque would say. I believe most people when asked how they 
understand the term ‘mere things’ would probably think about the wider sense of the term (all 
objects ordinary and artefacts that are not works of art). Nevertheless one needs to point out 
that the term ‘mere objects’ is usually used when thinkers or artists or art critics encounter 
and analyse works of art, including ready-mades or found objects as part of works of art, and 
when they try explaining how a work of art comes into existence and how it goes out of 
existence. A quick note here: ‘ready-mades’ refer to mass produced objects selected by artists 
and displayed as works of art (first used by Duchamp) while ‘found objects’ (objet trouvé) is 
a wider term referring to any object which in its normal context is not considered art (these 
‘objects’ can be natural objects, like a stone or a twig or they can be manmade modified 
objects) but which can be used by artists to create works of art. Here I understand that a work 
of art is more than its physical base, even if the physical base constitutes one single found 
natural object. Thus I use the term ‘create’ a work of art even in the case of found objects. 
Also ready-mades were initially artefacts, but not necessarily cultural objects (a urinal for 
example or a bicycle wheel), which can be transformed by ‘interpretation’ (to use Danto’s 
expression)
 253
 in a different ontological object – in a work of art, which becomes part of the 
artworld. Two such mass produced objects a urinal and a bicycle wheel were transformed 
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into two works of art: The Fountain and respectively The Bicycle Wheel by Duchamp and 
these two are after the artist creative moment two different objects, ontologically speaking, 
from their material base (the urinal and the wheel). Therefore paintings, books, poems, hand-
painted decorative tiles or a shaman’s hand-made cape are cultural objects which are works 
of art but mass produced objects can also become works of art. Moreover ordinary objects 
like a stone, a meteorite, a stick, a river could become conceptual pieces or art installations. 
Lamarque would say that an institutionalist view
254
 could explain why such objects can 
become works of art (ready-mades) and he would argue that ready-mades are ontologically 
different objects from their physical, mere object base. Lamarque’s distinction between ‘mere 
objects’ and works of art is based on the idea that each work of art has ‘an underlying 
constituting medium, describable (broadly enough) in culture-independent terms’.255 Thus 
Lamarque uses the term ‘mere object’ to refer to the object that embodies the work of art he 
talks about.  
    To return to the initial proposal of this section, that of the preoccupation with the nature of 
works of art, one needs to analyse Lamarque’s way of tackling this ontology. Lamarque has 
two avenues of this investigation: one which deals with general conditions for works of art to 
be art (work-identity and work-survival) and the other which is about work-specific identity 
conditions. In the first investigation there are questions about the identity of works of art 
(questions about the creation process: how works came in existence, the role of the artist in 
manipulating a medium and when is a work complete) and questions about the survival 
conditions of works (what conditions contribute to sustain the work in existence, what makes 
it to be recognised and responded to as a work of art and as the work it is?). The above 
enumerated questions are about works of art in general. The second investigation is focused 
on questions about individual works and their specific identity conditions, for example 
questions about the creation of certain works, their reception and survival. The work-identity 
and work-survival conditions of a certain work nurture a particular character of a work with 
salient features (intentional and relational properties – in particular its specific aesthetic 
properties) and value; but the work’s character is intimately linked to the historical and 
cultural context of that work.  
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     In order to answer all those questions about the conditions of work-identity and survival 
conditions, Lamarque suggests the following desiderata for works of art, which he argues, are 
‘commonsensical and desirable’: works of art are real, not ideal entities; they are public and 
perceivable; they possess their properties objectively, some essential, some inessential; they 
are cultural objects; they are essentially tied to human acts and attitudes; they are created (by 
artists); they can come into existence and go out of existence and their identity conditions are 
value-laden.
256
 Lamarque points out that in the aesthetics literature each desideratum was 
rejected but he maintains that these desiderata need preserving even though he does not offer 
arguments to support each desideratum.     
    There are two ways of dealing with his suggestion. One is to choose a number of very 
different works of art and investigate whether each desideratum is suitable for them. 
However, this approach would require more than the scope of this thesis. The second way of 
dealing with Lamarque’s desiderata is to select the most important ones and discuss them in 
relation to a reduced, but hopefully representative number of works of art. This seems a more 
appropriate approach with regard to the aim of this section. However the question of which 
works one should choose as ‘representative’ is still very difficult and there is no easy answer. 
For example, Lamarque considers that ‘it is important not to focus exclusively on the most 
revered and most well-known works of art, for this can lead, as we shall see, to theoretical 
distortions’.257A possible acceptable compromise is to choose works that are “representative”. 
This choice could be a combination of works of art that are accepted and revered and works 
that are considered to be controversial but influential in the history of art. The puzzlement 
about representative works of art is mainly a 20
th
 century affair. It can be argued that this 
puzzlement was always there when works of art were produced and responded to. However, 
the Dadaists ignited a more focused and poignant debate about the ontology and status of 
works of art. One can insist that there is a number of works of art that are generally regarded 
as artistically significant and this significance does not have to be debated (works which are 
recognised by an important segment of a culture as influential and valuable). Lamarque warns 
us against considering only the most ‘revered and well-known’ works of art because he 
claims that this can lead to distortions. In general when one uses the expression ‘revered 
works of art’ it is understood that this is a positive evaluative characterization and that this 
characterization is usually an aesthetic or an artistic one. There are other works that can be 
representative but not necessarily ‘revered’ and some of the most interesting ontological 
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discussions start with arguments about the exceptions – some works are borderline and not 
‘revered’ in a traditional sense but they are  representative (from an art history point of view, 
or from a cultural perspective, or even form an anti-aesthetic perspective
258
). Choosing to use 
the adjective ‘representative’ or ‘significant’ instead of ‘revered’ for works of art would 
allow more manoeuvrability when selecting individual works of art to be discussed. Because 
my main interest is in the aesthetic experience of visual arts, in this section I am going to 
mainly focus on the following works: the painting Guernica by Picasso, the sculpture 
Laocoon and His Sons from the Hellenistic period and the Chauvet Cave pre-historic 
paintings.  
     The term ‘works’ covers a large class of entities from paintings, sculpture, novels, poems, 
sonatas, jazz improvisations, kabuki plays, contemporary pieces of dance, films, video pieces, 
photographs, installations, buildings, performance pieces to social sculpture, or land art 
works. Lamarque says about works:  
 
Works are objects (broadly construed) but objects of a distinct kind, cultural or 
‘institutional’ objects. The crucial distinction is between that which depends 
essentially on human thought and cultural activity and that which does not.
259
 
 
What Lamarque emphases here is that the difference between works and mere objects is an 
ontological difference – the objects are different in kind and this is due to the fact that works 
have relational and intentional properties which mere objects do not have. Works of art are 
essentially dependent on appropriate cultural conditions (e.g. cultural practices, people’s 
attitude, art history, the role of the artist and social context). I will discuss what Lamarque 
says about the essential role of cultural conditions in the identity of a work of art in this 
section when I analyse some of the above mentioned works of art. Lamarque uses a beautiful 
expression to capture this important role: ‘cultural wrappings’. 
     To shed light on Lamarque’s characterisation of works of art as cultural objects which are 
ontologically different from mere objects (from the objects that embody them)
260
, I start with 
the painting Guernica (1937) by Picasso (Fig. 14).  
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 Fig.14 Guernica (1937) by Pablo Picasso 
 
First of all one can begin with the idea that there is a physical object, the oil painting with 
black, white and grey colours, that is 349.3 x 776.6 cm and is now in the  Reina Sofia 
Museum in Madrid and which was painted in May 1937 by Picasso. Secondly, Guernica is an 
object of a distinct kind, a cultural or institutional object (it depends essentially on human 
thought and cultural activity). Guernica as a work of art depends essentially on human 
thought and cultural activity because it was created by an artist, it demands certain responses 
from the viewers (aesthetic/artistic or contemplative), and it needs its viewers to be sustained 
in existence as a work of art. Here, for example I think Lamarque would need to add a caveat: 
Guernica can be sustained in existence as long as there is a faint possibility of human 
responses to its encounter.  
     One way to tackle all these characteristics is to start with this basic question related to the 
nature of the painting: ‘Is Guernica identical with its constituting material?’ According to 
Lamarque (and most other aestheticians), Guernica is constituted by physical materials but is 
not identical with its constituting materials: ‘...for every work there is an underlying 
constituting medium, describable (broadly enough) in culture-independent terms’.261  This 
view suggests that the properties of the canvas, the paints and the colours of Guernica can be 
investigated using the language and the methods of physical sciences while works of art 
would require different types of investigation. Thus one of the most challenging tasks is how 
to investigate the nature of the relation between the medium (the materials out of which 
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Guernica is made) and the work of art Guernica.
262
 One needs to point out that here materials 
of Guernica are maybe easily identifiable, but Lamarque insists that ‘material’ needs to be 
understood in a wider sense as a medium, because when talking of other types of works of art 
there is not only the canvas, the bronze, the paints, the charcoal, the paper, etc. but also there 
are word-types, sound-types or structure-types, and I would add found objects, gestures, 
movements, bodies etc. which are the ‘materials’ of works of art.     
    One traditional view about the relation between Guernica and its physical base is that 
Picasso manipulated the physical medium (the canvas and oil paints) in such a way that the 
result was the creation of a painting called Guernica. The resultant object is still a physical 
thing but with a different outlook from its original physical materials that were used to 
constitute it. The most common example used to illustrate such a traditionalist understanding 
of the relation between the material constituting the work and the work, is the explanation of 
the creation of figurative sculpture. In the case of a statue made of bronze, the work would be 
the bronze shaped in a particular way by the artist. In the same vein when discussing musical 
works the explanation could be that the composer manipulates the medium (arranges in 
patterns, sequences and juxtaposes sound-types with certain pitches, tones, rhythms or 
harmonies) until the completion of the musical work or in the case of literature, the writer 
does something similar by manipulating the medium of language by structuring words, 
meanings, sentence-structures and putting them in a certain context of ideas, themes and 
genres until the literary work is completed.
263
 This kind of approach proposes a simple view 
of creativity and of the relation between the work of art and its physical constitutive material; 
it argues that the work is identical with its constitutive material manipulated into a certain 
structure.  
     There are a number of direct consequences if one accepts this view of the creation of 
works of art. First, we could dispense with the artist as a creative genius (a robot could be 
programmed to manipulate a material into a certain structure and consider this structure a 
work of art not the software or an agent could by mistake manipulate the materials is such a 
way that the product could be considered a work). Secondly, the identity of a work would be 
wholly dependent on the integrity of the material manipulated in a certain structure (changes 
of the constitutive material would mean changes of the work). Thirdly, the work could be the 
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result of the material accidentally being manipulated into a certain structure (the wind carving 
a stone into a particular shape or the Polaroid camera falling down from a moving car and 
producing an image of an urban scene). The problem here is not so much with the claim that 
the materials are combined in a certain structure but with the idea of intentionality; a work is 
an intentional object. Some of the consequences mentioned in accepting the simplistic 
traditional view point towards the idea that objects which are not intentional can be mistaken 
for works of art.  
     The supporters of the simplistic view argue that the work of art is a physical object and the 
artist only manipulates the (physical) materials into a certain structure, emphasising the idea 
of a ‘certain structure’. What is important for them is the fact that the artist’s creativity is 
only about his or her ability to arrange things into a coherent and recognisable structure that 
they would call a work of art. One can think of a number of obvious reasons to reject such a 
view; here are these reasons and comments to support them: 
     i)  Often changes in the physical base of a work do not necessarily affect the identity and 
value of the work itself. Of course here one is referring to certain ‘changes’ which are not 
major changes to the appearance and the composition of a work. Thus, if a radical supporter 
of the simplistic view says that the work is identical with its material base, then even a small 
transformation of the base should directly and wholly affect the work. However, this is not 
the case and there are very few supporters of an identity view. In most instances when the 
medium of a work is slightly modified this will not affect the identity and reception of the 
work (e.g. a missing nose of a statue, or the slight fading colour of a 15
th
 century painting, or 
the missing of a note on a symphony, or a change of the sex of one of the performers of one 
particular a piece by Pina Bausch, or taking out a particular scene of a feature film
264
, or the 
typing errors of the publishing of a novel
265
 etc.). Of course, the discussion here changes 
depending on which each art form one talks about. In some cases, like a dance piece some of 
the properties of the performance can change often without affecting the value of the work 
(but this is another discussion about performance works and the choreography score). 
However, there are some dance pieces in which the sex of the performer can be an essential 
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ingredient of the piece and changing it could affect the work (usually the choreographer’s 
instructions are important for the integrity of the performance).  
     Here one can also envisage cases when ‘significantly altered’ means changing only one 
colour in a painting and this change could mean the changing of the identity of a work. For 
example changing one of the neutral colours, let us say the white in Picasso’s Guernica with 
a primary colour like red or blue would mean that there is a different work to be 
contemplated. The explanation of the change would be that the monochromatic composition 
in Guernica is an essential property of the work and changing it will change the work (but not 
because of a simple change in the physical base, although changing one colour would appear 
so, but because the chromatic effect of Guernica is a feature of the aesthetic of the painting 
not of the base material).
266
 
     ii)  One could argue that the traditional view has a narrow understanding of what artists do. 
If ‘manipulating’ materials in a certain structure is all that is required for a work than artists’ 
creativity is a simple matter of compositionality.
267
 Lamarque argues that works of art are 
distinct from the ‘objects’ that constitute them and they are more than the physical 
support/material that constitute them: 
 
There is more to a musical work than just a sequence of sounds. More to a literary 
work than just a sequence of words, more to a pictorial work than just the 
configuration of line and colour, more to a sculpture than  just a shaped block of 
marble.
268
  
 
This ‘more’ can be easily accepted as an explanation of what distinguish works of art from 
other objects but the puzzle arises when one wants to qualify the nature of ‘more’. What 
makes the sequence of sounds to be music? Is Lamarque saying that there is another 
ingredient that one needs to add to the sequence? One can suggest that this ‘more’ is not 
another thing. What makes us to consider something being music, are certain qualities of the 
sound arrangements that we call music.   
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     Lamarque’s answer to the above question is that one way of showing that a work of art is 
more than the stuff that constitutes it is to make use of Danto’s distinction between the ‘mere 
real thing’ and the work. Thus Lamarque rejects an identity theory which proposes that a 
work is the result of ‘a change occurring in a pre-existing thing in the world, a thing that 
remains essentially the same, albeit with evolving properties.
269
   
     Lamarque proposes the new-object (non-identity) theory which explains how a work 
comes into existence and how it is sustained in existence. There are two central ideas running 
through his theory. The first idea is that the new object is different from the mere object 
which embodies the work, even though this new work of art is still a physical object (if 
physical is construed in a wider way): 
 
....a new thing is introduced into the world when a work of art is made. This new 
thing is still a physical object or a sound- or word-sequence-type but it is not the 
same physical object or type that existed earlier.
270
  
 
     The second idea is about the central role of the conditions of creation and survival of the 
work, conditions which are totally embedded in the cultural context of the work. Lamarque 
talks eloquently about the intimate link between the works and everything related to their 
coming into existence and their survival. He says that works:  
.....are inseparable from their cultural wrappings, such that features of these 
‘wrappings’ can be thought to ‘belong to’ the works themselves 271 
 
 What are these cultural wrappings? Lamarque would say that cultural wrappings are the 
historical and cultural context of the creation of works of art (‘what must obtain for a work to 
come into existence’), as well as how the work is responded to (the conditions under which 
the work is ‘sustained in existence’). Thus with the new-object theory we come full circle 
because this is Lamarque’s initial suggestion of how to tackle the question about the nature of 
works: to establish what makes something a work of art is to explain how a work comes into 
existence, to show what role the artist plays in the creation of a work and to understand the 
importance of how a work is recognised and responded to as a work of art. As already noted, 
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Lamarque does not defend each desideratum of works, but by arguing for his new-object 
theory he invariably discusses most of the enumerated characteristics of works of art. 
    Now that I have presented a number of Lamarque’s main claims with regard to the nature 
of works of art, in what follows I return to the painting Guernica and I analyse its conditions 
for coming into existence and its conditions for survival in order to support Lamarque new-
object theory and to show that a work of art is a different kind of object from the mere object 
that embodies it.  
    When did Guernica become the work it is and what does it mean to say that it is a real 
entity which is public and perceivable? Picasso started working on the idea of Guernica at the 
beginning of May 1937. There are 45 studies on paper for Guernica which Picasso did in 
Paris between 1
st
 May and 4
th
 of June using various techniques (most of the sketches were in 
pencil and crayons). The big canvas that was the physical base for the painting went through 
seven stages before it was completed on 4
th
 June 1937.
272
 As already mentioned, Lamarque 
endorses the view that works are more than manipulations of the existing material in the 
world or the rearrangement of pre-existing items. Guernica as a work is a cultural entity 
because it is the product of human agency and intention and the work that is Guernica, 
emerged when the work on it was completed, when a new object, a work of art entered the 
world. But are the 45 studies on paper which Picasso did in preparation of the painting part of 
the physical medium or part of the artistic medium? Or are they preparatory sketches that 
only contributed to the creation of Guernica in the same way that other sources of inspiration 
did – for example the images from the newspapers reporting the destruction of the Basque 
town of Guernica in three and a half hours? The preliminary studies for Guernica can be 
considered both part of physical medium (Picasso used the studies physically by looking at 
them, handling them, using them as other tools whose function was to help in the physical 
production of a work) and part of the artistic medium (Picasso used the studies as inspiration, 
as the basis for his artistic conception of atrocities of the war, for compositional ideas). Thus 
one can argue that Picasso manipulated the physical medium (paints, canvas, preliminary 
studies on paper) under certain practical constrains (time, the flexibility of the actual 
materials Picasso used, his physical power of work etc.) and under certain artistic conditions  
(e.g.: his ability to depict figures and objects, his response to war atrocities, his compositional 
ideas, usage of certain socio-cultural symbols, his cubist and surrealist style, his earlier 
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studies, his trust in an informed public who was aware of the event depicted, etc.) and all of 
these were part of the creative process.  
     In order to better understand the creative process of Guernica one needs to mention David 
Davies’ distinction between vehicular and artistic medium, a distinction which Lamarque 
adopts in his explanation of how an artist brings a work into existence. Davies mentions that 
the debate about the distinction between the two media started in the 20
th
 century with 
Beardsley and it continued with other philosophers like Levinson, Margolis and Binkley. 
Davies has a detailed discussion about these philosophers’ conceptions in his book Art as 
Performance, 2004, a discussion which I am not going into. However, the distinction is 
important for Lamarque’s account of how a work is completed, thus I briefly present and 
discuss Davies’ distinction. He says: 
 
We may adopt the term “vehicular medium” as a generalization of Margolis’ notion 
of physical medium [...]. The product of an artist’s manipulation of a vehicular 
medium will then be the vehicle whereby a particular artistic statement is 
articulated
273
 
 
and  
 An artistic medium of a work, so construed, will be the means employed by an artist 
to articulate an artistic statement, and thereby specify a piece that is accessible to 
receivers.
274
 
 
An immediate comparison springs to mind when thinking about the distinction of vehicular 
medium and artistic medium, which is a traditional conception that the artist manipulates the 
material he uses (mostly physical, although these can also be actions or sounds or words) 
with a certain artistic or aesthetic goal in mind. But this comparison is not very apt when one 
analyses what both Davies and Lamarque mean by artistic medium. The artist creates a work 
of art with representational, expressive and formal properties
275
 and it is central to the 
creative process how the work is conceived or articulated – this is the artistic medium. The 
most interesting characteristic of the artistic medium is that: 
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[...] An artistic medium mediates between what the artist does, naively construed, 
and what the work “says”, in a broad sense, in virtue of what the artist does.276 
 
Such a view introduces the powerful idea of the intentionality of the artist who creates a work 
by manipulating a vehicular medium in order to articulate his artistic or aesthetic intentions 
by producing certain salient features of a work (what earlier I mentioned as representational, 
expressive and formal properties and meanings). Thus having the materials to work with, 
knowing how to manipulate these materials, having skill and having a conception about what 
kind of work one wants is what is involved in the creative process. Lamarque says that: ‘The 
combination of vehicular medium and artistic medium allows for a richer understanding of 
what it is to make a work.’277      
     But how is this distinction between vehicular and artistic medium applied to Guernica? In 
the case of Guernica, Davies says the vehicle is the physical object. By this he means, I 
suppose, the physical particular that can be found in the Reina Sofia Museum in Madrid 
which is comprised of canvas and paints and having a certain. In the case of Guernica the 
artistic medium is well known because we know about Picasso’s intentions from his 
discussions with contemporaries, about his creative process by looking at his many 
preparatory sketches and also because we understand Picasso’s conception of how he could 
express his revolt. In other words, the artistic medium of Guernica is a distinctive aesthetic 
‘vocabulary’ embedded in artistic conventions and practices which Picasso used when he 
manipulated the vehicular medium (this formulation stems from Davies’ own explanation).  
     Another important discussion with regard to the coming into existence of a work of art is 
the idea of completion of a work. For example most people would say that when Picasso 
considered that the work was completed, then the work of art Guernica came into existence. 
But is the matter of completion only dependent upon the artist’s deliberate decision ‘to stop’? 
Lamarque says that a work of art is completed, when it satisfies the artist (what Lamarque 
calls a ‘genetic completion’) and then a new kind of object comes into existence. There are 
two types of completion of a work: an aesthetic completion and a genetic completion; both 
are value-dependent. The aesthetic completion refers to a judgement made about the work by 
others than the creator of the work and the genetic completion involves a value judgment 
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about the work by the artist.
278
 The aesthetic completeness means that the work is well-
structured, unified and pleasing and if the work is aesthetically unsatisfactory, it means that it 
fails in certain respects.
279
 However, Lamarque is not clear about who are the ‘others’ making 
the aesthetic judgment that the work is complete. He says that a work can look aesthetically 
complete even though an artist left the work unfinished. This suggests that other people than 
the artist could declare the work aesthetically complete, but a fully completed work is the 
result of the artist’s decision that the work is complete.280 Nevertheless, Lamarque does not 
elaborate on the people who can make the judgement about aesthetic completion. Are they 
the art critics, the art public or even a group of the artist’s friends who are able to see the 
work? Also Lamarque does not say what would be a sufficient number of these people.  
     It is accepted that Picasso started working on Guernica on 1
st
 of May 1937 although the 
bombing of Guernica by German and Italian forces allied with the Spanish nationalists 
happened earlier on 26
th
 April 1937. But because we know a lot about some aspects of the 
creative process of Guernica one is wondering when the work came into existence, when the 
work was complete? Its genetic completion suggests that Picasso ‘finished’ the work by mid-
June when the painting was mounted on the walls of the Spanish pavilion of the World 
Fair.
281
 And if one thinks of aesthetic completion then there are at least two alternatives: on 
the one hand, friends and critics of Picasso might have seen the work immediately after the 
completion and made aesthetic judgments about it. On the other hand, one can consider that 
the date for the public aesthetic reaction to the painting was the opening of the Spanish 
pavilion on 12 July 1937 and this should be considered the date of the aesthetic completion. I 
think the former is a better candidate for the establishing the parameters of aesthetic 
completion. However, it appears that the concept of ‘aesthetic completion’ is a tall order 
requirement for an explanation for the completion of a work of art. If a work of art is 
completed when the artist considers it is completed, then it would not matter if the work is 
never discovered by another person or never experienced as a work of art. But according to 
the idea of aesthetic completion the work needs an audience to make aesthetic judgements 
about the work. Thus, one can imagine a fire that would have destroyed Guernica before 
Picasso exhibited the painting (let us assume that other people would not have visited Picasso 
and seen different stages of the work). Nevertheless one would still be entitled to consider 
                                            
278
 P. Lamarque acknowledges that these terms are borrowed from Livingston’s ‘Counting Fragments and 
Frenhofer’s Paradox’ (BJA, vol. 39, 1999., pp. 14-23). This is mentioned in note 3, p. 35, in W&O, 2010. 
279
 Ibid., p.35. 
280
 Ibid., p.36. 
281
 Carsten-Peter Warncke and Ingo E. Walther, Picasso, Taschen, Koln, 1997, p. 388. 
124 
 
that there was a work of art which perished in the fire. Lamarque’s distinction between 
genetic and aesthetic completion could help with similar hard cases. For example: if the artist 
was interrupted in completing a work, or if there was no other person who saw the work, or if 
all the people die as in the doomsday scenario, or when we do not have any details about the 
context of the work production or about its historical provenance, like cave paintings. 
    Another intriguing example of a work for the current discussion is that of the classical 
marble sculpture Laocoon and His Sons (from the late Hellenistic period, 160-31 BC) which 
is attributed to three Rhodian sculptors (Fig. 15). Interestingly, Pliny the Elder believed that 
the three sculptors were copyists and the Laocoon Group was probably not their 
composition.
282
 One can assume that if there is collaboration for a work of art there are many 
possible ways in which such work could have been completed in the genetic sense.  
     One can imagine the following situation that could take place if there are three sculptors 
involved in the creation of a statue: two sculptors work intensively in the last stages for the 
completion of the work and the third sculptor comes much later and tells the other two 
sculptors that he is going to work a little more on the sculpture. They all agree that the 
sculpture still needs some work. After agonising over the sculpture (it is 
not important how long – it can be a short or a long period) the third sculptor decides that ‘in 
the light of what has been achieved’ he does not need to add or modify the marble and leaves 
the sculpture as it is.  
     The three sculptors then decide that the work is complete and then they present it to a 
group of art lovers (Roman buyers if the sculpture was the Laocoon Group). The viewers and 
the buyers are astonished by the skill of the sculptors in portraying the death struggle of the 
three bodies and the suffering of the characters of the group. Thus the aesthetic experience of 
such a work is hugely rewarding and the sculpture becomes an exemplar of the portrayal of 
sufferance and agony in sculpture. This imaginary example about the creation of such a work 
suggests that the genetic completion of the work, as understood by Lamarque, happened 
when the three sculptors decided that the work was ready to be exhibited or presented to 
viewers. Was the sculpture completed when the three sculptors agreed to stop working on it 
because they were aesthetically satisfied?   
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                 Fig.15 Laocoon and His Sons (160-31 BC) 
 
In this imaginary case the decision was a collective one and even though the third sculptor 
did not carry out additional work on the sculpture, all three sculptors guided by aesthetic and 
artistic considerations, decided that the work was completed. However, this is an interesting 
case. One can suggest that the genetic completion happened at the same time with the 
aesthetic completion because of the collective aspect of the creation of the sculpture.  
     The distinction between the genetic completion and aesthetic completion is very useful 
although there are many cases when the two conceptions will be impossible to separate or to 
establish. To reiterate, Lamarque’s new-object theory suggest that an ontologically different 
object comes into existence when a work is completed. On the downside of this theory, if 
there is a ‘before’ and an ‘after’ the completion of a work there will be cases which do not fit 
within this dichotomy, for example: incomplete works, diaries, repainting of different 
sections of works much latter, reworks of an author by another author, some collective works 
etc. I want to conclude here that the question about the genetic completion of a work should 
not be given too much weight by the viewers or the critics if such a completion is not 
identifiable from the artist’s memoirs, interviews and testimonials of his contemporaries. As 
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Lamarque says, the decision of the artist of what constitutes a work brings into the world a 
new object, but this is not always something that the viewer or critic can establish. But, there 
are cases as already mentioned, where the artist’s decision to complete the work in the 
genetic sense, does not exist.  
      Given what we said until now, one can see that Lamarque’s idea is that the existence and 
survival of a work of art is dependent upon appropriate cultural conditions and this idea is 
crucial for understanding the nature of works of art – without those conditions the work 
would not be essentially what it is. Lamarque uses an illuminating example to illustrate what 
he means by the appropriate cultural conditions: prehistoric cave paintings. These paintings 
are examples of objects with certain lines, colour configurations, representational and 
expressive properties but Lamarque raises the question: Are they works of art?  
     In his paper ‘The Aesthetic and the Universal’ (1999), Lamarque discusses the 1994 
discovery of the prehistoric paintings of The Chauvet Cave which is located along a bank of 
the river Ardèche near the Pont-d’Arc, southern France.283 (Fig. 16) 
 
 
                                                
                    Fig.16 The Chauvet Cave (detail), 32,000 years old 
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 However since Lamarque’s paper was published in 1999, there have been other discoveries of cave art. The 
most recent is from El Castillio, a cave in Northern Spain whose paintings are dated at more than 40,800 years 
old thus making them the oldest paintings in the world.   
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     Lamarque argues that the discovery of these prehistoric paintings, thought to be 32,000 
years old,  makes art historians uncomfortable because: on the one hand, the perceptual 
qualities of the paintings invite aesthetic and art historical characterisations and on the other 
hand the paintings remain mysterious and  hard to be appropriately interpreted. He considers 
that this kind of uncomfortable situation is also reflected, in contemporary aesthetics, by a 
tension between two significant motifs: one, the essential embeddedness of cultural objects in 
cultural traditions that give them identity and make them intelligible and the other, the 
easiness with which these cultural objects are appropriated by other cultural traditions and 
assimilated into different contexts.
284
 
     If one accepts the proposal that works of art are cultural artefacts inseparable from their 
cultural wrappings, then it is understandable why Lamarque is worried about the above 
mentioned tension. The main problem lies with the second motif described as the ‘easiness’ 
with which we appropriate cultural objects of other cultural traditions. The first culprits 
which come to mind are the rise of cultural relativism and postmodern tendencies which 
encourage a significant permeability between cultures and an unrestricted appropriation of 
works of art. However, even if one does not buy into this loose characterization of cultural 
relativism or postmodernist tendencies and believes that an informed observer has some 
recognition of the established practices of different cultures there is still the problematic 
interpretation of works of art from isolated cultures or very distant historical periods. 
Lamarque points out that if one considers that there are certain conditions that must obtain for 
a work of art to come into existence and be sustained in existence as a work with a specific 
identity then one should be wary of identifying and appreciating works like the prehistoric 
cave paintings as works of art. Did the people making the Chauvet Cave paintings 
(palaeontologists call the people who live there around 40,000 years ago Cro-Magnons) not 
created works of art? Lamarque says that we don’t know and we cannot know if these 
paintings are works of art or they could have been: ‘The line and configurations are still there 
to see, but arguably the works are lost.’285 
    However a chorus of art lovers, nature enthusiasts, speleologists, poets, artists, art critics, 
film makers, historians etc., would univocally praise the beauty and the expressive qualities 
of the paintings and the rewarding aesthetic experiences they had when encountering theses 
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works.
286
 For example, one such artist is contemporary artist Jo Thomas, who was 
aesthetically inspired by seeing reproductions and documentaries of the cave paintings (Fig. 
17). She responded to those prehistorical images through sketches, paintings and writings – 
creating her own homage to the aesthetics of the Chauvet Cave. Thus from an art historical 
perspective the images form Chauvet Cave are some of the first in a line of extraordinary 
representations of nature in movement and for all subsequent artists who are aware of these 
paintings, the images from 40,000 years ago cannot be other than a source of aesthetic 
inspirations, of the first works of art. 
 
 
 
                                        
                         Fig. 17 Lion Cave by Jo Thomas (Diary page) 
 
     Lamarque does not deny that we do appreciate the prehistoric cave paintings for their 
beauty; he thinks that we enjoy the prehistoric depictions simply through their appearance. 
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We do, indeed consider them worthy objects of attention. What he denies is that we can 
understand and appreciate them as prehistoric works of art: 
 
Because we do not know what practices they were embedded in or what meanings, 
if any, they express, we are literally in the dark as to what intentional objects they 
are; this should make us wary of importing an artistic vocabulary in our attempts to 
understand or explain them
287
  
 
    His argument starts with his ontological view of works of art: works of art are distinct from 
‘mere objects’, they are intentional objects with aesthetic, artistic and representational 
properties, they have no independent existence from the very practices that serve to 
discriminate them from other things. If the interpretative process means seeking to 
understand and appreciate the prehistoric cave paintings, then according to Lamarque 
‘reading’ them as works of art is misplaced. He points out that even if these works were 
works of art during the last Ice Age, they do not exist anymore as works of art; we now, 
appreciate them as something else. Perhaps, he says, ‘different works have arisen in their 
place’.288  
     Lamarque argues that as the Chauvet Cave paintings as works of art are lost, they do not 
exist anymore because we do not know the appropriate conditions of production and 
reception of these works and because works survive only when we apprehend the works as 
the works they are
289
. For example according to this view we can find a text in an unknown 
language and what we discovered is a string of letters, a text but not a work. One could agree 
with Lamarque that the original works did not survive but the mere objects did. There are two 
reasons to support this claim: one is that because we do not know the conditions of 
production and the cultural context of these objects we cannot experience the original 
works
290
, and the second is that although we do experience them as paintings and as aesthetic 
objects it is possible for our experiences of them to be inappropriate for the works they were 
supposed to be. However, whatever they were originally, now we think and appreciate them 
as works of representational art or aesthetic objects, but Lamarque points out that maybe we 
appreciate different works from the originals. Not knowing anything about the practice that 
encouraged such works and how they were supposed to be received as works, is a handicap 
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for experiencing the cave paintings as the works they were intended to be. A particular 
cultural object exists as long as the appropriate cultural conditions exists or are known. 
Indeed the 40,000 years since the Chauvet Cave paintings conception could be considered a 
barrier to the appropriate appreciation of these works as works of art. Here the emphasis is on 
‘appropriate’ appreciation – as already mentioned we do enjoy the aesthetic appeal of these 
paintings but what Lamarque insists on is that the origin and intention behind these works are 
not known to us and this drastically reduces our chances of appropriately perceiving the 
paintings for the works they were supposed to be appreciated.  
     ‘Never mind!’ will cry the chorus (art lover, writers, artists, film makers, historians, 
scientists, etc), we should be satisfied with the great aesthetic experiences and with the 
cognitive puzzles that these prehistoric cave paintings conjure. To a large extent the chorus is 
right and we are not aesthetically impoverished when we appreciate those paintings (or at 
least, we think we are not). But Lamarque makes an important point that the reception 
conditions of a work are part of its identity as a work of art and in order to sustain a work in 
existence one needs the awareness and understanding of the cultural wrappings of the work. I 
believe it is important here to mention that Lamarque is not worried about calling the 
Chauvet Cave paintings, works of art or not (indeed it should not matter if the Cro-Magnons 
called them ‘works of art’ or if they used a similar concept). Lamarque makes a point about 
the appropriateness of the experience of the work – by having the suitable cultural 
background and knowledge about the context of creation of a work, one could experience a 
work of art appropriately for the work of art it is. The idea that we do not know anything 
about the cultural wrappings of the pre-historical paintings, warns us against making 
unsubstantiated claims about the works as works of art of that period. However, these images 
are no doubt a continuous source of aesthetic delight for both artists and the general public 
and both representing the aesthetic outlook of a contemporary audience.  
    In addition to this discussion about pre-historic cave paintings an interesting application of 
the distinction between vehicular medium and artistic medium is the interpretation and 
evaluation of some works whose makers are not known. In order to recognise and experience 
a work of art as art, as a new object in the world, one needs to know something about its 
properties and its cultural wrappings. But if one does not know anything about the artistic 
medium of the pre-historic paintings then one does not know the works’ conditions of 
existence and reception. Therefore, one is not able to experience and appreciate the pre-
historic cave painting as the works intended to be, because we do not know if they are works 
of art – to be more specific, as the works they were supposed to be when they come into 
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existence 40, 000 years ago. Moreover considering the case of not knowing anything about 
the creators or contexts of creation of works can be very useful to warn us against famous art 
hoax examples of paintings presented to the art public as paintings created by famous 
‘artists’, where the ‘artists’ are animals (e.g. the case of Pierre Brassau, the chimpanzee from 
Sweden’s Boras zoo, in 1964). 
     In this chapter I introduced the main terminology of an essentialist framework and I 
introduced Lamarque’s aesthetic essentialism by discussing the first premise of his argument. 
His essentialism proposes that some works of art necessarily possess a distinctive aesthetic 
character which is supported by his two premises, the first one is works of art are ontological 
different objects from the mere object that embodies them and the second premise is about 
some aesthetic properties having a necessarily relation to the individual works of art and not 
to the object that embodies them. I agreed with Lamarque that works of art are cultural 
objects which are public and perceivable, they are new things brought into the world by 
artists’ manipulation and creation under a certain conception, and that these new objects have 
a certain identity and survival conditions. In the next chapter I deal with the second premise 
which is about the importance of the role that aesthetic properties play in the identity of a 
work and I discuss a number of applications of Lamarque’s I-essentialism to works of visual 
art. 
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CHAPTER V 
Lamarque’s  Individual Essentialism 
Part 2: Aesthetic properties and works of art 
 
 
     Lamarque proposes two versions of aesthetic I-essentialism:  
i) The strong thesis 
(T*) All works of art that possess aesthetic properties possess at least some of them 
essentially 
291
 
 
ii) The weaker thesis 
(T) Some aesthetic properties are possessed essentially by some works of art
292
 
 
Both these theses assume that there are two kinds of aesthetic properties: essential and 
inessential.  
The stronger thesis assumes that some works of art have aesthetic properties but there are 
some works which might not have them.  It also states that for some of those works which do 
have aesthetic properties some are possessed essentially. Lamarque mentions in the same 
context that maybe all works of art have an aesthetic character essentially.
293
  First, if one has 
a more traditional view of art, the idea that there are some works of art which do not have 
aesthetic properties at all, appears puzzling. We can remind ourselves about P. F. Strawson’s 
warning which was briefly touched upon in Chapter III: 
…the concepts ‘work of art’ and ‘aesthetic assessment’ are logically coupled 
and move together, in the sense that it would be self-contradictory to speak of 
judging something as a work of art, but not from the aesthetic point of view.
294
 
 
Strawson argues that assessing a work of art qua art implies an aesthetic approach because 
the concept of aesthetic appraisal is intrinsically linked to the concept of a work of art. I 
would say that a work of art ‘demands’ an aesthetic consideration. This means that no work 
of art can be judged as art if there is no aesthetic judgement involved. Does this mean that 
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supporters of Strawson would disagree with the idea that there are works of art that are non-
aesthetic and thus not susceptible of being the objects of aesthetic descriptions or judgements? 
Strawson insists that the objects we call ‘works of art’ are named as such because we mark 
them primarily for aesthetic appraisal. Thus one can see that a supporter of Strawson’s view 
would not accept that works of art could be non-aesthetic (the raison d'être of works of art is 
to be aesthetically appreciated). However, Lamarque envisages the possibility that a small 
number of works of art may not possess aesthetic properties at all:  
 
Maybe some works of art (conceptual art, ‘transfigured’ urinals or snow shovels) 
have no aesthetic properties.
295
 
 
     This is also the opinion of many conceptual artists who claim that their conceptual pieces 
are not aesthetic in nature but they are about an idea or a concept which does not need 
aesthetic wrappings. Before discussing works of conceptual art one needs to establish what 
Lamarque means, in general, by an aesthetic nature or aesthetic character of a work and 
which of the two essentialist theses he supports and why. According to Lamarque, the 
aesthetic character of a work of art is determined by the possession of essential aesthetic 
properties and when one makes an aesthetic judgment about a work of art he is also saying 
something about what ‘partially constitutes it [the work] as the work it is’.296 Some aesthetic 
descriptions or judgments about the possession of aesthetic properties are for Lamarque 
necessary truths. Having some aesthetic properties constitutes partly what the work is, it is 
part of its identity as a work of art. Hence Lamarque argues for the weaker essentialist thesis 
(T) which commits him to a moderate aesthetic individual essentialism. The weaker thesis is 
not referring to all or the majority of works of art but makes a statement about some aesthetic 
properties which are possessed essentially by some works of art partly constituting the 
identity of the work as the work it is.  
    The main question here is: what makes an aesthetic property an essential one? As noted in 
the previous chapter, Lamarque’s argument for I-essentialism rests on two main premises: the 
work of art is different from the object that embodies the work (his new-object theory), and 
aesthetic properties have a relation with the work of art and not with the object that embodies 
the work. This last premise is the backbone of Lamarque’s essentialism because he says that 
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the type of essentialism he defends rests on this premise that there is a relation between a 
work of art and an aesthetic property. Here is how he explains this: 
 
It is always only a contingent fact that an object O possesses aesthetic property P. It 
is also a contingent fact that a work of art w emerges from O. My claim is only that a 
property P can in certain cases be an essential property of w.
297
 
 
    I think that one way of understanding I-essentialism is linked to the idea that for Lamarque 
it appears that ordinary objects and works of art have different modes of existence. For 
example, the work of art (w) has different ontological characteristics from the mere object 
(O) that embodies the work. Lamarque argues that the mere object (O) and the work (w) have 
different identity and survival conditions (different conditions of creation, of sustainability, of 
identification). And this difference between w and O transpires when one agrees that a work 
of art possesses essential aesthetic properties but, the mere object which embodies the work 
does not have aesthetic properties essentially.  
    The innovative aspect of Lamarque’s aesthetic essentialism is that in works of art aesthetic 
properties although emergent from non-aesthetic properties, have a relation with the work of 
art not with the mere object, thus they are ‘inherent’ in the work of art, they are an essential 
part of the work, not of the object that embodies the work. However, the problem is that, 
because we agreed that aesthetic properties are emergent, or they have a kind of dependency 
on non-aesthetic properties of the base object, we cannot escape the thought that aesthetic 
properties have an ‘umbilical’ relation with the non aesthetic properties of the mere object 
which embodies the work. 
    Here is an example that could illustrate this ‘relationship’ of aesthetic properties to the 
non-aesthetic properties of a material object. Many of Alberto Giacometti’s sculptures (in 
particular his late works) are made of bronze but they were originally casts from models 
made of iron and plaster or clay. The original medium of the model sculptures, the plaster or 
the clay (before being dried), had a craggy surface which could be considered a non-aesthetic 
property of the plaster or the clay at the beginning of the creative process. Giacometti’s work 
has many extraordinary essential aesthetic properties but here I am interested in a particular 
one, the unusual texture of his final bronze pieces: the surface of his bronze sculptures which 
retained the rough, craggy, tactile qualities of the plaster or clay they were cast from. A 
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particular aesthetic property of Giacometti’s sculptures, like the craggy reflective surface, has 
a direct link with the non-aesthetic property of the original medium, but as an aesthetic 
property becomes constitutive of the bronze sculpture. For example, Large Head of Diego, 
1954, (Fig. 18), as a work of art, retains the craggy surface of the original clay medium.  
 
 
 
                        Fig.18  Large Head of Diego, 1954 by Alberto Giacometti 
 
This aesthetic property, the ragged tactile texture has a relation with the work of art, not with 
the material base of the sculpture (in particular in this case because the base material is 
bronze which does not have this quality). However, one can say the same about the initial 
models of the sculptures: the textural qualities of the medium before modelling were not 
aesthetic in nature. Of course, one can say that the surface of original material (clay in this 
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case) can be characterised as ragged if aesthetically contemplated. However, this 
characteristic is not an essential aesthetic property of the medium as such. This example is 
meant to show that the essential aesthetic properties of a work have a relation with the work 
of art not with the medium (the object) which is the base of the work. Even though one can 
attribute an aesthetic property to the object this will not be an essential property.   
    But as pointed out in the previous chapters, when I discussed Lamarque’s view of the 
identity and survival conditions of works of art, the dual aspect of aesthetic properties, being 
intentional (being possessed by ‘culturally emergent, institutionally grounded and intentional 
objects’298) and being relational properties (response dependent) is what makes aesthetic 
properties have a paradoxical status, being part of the identity conditions of works of art. The 
detection of aesthetic properties in a work of art, its aesthetic character, is a fundamental 
aspect of what makes the work of art the work it is. Lamaque says that works are 
’intrinsically intentional and relational’299.  
    One can give again the example of the aesthetic property of being tragic.
300
 It can be 
argued that this property is an essential property of the sculpture Laocoon and His Sons 
without which this work could not exist as the work of art, Laocoon and His Sons. The 
group’s suffering is depicted in such a way that the appearance of the father and his sons 
(their expression of agony and physical struggle with the two serpents) and the way the story 
(the terrifying moments before death and in particular the father’s powerlessness to help his 
two sons to escape
301
) is told in marble, have the character of being tragic. The aesthetic 
property of being tragic is constitutive of what Laocoon and His Sons is as a work of art.  
       But again what does make an aesthetic property like being tragic, essential to some 
works of art and not to others? Or do most works of art which possess this aesthetic property, 
have the property of being tragic as an essential property?  Lamarque says that: 
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A property is essential to a work only if its presence makes a relevant difference to 
the experience of the work (when correctly experienced) and bears on the work’s 
value as a work.
302
 
 
Then if an aesthetic property impacts directly on the aesthetic experience of the work (an 
appropriate experience) and this property also contributes to the aesthetic value of the work 
then this property is an essential of the work. Two things need to be said here. One is that, 
according to Lamarque, essential aesthetic properties determine the aesthetic character of a 
work of art because these aesthetic properties are salient features without which the work 
would not be the work it is – this is his aesthetic essentialism.303 The second one is that 
Lamarque links the aesthetic experience of a work of art (the detection of essential aesthetic 
properties in a work of art) with the aesthetic value of the work – this is his aesthetic 
empiricism.
304
  
    It is easier to point out examples where the aesthetic property of being tragic is an essential 
property of a work (Lamarque’s favourite example was the last scene in King Lear and my 
previous examples were the description of Anna Karenina’s last moments, Cappa’s depiction 
of the death of a soldier, or the depiction of the struggle against the deadly serpents in 
Laocoon and His Sons). Thus if being tragic ‘defines’ how one experiences a work then the 
aesthetic property of being tragic is part of the identity of the work, it is an essential property 
of the work.  It is not easy to think of counter-examples of a work having aspects which can 
be described as tragic, but not having the aesthetic character or nature of being tragic. 
However, one can think of some works which are not quintessentially tragic but contain 
depictions of some tragic moments. For example, Grayson Perry’s series The Vanity of Small 
Differences, 2012, of six tapestries, which portray death, relationships breakdowns, tears, car 
accidents and sufferance before death, characteristics which taken out of the pictorial context 
are tragic depictions of events but the character of the whole work (the six tapestries) is not 
tragic The Vanity of Small Differences is Perry’s social satire on our contemporary world; it is 
about social mobility, taste, our obsession with upper classes, technology and social media.  
 In the next paragraph I focus on one of the six tapestries, from the above mentioned series by  
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Perry entitled Lamentation (Fig. 19).  
     I would argue that the essential aesthetic property of this work is a humorous evocation of 
contemporary life embodied in the visual narrative of the main character, Tim Rakewell’s life 
events. Perry’s work is inspired by Hogarth’s 18th century famous series of paintings A 
Rake’s Progress. Thus the aesthetic nature or character of Perry’s series as a whole is not 
being tragic and the appropriate response to the work should be both: recognition of what the 
work is – a visual social satire – and an understanding of the work’s reflective message. 
However, The Vanity of Small Differences contains tragic elements which it can be argued, 
are essential to different aspects of the work, they are integral parts of the series, thus 
contributing to the overall experience of the work (in particular to the reflective aspect of the 
response). But again, it needs to be pointed out that the overall experience of Perry’s series is 
not a response to a tragic work, even though it contains essential tragic elements.  
 
 
 
Fig. 19 Lamentation, from the series The Vanity of Small Differences (2012) by  
Grayson Perry  
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     In order to clarify even further Lamarque’s idea that the identity of an individual work of 
art is intertwined with the possession of salient properties, in particular essential aesthetic 
properties, and their experience, it is important to understand what Lamarque means by 
recognizing a work of art as the work it is (his main identity claim about works of art). This is 
what he says:   
To recognize a work for what it is – the Fra Angelico [the Lamentation over the 
Dead Christ] as sorrowful, but also as a depiction of the dead Christ, a painting in 
the devotional tradition, and so forth – is to be in a cognitive state internally related 
to the experience the work affords.
305
 
 
Lamarque makes a point here about the link between the perception/experience of the 
painting and the identification of a work of art for what it is, underlining that this experiential 
state is the basis of aesthetic characterisations of the work. In the case of the Fra Angelico’s 
painting, the identification of the painting for what it is (a sorrowful work, a depiction of a 
dead Christ, a painting in the devotional tradition, etc.) is dependent upon the appropriate 
experience of the work. In other words, recognising the painting as a sorrowful work is 
dependent upon having the appropriate experience: feeling distress or being troubled by the 
depiction of the dead Christ being in a certain mental state.  
     What interests me at this moment is Lamarque’s claim about aesthetic essentialism, that 
the aesthetic description of a work of art (an aesthetic description means the attribution of 
aesthetic properties to a work of art) is a necessary truth which can identify the aesthetic 
character of the work.
306
 Lamarque uses two stages or interpretations to explain the 
recognition of a work of art for what it is, and his main aim is to re-emphasize that aesthetic 
properties are related essentially to both, the response of perceivers and to the works of art 
themselves.
307
  
    The two interpretations or stages of recognizing a work of art for what it is are as follows. 
The first is recognizing that the object is a work of art and the second is recognizing what 
work of art it is.
308
 It is important to re-emphasize that Lamarque thinks that the two 
interpretations or stages of the identification of works of art are directly linked with aesthetic 
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characterizations (characterizations which are based upon the perceptual or experiential 
encounter with the work of art). Lamarque says: 
To recognize a work as a work – a colour configuration as a painting (i.e. an 
intentional object conforming to cultural practices) – presupposes fairly complex 
background conditions.
309
 
 
     This first stage of the identification is described by Lamarque in the following way: when 
encountering a work of art an informed perceiver has the thought of an object under-a 
description.
310
 The informed perceiver (having background knowledge) directs his attention 
to the object and sees it as a work of art; the object has intentional properties which sets it 
apart from other objects.  Lamarque argues that the identification of the object as a cultural 
object, as a work of art, involves a gestalt switch or a ‘seeing as’ mode of perception or 
experience. In addition he reminds us that this is very similar to what Sibley meant by 
requiring a ‘special epistemic access’ to the aesthetic properties of a work of art. Thus, this 
first stage establishes only that the object perceived is a work of art of a certain genre. For 
example, it establishes that the painted configuration on the wall is perceived as a painting, or 
the chair on a plinth as a sculpture, or the synchronized moments of a young group on the 
street as dance, or the rhythmic loud reading of a text in Trafalgar Square as a poem, or the 
acid burning of a canvas in South Bank as a performance. It is conceivable that one can stop 
at this level of recognition if no other attention is paid to the object. For example, 
encountering a rectangular object on a wall and identifying it as a painting could  not be 
followed by any other subsequent thought about the painting (most of the time we do this in a 
quotidian context when our attention is not aesthetically inclined)
311
. One could remember 
that a house was full of paintings without identifying what kind of paintings they were.  
    Also at this stage, identification mistakes are possible; one can totally fail to recognize an 
object as a work of art. A very rare case would be when a work of art like a painting is shown 
to a member of a primitive tribe who had no contact with the western world – the viewers 
from the tribe have no background knowledge to identify the object with a work of art. One 
observation is necessary here, even the most primitive tribes were acquainted or used some 
form of basic decorative art (for bodies or objects) and this means that there was a basic 
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understanding of the configurations of colours and lines representing something or 
symbolising something and having a decorative function. The members of the tribe would 
probably not recognise the painting as an aesthetic object to be hanged and contemplated as 
such. Of course, this is an example of an extreme and very rare case. One knows that to 
recognise something means to be aware of previous samples or to have seen similar objects 
which can be related to the new encountered object or simply put to have the concept of art.  
Thus maybe the example of the primitive tribe cannot be used to show that there is failure at 
the first stage of recognising an object as a painting because as described, the tribe does not 
have the concept of art.   
     The first stage of recognising a work of art as a work of art also can be used as a simple 
explanation of how children learn how to recognize objects. For example, initially children 
are shown many examples of paintings, then maybe they are asked to paint themselves 
pictures and they are taught how to use the language associated with the paintings and all of 
these will help them later to discern between paintings and other objects.  
     Lamarque mentions more common misidentifications at this first stage: found art or ready-
mades being mistaken for the mere objects that constitute their base. My favourite examples 
are those of contemporary works of art that are confused with the mere objects that constitute 
their physical base.  For example, one of Christo’s sculptures was destroyed by a porter at an 
art auction who failed to see that the wrapping on the chair was the sculpture
312
. Another 
example is of a work of art consisting of a typewriter which was sent to be exhibited with the 
label ‘This is not a work of art’ and which was taken by one of the gallery’s attendances to be 
a real working typewriter and was sent to the art gallery’s office. Such objects were not seen 
as intentional objects conforming to artistic practices and because of this they were taken to 
be ordinary objects. The viewer looked at only the non-aesthetic properties of the object and 
failed to see the work of art (or as Lamarque says, the viewer did not see this object as art or 
did not have a ‘gestalt switch’). If the person making these mistakes would have thought of 
the object encountered under-an-artistic-description and paid minimal attention to its 
aesthetic and artistic properties, maybe the mistakes could have been avoided. In 
contemporary art, in particular conceptual art which uses found objects and ready-mades this 
difficulty is overwhelming if the institutional framework is not imposed on the work and if 
the viewer does not have sufficient background knowledge about the contemporary artworld. 
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     Lamarque’s second stage of work recognition is more complex because once the object is 
recognized as a work of art having the intentional property of being thought as a work under-
a-description (for example, a painting), this object will be perceived or experienced in a 
particular way. Thus the viewer would partly respond to or experience the encountered work 
in a certain way. But what does it mean to say that a viewer responds to a work in a ‘certain 
way’? Thinking of the example of Guernica, Lamarque would say first that the viewer 
recognizes the object as a work of art of a certain art form – as a painting – and then he 
recognizes the object for the work it is.
 313
  It is not clear to me what Lamarque means when 
he speaks about this second stage in encounters with works of art. For example, in the case of 
Guernica ‘what work of art it is’ could mean: a cubist painting, or a painting by Picasso, or 
an exemplar of artistic achievement, or a work with unusual representational, expressive and 
formal properties, or an extraordinary depiction of the consequences of war, or the artist’s 
visual statement against atrocities of war, or that the painting is Guernica. It could mean one 
or a number of those things. Let’s suppose that one takes the most immediate response of the 
informed viewer to the encounter of the painting Guernica: ‘it is Guernica’314. First it can be 
said that this response encompasses most of the other responses to the painting: once it is 
recognized as being Guernica, this recognition has a rich hinterland (the viewer knows a lot 
about the painting even if this is not explicitly thought of). Secondly, by a certain response, 
Lamarque means a normative response, which is demanded by the encountered painting. 
Guernica possesses an aesthetic character which is determined by its essential aesthetic 
properties and this character is the one that elicits a certain normative response.  
     Lamarque points out that, many interesting misidentifications are possible at this second 
stage. This could happen for different reasons: because the viewer responds to elements 
which are not in the painting or because some of the elements of the painting are taken to be 
what they are not. For example: ‘This painting is by Vermeer’ (when it is not), or a painting 
is identified as surrealist when there are no surrealist elements present in the painting, or 
when a viewer argues that the painting is by Picasso because of its cubists elements while the 
painting is by Braque, etc. Thus these confusions are about the misinterpretation of some 
aspects of the work, including aesthetic properties, which impact on establishing the identity 
of the work.    
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     In order to illustrate Lamarque’s distinction between essential and inessential aesthetic 
properties and how some works of art possess essentially some aesthetic properties, I choose 
to analyse two paintings. One is Lamarque’s example, the earlier mentioned Fra Angelico’s 
fresco Lamentation over the Dead Christ (1440-1442) from the cell 2 of San Marco Convent, 
in Florence (Fig.20), and the other is also by Fra Angelico, Lamentation, from Florence 
Museum 1436-1441 (Fig. 21).   
    Lamarque characterises the first fresco, Lamentation over the Dead Christ (Fig.20), as 
having a sorrowful intensity and he also argues that this aesthetic judgment identifies the 
sorrowful intensity as an essential aesthetic property of the fresco.
315
 No doubt many critics 
and art lovers would find the aesthetic characterisation of the fresco as a having a sorrowful 
intensity very appropriate. However, the more challenging task is to show that this aesthetic 
property is an essential property of the fresco – without which it would not be the work of art 
it is. Thus, the litmus test for Lamarque’s suggestion would be the way in which one answers 
the following question: ‘Can you imagine Lamentation over the Dead Christ (1440-1442) as 
not having a sorrowful intensity?’ If the answer is ‘no’ then Lamarque would be entitled to 
say that the sorrowful intensity is an essential aesthetic property.  
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                   Fig. 20  Lamentation over the Dead Christ (1440-1442) by Fra Angelico  
 
 But what makes the aesthetic property of sorrowful intensity to be quintessential to this 
work? An analysis of the fresco could point out the following important properties: a 
balanced composition of concentric interplay of different elements (the curves of the cave 
and of the rocks, the folded curves of the mourners clothes and the halo circles of all the 
characters of the scenes); the bare rocks mirroring the folds of the women mourners; the 
harmonious chromatic of the mourners’ clothes; the strong emotional intensity of the 
mourners; St. Dominic’s calm witnessing and the whole atmosphere of reverence, piety and 
sorrow. One could justify the description of the fresco as having a sorrowful intensity as the 
result of a combination of both aesthetic and non-aesthetic elements: the sombre unity of the 
kneeling mourners and the tenderness of their gestures, their devoted expression and 
profoundly absorbed attitude, the quiet pain of their faces, their ordered position around the 
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body of Christ, the meaning of the depicted scene (a literal and figurative Entombment) and 
the interplay of curves focusing the viewer’s attention on the mourners’ group and the 
mourners absorbed concentration which makes the body of Chris to appear weightless. 
    However, a critic or an art lover could disagree with this interpretation and contradict the 
claim that Lamentation over the Dead Christ (1440-1442) has essentially a sorrowful 
intensity. Lamarque himself is aware that in some cases he might be mistaken about some of 
his claims that the works he mentions have the essential aesthetic properties that he is 
suggesting
316
. However, Lamarque points out that he is not making an epistemological claim. 
His defence for his essentialist claims is that a possible deep analysis of the works he 
describes can show if those works have certain aesthetic properties as part of their aesthetic 
character, as part of their identity as individual works of art.  
    In accordance with Lamarque’s view one could say that the fresco by Fra Angelico, 
Lamentation over the Dead Christ (1440-1442) from the San Marco Convent in Florence, 
cannot be otherwise than having the sorrowful intensity that it has. Without this essential 
aesthetic property, the fresco would have a different aesthetic character and be a different 
work of art. Thus, saying that the fresco has a sorrowful intensity is a claim about the fresco’s 
identity. 
     I suggest another similar analysis of a painting in order to extrapolate Lamarque’s claim 
that certain aesthetic properties are possessed essentially by some works of art and they 
define the aesthetic character of these works. I have chosen another painting with the same 
subject by Fra Angelico, Lamentation, tempera on panel from Florence Museum, 1436-1441 
(Fig. 21) and I propose that this painting also can be characterised by strong emotional 
intensity. With regard to this paining, there are many intrinsic properties of Fra Angelico’s 
painting which do not pertain to its aesthetic character: the size and weight of the panel of the 
painting, the tempera paints, the direction of the brush strokes, etc. Lamarque would say that 
these properties belong to the mere object which is the basis of the painting and they are 
inessential to the work. The essential properties of the painting which would identify the 
painting as a particular work of art are certain formal, expressive and representational 
properties. The main formal properties are: a balanced composition, chromatic unity and 
delicate brush strokes. Some of the representational properties of the objects in the painting 
can be considered not aesthetic in character: the mourners – four men and ten women, the 
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unanimated body of Christ, the emptiness of outskirts of town (a Tuscan landscape) or the 
bare crucifix etc. (these are aspects that can be noticed without an aesthetic engagement with 
the work). 
 
 
Fig. 21  Lamentation, Fra Angelico, Florence Museum, 1436-1441 
 
However the aesthetic representational and expressive properties which are important for the 
aesthetic character of paintings require a more sustained effort of aesthetic identification by 
the informed perceiver. For example, one could argue that the aesthetic representational 
properties of the paintings are: a highly stylised depiction of a group of mourners, the 
peaceful lifelessness of Christ’s body, the portrayal of devoted followers around the dead 
Christ, the emblematic human responses to loved and revered figure’s death, the oblique 
delicate traces of Christ’s blood on the cross or the symbol of the cross as the instrument of 
Christ’s death. But the bare natural surroundings of Christ’s crucifixion and the particular 
number of mourners and the colours of their clothes have in devotional paintings a symbolic 
importance which can bear on the aesthetic interpretation of the work, thus these elements 
can be of aesthetic importance. The examples of the expressive properties that the work could 
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have are: the reverence of each kneeling person, the care expressed by the mourners’ 
postures, the concentrated devotion of their hands, and the emotional intensity of the whole 
subject. But which ones of those formal, representational and expressive properties are 
essential to the aesthetic character of the painting? This question appears to ask two things: 
one is about the essential aesthetic properties of the painting and the other is about the 
(overall) aesthetic character of the painting. I said it ‘appears’ because it can be argued that 
by establishing the essential aesthetic properties of the painting one will be able to underpin 
the aesthetic characterization of the work. This is a difficult question because there are many 
essential aesthetic properties of the painting and trying to capture its rich aesthetics with one 
description requires a complex search which should include the appropriate response to the 
work and the understanding of its meaning. I suggest that Lamentation, (1436-1441) from the 
Florence Museum, has an essentially carefully constructed composition which supports the 
depiction of emblematic human responses to Christ’s death by its devotees.  
    This analysis of the paintings showed that in many cases works of art are too complex to 
be characterized by one essential property even though one can agree that there is an overall 
aesthetic character or nature that works of art have. Lamarque’s argument of aesthetic 
individual essentialism stipulates that some aesthetic properties are essentially possessed by 
some works of art (T) – that some works of art necessarily possess an aesthetic character – 
without elaborating in detail on individual cases.  
     In conclusion in this chapter I focused on Lamarque’s argument for aesthetic essentialism 
which proposes that some works of art possess some aesthetic properties essentially and that 
these properties contribute to the identity of these individual works as the work they are. 
Lamarque’s position rests on two important points: the distinction between work and object 
and the proposal that aesthetic properties are dependent on their relation with the work (as a 
cultural object) not with the mere object.  
    My main interest in Lamarque’s individual essentialism took a more decisive role when I 
started analysing works of conceptual art. This became more acute when I thought about 
contemporary radical positions which argue that conceptual works do not have aesthetic 
properties, which means that one is subscribing to the idea that conceptual works do not have 
an aesthetic character and they should not be considered and judged from an aesthetic point  
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of view.
 317
 My position with regard to conceptual art is slightly different from Lamarque’s, 
who suggests that maybe conceptual pieces do not have aesthetic properties. Although it can 
be argued that a large majority of conceptual works do not have many essential aesthetic 
properties (I would argue in the following chapter that some of them do), I claim that all 
conceptual works have inessential aesthetic properties. Thus, the inessential properties of 
conceptual works are not responsible for determining a certain aesthetic character or the 
aesthetic value of the works because conceptual art works are not supposed to be experienced 
aesthetically or to make aesthetic statements but to make conceptualist statements. The basis 
of my argument about conceptual art, which I develop in the next chapter, will rest on some 
previous discussions: how one uses the concept of the aesthetic, what are essential aesthetic 
properties and how these properties impact on the identity of the works as works of art and 
their value and how important is the role of the conceptual artists in characterizing their work. 
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CHAPTER VI 
The Aesthetics of Conceptual  Art 
 
I began this thesis with a question about the concept of the aesthetic and about aesthetic 
properties and I tried to clarify Lamarque’s theory of individual essentialism.  In order to 
offer an adequate application of these ideas to the analysis of conceptual art, I need two 
preliminary set ups: one is to reiterate which senses of the above concepts I use and the 
second is to give a general characterization of conceptual art. Thus in the first section of this 
chapter I briefly remind us of the main concepts I discussed in previous chapters (Section 1), 
in the next section I try to present a general characterisation of conceptual art (Section 2), in 
the third section I propose my own characterisation of conceptual art, arguing that works of 
conceptual art can be assessed aesthetically and a small number of conceptual works have 
essential aesthetic properties (Section 3). 
Section 1: Main conceptual framework 
 
The concept of the aesthetic is used in two ways: in a narrow sense, when it refers to the 
perceptual (in relation to aesthetic properties this includes the beautiful and many other 
perceptual properties directly linked to sense perception) and in a wider sense when it refers 
not only to the perceptual but also to the experiential (this includes a long list of aesthetic 
properties which was initially proposed by Sibley and developed later by many aestheticians 
including A. Goldman’s list). I am interested in the wider sense of the term and I think 
Goldman’s list of aesthetic properties presented in Chapter II (pure value properties, emotion 
properties, formal qualities, behavioural properties, evocative qualities, representational 
qualities, second-order perceptual properties, and historical relate properties), captures an 
extensive use of the qualifier ‘aesthetic’ in characterizing properties of works of art. Also I 
need to add that Lamarque’s conception of aesthetic appraisal uses the wider sense of the 
aesthetic. Even though, in general Lamarque is preoccupied mainly with the appreciative 
experience of literature, which he argues, it must include the consonance of (aesthetic) means 
to (literary) ends, he also discusses the aesthetic appraisal of the visual arts. As mentioned 
before, he suggests that the experience of visual art works is similar to the experience 
associated with reading literature in that, both experiences (perceptual or imaginative) are 
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informed by knowledge about the objects experienced.
318
 Thus Lamarque uses a wider sense 
of the aesthetic including both, perception as traditionally understood (through the senses) 
and experiential or imaginative occurrences as part of an appreciative experience of works as 
works of art.  
     The second concept I need to re-emphasise is that of aesthetic properties. As stated 
previously, according to Lamarque’s view there are two main types of aesthetic properties: 
essential and inessential. The essential aesthetic properties are responsible for determining the 
aesthetic character/nature of a work of art (without those properties the work will not be the 
work of art it is – it will be a different work319) but the same aesthetic property can be 
possessed by different individual works of art. When appropriately perceived or experienced, 
an essential aesthetic property of an individual work shapes the character of the aesthetic 
experience and the aesthetic value of that work. However, a work of art could lose some of its 
aesthetic properties and remain the same work – these properties are inessential to the work 
as the work it is. I would like to add here that certain essential aesthetic properties are more 
easily detectable in a work than others, and these will help the informed perceiver to identify 
the work and its aesthetic character without difficulty. For example, the property of being a 
static work for The Rhine II by Gursky, or being a dynamic work for A Sudden Gust of Wind 
(after Hokusai) by Wall, or having a sorrowful intensity for Lamentation over the Dead 
Christ by Fra Angelico, or being tragic for the last scene of King Lear are essential aesthetic 
properties that are immediately evident to an informed perceiver’s aesthetic encounters with 
these works. However, the large scale of The Rhine II, or the monochromatic grisaille 
composition for Guernica are not evidently essential aesthetic properties of these works – the 
need for an in depth analysis in the case of these aesthetic properties is more pressing than in 
the case of more obvious essential aesthetic properties like a composition being static or 
dynamic. In short, I believe that although one can speak of essential aesthetic properties of 
individual works, it needs to be pointed out that the acceptance of such properties as essential 
to the identity of the works and their character often requires fine-grained justifications from 
the viewers, critics or the artists.  
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Section 2: General characterization of conceptual art 
 
The attempt to give a general characterisation of conceptual art will prove to be a difficult 
task because, as Lucy Lippard says, there are as many definitions of conceptual art as there 
are conceptual artists,
320
 or as Elisabeth Schellekens argued more radically that ‘there are, in 
fact, as many definitions of conceptual art as there are conceptual artworks.’321 First in this 
section, I am going to briefly present three perspectives on conceptual art – the artist Sol 
LeWitt’s perspective, the art historian Paul Wood’s and the philosophers Peter Goldie and 
Elisabeth Schellekens’. Secondly, I am going to discuss the prevailing tendency to 
characterize conceptual art in opposition to other art forms.  
 
2.1.Three perspective on conceptual art 
i) The first perspective that I want to briefly focus on is Paul Wood’s description of the 
history of conceptual art in his introductory book Conceptual Art. He proposes three distinct 
phases in the development of the term ‘conceptual art’:322 
 
1) ‘Concept art’ was introduced for the first time by the musician and writer Henry Flynt 
who wrote about conceptual works in the context of ‘Fluxus’ group in New York in 
1961. The term referred to an art which uses concepts as its materials. 
2) ‘Conceptual art’ as an historical form of the avant-garde practice which thrived in the 
60s and 70s. The term describes an art that included language usage, photography, 
serialisation of images and process based activities.  
3) ‘Conceptualism’ is the third term used for conceptual art; this term is used in two 
different senses:  
a) Representing the variety of contemporary art practices that do not comply with the 
usual art expectations (for example, the ‘Turner Prize’ entries) and are described 
as practices that are not interested in ‘showing hand-crafted objects for aesthetic 
contemplation’.323 
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b) A manner of working which started in the 1950s in a larger geographical context 
than the Anglo-American one. Here Wood points out that there are two identities 
of conceptualism: one is the ‘Analytical conceptualism’ (as the ‘art of white male 
rationalists, mired in the very modernism they sought to critique’) and ‘Global 
conceptualism’ (the art of men and women alike who began working in a 
conceptualist manner in the 1950s tackling issues form ‘imperialism to personal 
identity in far-flung place from Latin America to Japan, from Aboriginal Australia 
to Russia’).324 
    For Wood these developments of ‘conceptual art’ as a term represent important reference 
points for art critics and aestheticians but he recognises that these are ‘rival senses of the 
term’ which sometimes overlap while other times grow in opposition to each other. As a 
response to this difficulty his main take on conceptual art is not directly about the changes the 
term went through but about focusing on three things: first, the preconditions of conceptual 
art – Dada, Surrealism and Constructivism; secondly, the non-medium-specific art activities 
of the regenerated avant-garde at the end of the 1950s modernism; and thirdly, the 
importance of ideas as art through the rejection of the aesthetic and the politicisation of art 
practices in the 70s. It is very difficult to tease out a definition of conceptual art from Wood’s 
introduction to conceptual art because Wood himself thinks that the boundaries of the 
concept of conceptual art are hard to draw. On the one hand he says, conceptual art is like 
Lewis Carroll’s Cheshire cat:  
 
….dissolving away until nothing is left but a grin: a handful of works made over a 
few short years by a small number of artists, the most important of whom went on to 
do other things.
325
  
 
On the other hand conceptual art is like:  
 
… the hinge around which the past turned into the present: the modernist past of 
paintings as the fine art, the canon from Cezanne to Rothko, versus the 
postmodernist present where contemporary exhibition spaces are full of anything 
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and everything, from sharks to photographs, piles of rubbish to multi-screen videos – 
full, it seems, of everything except modernist paintings.
326
  
 
I would like to mention here that Wood’s metaphor for conceptual art as hinge between the 
past with its tradition in the fine arts and the postmodernist present with its multivariate art 
practices was used very recently by Andrew Wilson in his book’s introduction to the Tate 
Britain exhibition ‘Conceptual Art in Britain, 1964-1979’. Here is Wilson’s similar metaphor 
about conceptual art: 
 
It [conceptual art] acted as a hinge between modern art and contemporary art, 
proposing new ways of thinking about what is art, how it is made and what it is 
for.
327
  
 
    One could argue that this metaphor suggests a double-edged sword role for conceptual art. 
On one hand conceptual art can be seen as a ‘tool’ helping with the transition from modern 
art to contemporary practices (I think this is the intended sense proposed by Wood and 
Wilson and promoted by most conceptual artists). On the other hand the metaphor can allude 
to the danger of ‘closing up’ to the past, which could mean for example, a rejection of the 
great canon of representational art (this would be a radical interpretation of the metaphor
328
). 
However, I think both Wood and Wilson have a positive view of the role of conceptual art in 
contemporary art and conceptual art as a ‘hinge’, suggests the flexibility of conceptual pieces 
to connect to a variety of different artistic practices (modern or contemporary). Conceptual 
artists make use of different media and art practices: from the traditional paint, drawing, 
collage, sculpture, text, photography, film to unusual presentation techniques, installation, 
performances, social sculpture
329
, body art or land art and this can be seen as an adaptive 
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method of making art (I am not making here a claim about the quality and value of 
conceptual works, I am only pointing out some aspects of this type of artistic endeavour).
 330
  
     Here is what Wood thinks are the main aims of conceptual art: ‘it raises questions about 
the products of art activity and about art’s purpose in relation to a wider history of 
modernity’ 331  and it takes a political stance especially after the 1970s 332 . One possible 
criticism of this characterisation is that these aims (questioning the work of art, the creative 
process, the role of art and its autonomy and art responsibility in relation to social change) 
appear not to be specific to conceptual art, since other arts (e.g. modernism, minimalism, 
kinetic art, the political poster, theatre, literature, poetry) posit those questions too. Then, 
what makes those aims specifically important for conceptual art? Wilson says that the 
involvement of the viewer in conceptual art is different from the experience of other arts:  
 
This structuring by time, as event, did not just reflect changes in the artwork – say,  
from object to performance – but also in the involvement of the viewer of an artwork 
that perhaps called for participation. If the artwork could be a form of enquiry, 
participation or a critical act, then this put into question the status of the art object, 
[…].333 
 
    There are two things that the critic of conceptual art would immediately flag up here. The 
above characterisation of conceptual art assumes first, that the other more conventional art 
forms are not demanding from the viewer an active involvement with their works, and 
secondly, that these art forms are not critical enough of the role and status of works of art.  
The critic of conceptual art would argue that the conceptualist is wrong and both of these 
assumptions are false. But how would the conceptualist defend his position and show that 
these two assumptions are not false? First the conceptualist could say that the unusual 
presentation of conceptual works and the works’ messages demand a more sustained attention 
and a more physical and intellectual involvement than the more conventional works of art. 
There are different examples which the conceptualist could give here to justify his claim 
about the importance of the participatory role of the viewer in the experience of conceptual 
works. For example: the recent work of Marina Abramović at Serpentine Gallery in London 
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(2104) entitled 512 hours, when the viewers were asked to sit silently in front of the 
performer at a table inside the gallery, or much older works like Roelof Louw’s Soul City 
(Pyramid of Oranges), 1967, when the audience was invited to interact with the work and 
could take home an orange, from the 5,800 oranges arranged in a pyramidal from on the 
gallery floor. However, the critic of conceptual art would say that the example of 
Abramović’s work and the other such conceptual works which involve an overt participation 
of the viewers, do not show that the traditionalist art viewer is more passive in experiencing 
conventional works. These examples only point out a predilection of some conceptual artists 
to create works which demand from their viewers an extroverted engagement with such types 
of conceptual works. Moreover, not all conceptual art experiences are characterized by the 
viewer’s response involving direct interaction and overt participation in the encounter with 
conceptual works.   
    The second assumption could be defended by the conceptualist in the following way: 
because the conceptualist artists are not so much interested in the material basis of their 
works (there is no medium specificity in conceptual art) and consider the craftsmanship or the 
skills related to a specific medium as a small or unimportant part of the creation of a 
conceptual work, they would say that they have more ‘freedom’ to be critical of the status of 
works of art and the role of the artists in society. A conceptualist would mean by ‘freedom’ 
an ability to pursue contemporary social and cultural questions by avoiding, what the 
conceptualist would call the ‘aesthetic trap’. I think that, according to the hard conceptualist, 
the ‘aesthetic trap’ could refer to the conventional artists’ insistence on creating works with 
certain appearances – the emphasis here is on the aesthetics of the work. This insistence is 
reflected in a type of conditioning to which the viewer is accustomed when appreciating 
works of art. The American artist Sol LeWitt says that our reaction to conventional works is a 
habit that is ‘only the expectation of an emotional kick’ and this would ‘deter the viewer from 
perceiving’ conceptual works.334 Thus many conceptualists consider that the conceptualist 
artist can help the viewer to ‘escape’ what they regard as the obsession with the aesthetics of 
works of art by creating works which have a minimal visual impact. 
 
ii) A second interesting perspective is that of Sol LeWitt who wrote two famous texts about 
conceptual art: ‘Paragraphs on Conceptual Art’ in Artforum (New York 1967) and ‘Sentences 
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on Conceptual art’ in Art-Language (Coventry in 1969). LeWitt used to be a painter before he 
became a minimalist sculptor and started to be interested in conceptual art. He says: 
 
‘In conceptual art the idea or the concept is the most important aspect of the work. 
When an artist uses a conceptual art form, it means that all the planning and 
decisions are made beforehand and the execution is a perfunctory affair.
335
  
 
Does this claim about conceptualists mean that anybody can make conceptual works even if 
there is no skill or craftsmanship involved in the creation of conceptual works? I do not think 
that this is what LeWitt suggests because for him what is important in a conceptual work is 
the process behind its creation and what should be appreciated is the thinking of the artist and 
his innovative practice and not his skills as a craftsman. LeWitt thinks that the conceptual 
artist needs to be interested in making his work ‘mentally interesting to the spectator’ and 
because of this the artist will want his work to be ‘emotionally dry’. This way of talking 
about art objects stirred a lot of discussions and protests in the late 60s. But it was not a new 
thing because there were a lot of previous artists who made what we now call conceptual art 
(the Dadaists, Surrealists, Constructivists and Minimalists). What was interesting about Le 
Witt’s writings was the way he crystallized his ideas about such art practices and that he 
started a new way of working based on these ideas. For him the relationship between the idea 
of the artist and the final work is what counts and the finished work should not obscure the 
creative process with its physicality: ‘What the works looks like is not important’336. One 
quick observation here is that Le Witt’s view about conceptual art is a clear rejection of the 
conception of the aesthetic as one of the main characteristics of works of art (when the 
aesthetic is traditionally understood as the perceptual aspect of a work of art). The other 
observation I would like to make is that Le Witt seems to emphasise what we earlier called 
the artistic medium. In short the conceptualist rejects the importance of the vehicular medium 
(the physical base of any work) and gives pre-eminence to the link between what the artist 
thinks (his concepts and ideas) and what his work ’says’ or what the work’s message is (this 
being the artistic medium).  
    To return to the question about the execution of the conceptual work, a supporter of 
LeWitt’s view can make two points: first, that the conceptualist’s artistic means are 
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subordinated to the aim of transmitting a concept/idea
337
 and the second, that many 
conceptual artists are actually very accomplished artists at using traditional media. In support 
of the first point, one can say that conceptual artists use a variety of media which are only 
‘crutches’ for the artists’ final aims; for example, conceptualists use ready-mades, repetitions, 
words, photo-text, indexes, props, performances, live or dead animals, auto-destructive art, 
body art, video, natural objects, fabrics, paints, collages and take measurements of time and 
duration as more important than the creation and presentation of their conceptual work. In 
support of the second point, a supporter of conceptual art could give many examples of 
conceptual artists that are also very good painters or sculptors, but have chosen at some point 
in their artistic journey to create conceptual works because they wanted to express certain 
ideas in a novel or challenging way or in different ways from the traditional arts. The 
conceptualists can then be divided into three possible categories: one is that of artists who 
gave up more traditional art forms and their specificity of medium for conceptual art, the 
second is that of artists who started being well known as conceptualists but returned to 
traditional art forms, and the third category is of artists who create both traditional works of 
art and conceptual art. Of course, ‘diehard’ conceptualists or purists would argue that 
conceptualists should be dedicated only to the aim of transmitting concepts and avoid a 
collapse into the aesthetic trap.    
     But the critic of conceptual art would say that many well known conceptualists who turn 
to or return to traditional art forms, like painting or sculpture, are actually taking advantage of 
their ‘celebrity’ status to present to the art public their newer work – I refer here to a number 
of artists like Damien Hirst, Tracey Emin, Michele Craig Martin or Michel Landy. The critic 
of conceptual art goes even further and says that, if those artists would not have been art 
celebrities (such status is conferred by the artworld
338
 because of these artists’ controversial 
conceptual works) then the art critics, art public and the art media would not give too much 
attention to those artists’ more traditional works. This may be true, but the discussion about 
the value of their work (conceptual or traditional) is a slightly different debate from the 
discussion about the artistic or aesthetic nature of these works. Even if someone thinks that 
Tracey Emin’s more traditional drawings are not very good drawings (the most common 
reaction to her work is that ‘she cannot draw’), they are still works to be considered and only 
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then, maybe dismissed as aesthetically unimportant.
339
 Here are a varied number of examples 
by other conceptualist ‘celebrities’, whose more traditional works are worthwhile examples 
of aesthetic achievements: Marcel Duchamp’s cubist paintings, Jean Arp’s paintings and 
sculptures, Joseph Kosuth’s architectural design drawings, Richard Long’s early natural 
sculptures,  Michel Craig Martin’s acrylic works, Michael Landy’s portraits of his friends and 
family, etc. A closer analysis of these particular artists’ works would show that regardless of 
their celebrity status, these are extraordinary gifted artists and their conceptualism is not a 
cover up for a lack of artistic skill or artistic imagination. 
 
iii) The third perspective on conceptual art I am interested in, is that of Peter Goldie and 
Elisabeth Schellekens who in their introduction to the book Philosophy and Conceptual Art 
propose five general characteristics of conceptual art: 
 
     1. Conceptual art aims to remove the traditional emphasis on sensory pleasure and beauty 
by replacing it with an emphasis on ideas and the view that the art object is to be 
‘dematerialized’. 
      2. Conceptual art sets out to challenge the limits of the identity and definitions of 
artworks and questions the role of agency in art making. 
      3.  Conceptual art seeks, often as a response to modernism, to revise the role of art and its 
critics so that the art-making becomes a kind of criticism, at times also promoting anti-
consumerist and anti-establishment views. 
      4.  Conceptual art rejects traditional artistic media, particularly the so-called plastic arts, 
in favour of new media of production such as photography, film, events, bodies, mixed media, 
ready-mades and more. 
      5.  Conceptual art replaces illustrative representation by what some call ‘semantic 
representation’, semantic in the sense of depending on the meaning being conveyed through a 
text or supporting discourse. 
 
    These five characteristic features state the aims of conceptual art in a slightly different 
manner from Wood’s proposal. They are more detailed and are not historically centred 
although they have an historical dimension. I think Goldie’s and Schellekens’ characteristics 
capture a number of essential features of conceptual art and my only quarrel is with the last of 
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their points about ‘semantic representation’. Although to some extent conceptual art uses 
semantic representation this is not the case with all conceptual works. For example one of the 
first conceptual works, Bottlerack (1914) by Marcel Duchamp, and other iconic works like 
Erased de Kooning Drawing (1953) by Robert Rauschenberg, or A Line Made by Walking, 
(1967) by Richard Long, or Self-Burial (1969) by Keith Arnatt or The Oak Tree (1973) by 
Michael Craig-Martin do not use text. However, one could point out that many conceptual 
works use, as Goldie and Schellekens suggest, ‘supportive discourse’ which could mean 
different things: the explicative text presented alongside the work, or the text included in the 
work, or the instructions of how to present or ‘build’ the work, or the actual title of the work. 
      For example, the title of Rauschenberg’s work, Erased de Kooning Drawing, constitutes 
an important part of the work. Otherwise, how would one know, what the blank paper 
presented to an art public in 1953 was, or how should one appreciate such a work? Another 
example, where the text is essential to a work, is Michael Craig-Martin’s work entitled The 
Oak Tree (Fig 22). The description of this work is disconcertingly simple: an ordinary 
Duralex glass with water, which is placed in the centre of a glass shelf, installed above 
normal body height and a printed text which is mounted below the shelf.  
 
 
 
 
                                   
                                  Fig. 22 The Oak Tree (1973) by Michael Craig-Martin 
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    This is a good example to single out because without the text, which records a conversation 
between Michael Craig-Martin and a putative viewer of his work, the appropriate experience 
of the work cannot take place. The text: 
rehearses questions, doubts and explanations regarding the transformation that has 
taken place, whereby the glass of water has become an oak tree
340
 
 
 Here is an interesting story related to how creative interpretation works when one encounters 
a work like The Oak Tree. An artist friend (the viewer) described to me Craig-Martin’s work 
which she saw many years ago, in the following way: a glass of water and a seed on a 
bathroom shelf hung above human high, and an adjacent text about the work, on the left  of 
the shelf, explaining how the work is an oak tree. Now there is no seed on the shelf but the 
viewer read the text and by the time she left the gallery thought there was a seed there. This is 
reconstructive memory, a way of dealing with missing information in order to make sense of 
what we remember – in this case, the viewer read the text and understood Craig-Martin’s 
intention to show how transformation can take place in someone’s mind by enumerating all 
the rational questions about such an act of transformation. The seed was not there (the 
thinking involved in seeing a seed near a glass of water would have involved the idea of 
natural growth but it would have been too direct) because the artist tried to show how one can 
make the leap of faith and buy into the idea of this radical transformation by having very few 
material clues. Wilson says that the work is not the glass of water or the shelf but the 
recognition that the transformation took place.
341
 Thus the text in The Oak Tree is essential in 
creating the belief that such transformation can be envisaged. 
     Nevertheless, not all conceptual works use supporting discourse or text. Moreover, the 
critic of conceptual art would emphasise that using text as a prop to the appropriate 
experiencing of the work, only shows the feebleness of some conceptual works which need 
an extra semantic layer for their appropriate perception. Even if the critic is right to a certain 
extent, one could still think of important conceptual works whose meaning is revealed in 
conjunction with their adjacent text. I discuss a number of such works in the third section of 
this chapter. 
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2.2 Conceptual art and other art forms 
Derek Matravers in his paper: ‘The Dematerialization of the Object’ argues that the existence 
of conceptual works challenges ‘some claims that seem to lie at or near the centre of the 
traditional concept of art’.342  According to Matravers these central claims characterizing 
works of art are: 
a) works of art are objects  
b) which we appreciate through direct experiential encounter and  
c) such experiential encounter is non-instrumentally valuable 343 
     In what follows, I discuss these claims in conjunction with the challenges from conceptual 
art. 
 a)  Conceptual artists would maintain that their works are not ‘objects’ as such, because 
conceptual works are the successful communication of  ideas or concepts and the physical 
appearance of the object that embodies the work does not matter. Here it is important to 
emphasize what traditional artists mean by ‘object’. First one could say that when traditional 
artists talk about works of art as ‘objects’ the traditionalist does not mean the actual physical 
embodiment of the work. Works of art are entities which can vary from physical to abstract, 
from types to particulars and moreover, as Lamarque says they are ontologically different 
from the mere objects which embody them. Thus the conceptualist claim against the 
traditionalist’s view that works of art are objects is misplaced because the conceptualist takes 
the term ‘object’ to mean a concrete, physical object. There are many art forms whose works 
of art are not concrete objects; for example ballet pieces, or jazz improvisations, or other 
musical performances, as works of art do not have an object in a straightforward sense.  
    One characteristic of conceptual art of the 1960s was the aim to avoid using physical 
objects as vehicles for the artists’ ideas or concepts. For these artists their art was more like 
information – communicating meanings and the best medium were things like language based 
work or photographs. One of the main reasons for rejecting an object based work was the 
obsession of the market with the uniqueness and value of the art object. In a famous article 
from 1968 called ‘The Dematerialization of Art’, Lucy Lippard and John Chandler suggest 
that the dematerialisation of art ‘may result in the object’s becoming wholly obsolete’.344 For 
Lippard the physical object in conceptual art was unimportant or irrelevant because it did not 
occupy a primary position in the experience of the work and also because like all physical 
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things it was perishable and it did not have an intrinsic value (a clear reaction against the 
revered perennial works of art from art museums and the art market).  Lippard says: 
 
‘Conceptual art, for me, means work in which the idea is paramount and the 
material form is secondary, lightweight, ephemeral, cheap, unpretentious 
and/or “dematerialized”345   
 
    Here is a paradox about Lippard’s characterization of the materials used by conceptualists:  
although she insists that the materials used are ‘lightweight, cheap, unpretentious’ which to 
some extent is true (such materials are ready-mades, cardboards, cheap fabrics, house paints 
or other disregarded materials), the overall effect of the materials that constitute conceptual 
works appears to be the opposite. On a closer analysis, the materials used by conceptualists 
although they appear to be cheap and lightweight, they are carefully calculated choices to 
shock or unbalance the viewer’s aesthetic expectations. Many would suggest that such 
choices are pretentious artistic gestures. But, one also say that although the materials used by 
conceptualists may be ‘unpretentious’ – meaning simple, unsophisticated, cheap, or 
commonly disregarded materials, the final result – the conceptual work itself and its aim 
could still be very pretentious.  
     However, Lippard’s ‘dematerialization’ is a metaphorical term for rejecting a material 
basis for a work of art in order to emphasize the importance of the creative process, the 
thinking involved in creating a work. According to the conceptual artist, in conceptual work 
the importance given to the creative process overshadows the attention given to the actual 
finished work. But the conceptualists’ aim (to transmit ideas and concepts) needs a ‘physical’ 
basis in order to be transmitted to or ‘perceived’ by an audience. The physical basis of the 
conceptual work could be anything: ready-mades or linguistic expressions, sounds or 
gestures, serial imagery or symbols and any other means the artist sees fit to engage to 
achieve his goal. It can be said that this is the weakness of conceptual art and its strength at 
the same time. First a weakness because there is not an immediate perceptual ‘hook’ for the 
traditional audience in the appreciative engagement with a conceptual piece (in contrast with 
a painting, for example, where the immediate hook is represented by the aesthetic properties 
of the painting). This can be explained by saying that because the materials used by  
conceptualists are so ordinary, and in some cases anti-aesthetic, the usual gallery goer 
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remains ‘unhooked’ if he does not actively seek a cognitive response. However, the 
conceptualist would say that if the viewer is perceptually ‘unhooked’ this is a good sign 
because the conceptual work should not strike the viewer with its appearance. The viewer’s 
appropriate experience of a conceptual work is not dependent upon the perception of the 
work being immediately striking; on the contrary, it depends upon a non-aesthetic 
engagement with the work. Thus, for a conceptualist this would be a strength because the 
perceptual means used by the conceptualist have only the role of a vehicle for his ideas or 
concepts, without demanding from the viewer an aesthetic response. As mentioned before, 
conceptualists would say that the traditional viewer is almost conditioned to approach works 
of art aesthetically and according to them, this would be a limitation when one encounters 
conceptual works.  
    However, in response most traditionalists will point out the normative nature of works of 
art: an appropriate experience of a work of art demands an aesthetic response. Here is clear 
that conceptualists would have a fundamental disagreement with traditionalists because they 
would consider part of the nature of conceptual works not to be experienced aesthetically. 
     There are other radical conceptualists who would go even further by giving as examples a 
handful of successful ‘dematerializations’ of the physical basis of certain works, and argue 
that one can easily reject the idea that conceptual works of art are objects. For example, two 
conceptual works stand up as the epitome of such radicalism: one is John Cage 4’33, 
from1952 and the other is Robert Barry’s Telepathic Piece, from 1969.  First, Cage’s famous 
piano work is a three-movement composition created as a performance in which, according to 
Cage’s instructions the performer or performers should produce no sounds for 4 minutes and 
33 seconds. Cage would say that the silences of the three movements were the part of the 
musical notations and any other ambient sound which filled the Maverick Concert Hall in 
Woodstock, New York, was centring the attention from the performer to the audience, thus 
physically dematerializing the ‘object’ of the work. Secondly, Barry’s work was ‘shown’ 
simultaneous at different galleries in USA and Europe and the artist told the galleries that: 
‘for the duration of the exhibition, the gallery will remain closed’.346  Even though, those 
works are ingenious efforts to totally dematerialize the art object both works had a ‘material’ 
support. In the case of Cage’s 4’33, the framework of the performance (the stage, the 
performer and the piano, the opening and closing of the piano’s lid to mark the movements, 
the artist’s written instructions for different stages of the work, the duration of the work) 
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represents the physical support through which the idea was transmitted (the idea was that 
silences are important structures in musical notation – this work is known as the ‘silent’ 
piece). In the case of Barry’s Telepathic Piece, the framework of the presentation of the work 
(the empty gallery itself, Barry’s announcement about the work printed on the invitations to 
the exhibition and the closed gates of the gallery) represents a material framework for the 
work. Now if one is wondering about what kind of properties these two works have as works 
of art then there are possible arguments in favour of the idea that each of these two works has 
a number of artistic (or more controversially, aesthetic) properties. I return to the possession 
of aesthetic properties towards the end of this chapter when I discuss different works of 
conceptual art.   
     These being said, the conceptual artist needs to concede the fact that there are at least two 
important things about conceptual works: one that there is an instrumental role for the 
material/physical basis of a work and the other that the conceptualists still needs to use 
physical means to communicate their works. Thus the conceptualist cannot dispense with the 
perceptual means in making his work or with the physical embodiment of the work. Even if 
the ultimate aim of the conceptual artist is to get rid of the physical basis of the conceptual 
piece (to dispense with the physical object) this is not something fully attainable. On the one 
hand, the conceptualist still uses perceptual means in order to transmit a concept (a completed 
conceptual work is still an ‘object’ or a kind of entity). On the other hand the conceptualist is 
mistaken when he is challenging the traditional concept of the ‘work of art as object’. The 
conceptualist is mistaken, because the traditionalist has never used the term ‘object’ in a 
narrow way, as standing only for a physical thing. Thus, conceptual artists cannot avoid using 
physical means to transmit their ideas but this does not necessary means that their works are 
physical objects. When the conceptualist rejects the idea that a work of art is an object, he 
assumes wrongly that ‘object’ means something physical which is only experienced through 
the senses. Conceptual works are not physical objects but neither all other works of art: 
‘object’ in art needs to be understood in a wider sense. 
 
 b)  The second claim that traditional art makes is that the appreciative encounter of works of 
art is the result of a direct experience of the works. For example, Lamarque says about the 
informed experience of works of art:  
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Only the person having the experience can give an authoritative characterization 
both of its phenomenology and its intentional content.
347
 
 
This remark points out the importance of the viewer’s firsthand experience in particular when 
one wants to describe and judge a work of art (the role of perception of the work is 
paramount both for affective and cognitive states).  Lamarque is not a subjectivist about the 
aesthetic properties detected and revealed in works of art. But the fact that he is a property 
realist does not preclude him from arguing that the viewer’s experience of a work of art can 
be authoritatively characterized only by the viewer.
348
 Lamarque defends his view by 
suggesting that an informed viewer would have an appropriate, correct or justified experience 
– he argues that aesthetic experiences in general, also including the appreciative experiences 
of literature are normative experiences. Here is an interesting observation for the 
conceptualist: on the one hand, many contemporary conceptual artists believe that the 
experience of the conceptual work is very subjective (each viewer has the freedom to 
experience the conceptual work in his own way, there are no standards of correctness or 
appropriateness for the response to the work), but on the other hand, there is a transmission of 
an idea or a concept which the artist wishes the viewer to ‘experience’ (cognitive 
understanding) in the encounter with his work. Then, how does the conceptual artist 
challenge the claim of the traditionalist that the appreciation of works of art takes place 
through direct experiential encounters with the art object (this includes, of course, the 
encounter with the physical embodied work)?  
     The conceptualist argues that the appreciation of conceptual works is a cognitive 
appreciation, not an aesthetic or perceptual one. Cognitive appreciation starts with ‘knowing 
what the viewer is looking at’ and then the viewer focuses on the conceptual level of the 
work. This is similar to Lamarque’s two stages in which the viewer is aware that he is 
encountering a work of art and then he experiences the work cognitively.
349
 Maybe in the 
cognitive experience of conceptual art there is a subtle separation between knowing what one 
is looking at and thinking about the message of the work. Even the conceptual art lover finds 
himself from time to time wondering about the status of the object encountered in a museum, 
a gallery or an artistic set up. For example, knowing that an object encountered is a work of 
art is more difficult in the case of ready-mades or ‘found art’ and this can create a faint 
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separation between the ‘knowing’ and the ‘getting’ of the message of the work as a work of 
art. The ‘knowing’ about the work is the knowledge of what kind of objects we encountered; 
this can be the result of being told about the kind of object we encountered, or it can be the 
reading of a text about the object, or seeing the object placed in a certain context which leads 
us to believe it is a particular type of object, or simply by ‘interpreting’ the object 
encountered as a work of art because we recognise some feature of the work or of the context 
in which the work is placed. Thus knowing something about the work encountered could lead 
to ‘getting’ the idea or concept of the work and this could mean cognitive appreciation which 
in turn can generate a valuable experiential state. The conceptual artist argues that the 
valuable experiential state is not due to the work’s perceptual features but is the result of 
detecting or accessing the work’s conceptual level. 
c)  The previous point took us to the third claim of the traditionalists that the experiential 
encounter with the work of art is a non-instrumentally valuable experience. In short, 
Matravers suggests that the view of the traditionalist is that what we value in art are the 
experiences that works of art afford (the link here between the experience of a work and its 
value is made obvious). For the conceptualist there is one main issue related to this 
suggestion about the experience and the value of works of art: the way one characterizes the 
concept of experience in an art encounter. If by ‘experience’ the traditionalist always means a 
perceptual or an aesthetic experience then the conceptualist rejects that conceptual art affords 
this kind of experience.  On the other hand, if by ‘experience’ the traditionalist also 
understands a cognitive experience 
350
 then the conceptualist supports a link between the 
value of the conceptual work and the way this is ‘experienced’. Thus by ‘experiencing’ a 
conceptual work the conceptualist means the successful transmission of the work’s ideas or 
concept.    
      This being said, although Matravers does not talk specifically about the aesthetic 
experience of works of art (he talks only about direct experiential encounter and non-
instrumentally valuable experiences), he suggests that it is possible but very risky to try to 
investigate the link between the experience of conceptual art and a satisfaction of a traditional 
kind, like the aesthetic satisfaction. Matravers proposes two alternatives to evaluate the 
challenge conceptual art posits to traditional art: the first is trying to defend conceptual art by 
attempting a rescue of a traditional conception (I call this the ‘aesthetic’ alternative) and the 
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second one is not to try to defend conceptual art against the traditional conception of art, but 
to assess its place in the history of art (Matravers calls this alternative ‘Institutionalism’ 
which is a particular interpretation of The Institutional Theory of Art)
351
. In his paper 
Matravers considers the first alternative – an attempt to link the experience of conceptual art 
to an aesthetic satisfaction of the traditional kind – a nonstarter and takes up only the second 
alternative as a safer route into defending conceptual art. His main conclusion is that 
conceptual art could be defended from an institutionalist point of view and not from an 
aesthetic one. Although Matravers’s defence of conceptual art from a socio-historical 
perspective can be warranted, the rejection of the aesthetic alternative is unsatisfactory for 
someone believing that all art encounters have some kind of aesthetic dimension, including 
encounters with conceptual works. Thus, I think the aesthetic alternative is an avenue worth 
exploring. I am going to bite the bullet and try to establish whether there is a link between 
conceptual art and the aesthetic or, if the link cannot be made, to attempt to establish the root 
of this failure. This is going to be a difficult task but I think one should attempt to discuss the 
aesthetic avenue.
352
 
    Therefore, in the following paragraphs I focus on introducing the aesthetic alternative. 
Here one issue needs addressing straightaway:  establishing what kind of art form conceptual 
art is. Most people would say that conceptual art is part of the visual arts. Interestingly 
enough, in most art history books conceptual art is presented in conjunction or around the 
same time with minimal art, abstract sculpture or environmental art.  
    Conceptual art appears to be very different from other art forms, like painting, sculpture, 
etchings, architecture, dance, theatre, music, literature or poetry, and to some extent different 
from all other types of arts. Although all the mentioned art forms are different from 
conceptual art, one can draw a broad distinction between all of these art forms: some employ 
perceptual means (things that can be primarily perceived through the five senses) and others 
employ non-perceptual means (for example, for literature the meaning of the text is more 
important than the perceptual appearance of that text). Because of this emphasis on the way 
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we perceive these art forms
353
 some critics argue for a division between perceptual and non-
perceptual arts. The perceptual arts are arguably centred on the importance of directly 
perceivable characteristics of the artwork (e.g. colours, shapes and textures are important for 
painting, movement and sound are important in dance, tones in music or images in film) 
while the non-perceptual arts are centred on the non-perceptual characteristics of the art work 
(the meaning of the words and symbols or the themes of a novel or a poem). In the case of the 
so-called non-perceptual arts (e.g. poetry, novels, short stories, etc) the perceptual 
characteristics are mainly the vehicles for the meaning of the words or the themes of the 
work.
354
 Those art forms have different ‘identity conditions’ for their experience. For 
example, painting and dance need to ‘be seen’, musical works need to be ‘listened to’, while 
literature or poetry need to ‘be thought of’ or ‘reflected upon’. 355  I am not saying that 
paintings or musical works are not to be ‘reflected upon’ but the demand on the viewer in 
experiencing the visual arts or the performing arts is first on the perceptual aspects of the 
works, the experience of the visual arts and the performing arts has an immediate impact on 
the senses (by ‘immediate’ I mean here a direct, obvious and resonant sense reaction).  Poetry 
or literature can also be ‘listened to’ (and in the case of poetry this is more acute) but what is 
essential to them is the meaning of the words, the themes and ideas transmitted and only from 
this point of view can they be considered non-perceptual arts. Lamarque argues that concrete 
poetry is an exception to this because the perceptual appearance of concrete poetry is 
essential to its identity.
356
  In concrete poetry the visual elements are more important than 
meanings or ideas thus the poem is more about mark making or visual patterns, which pushes 
concrete poetry towards visual works. Moreover, I am not saying that the perceptual aspects 
(the style of writing, rhythm, or form in general) are not important in literature or poetry, but 
the emphasis in defining and experiencing literary works is in their semantic content.  
    Here one needs to recall what Lamarque says about the appreciative experience of reading 
literature: considering the consonance of means to ends. In other words, the consonance is 
revealed by harmonious reflection between the aesthetic means (formal and sensuous features 
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of the text) and the thematic ends of the work – this is a cognitive process which would have 
its own distinct phenomenology. Thus talking about literature and poetry as non-perceptual 
arts makes sense to a large extent because the main aim of a literary text is to reveal ideas and 
themes. One can say that the best way of doing this is through a good marriage between form 
and content which could be a rewarding experience for the reader. Lamarque describes this 
valuable experience as having two dimensions: ‘imaginativeness and creativity [which is] 
evident in the design of the work and the richness of its content at both subject and thematic 
level’.357 
    To return to the question about conceptual art, one can give as an example a group of 
artists like the Dadaists who started experimenting with new literary forms at the end of the 
1910s.  When Hugo Ball invented the sound-poems, in which the relation between sound and 
meaning disappeared, or when the Romanian Dadaist, Tristan Tzara performed ‘random 
poems’, 358  the literary form was transformed into something else than ‘literature’ as 
traditionally understood. This type of poems were experimental works and Tzara, as a part of  
the avant-garde,  was interested in the process of creation as an instinctual, spontaneous 
progression, rather than a well crafted poetic structure which has a deliberate deep meaning. I 
think the Dadaists’ experiments pushed those poetic exercises towards conceptual art because 
the basic identity conditions of the poetic form changed. The meaning of the words and of the 
whole poem became almost irrelevant, shifting the burden from meaning (or the theme) to the 
form of the poem (by form here I mean the performance of the poem or how the poem sounds 
or appears when presented to an audience). But do these types of poems have a new status? 
Are they now ‘perceptual objects’ as opposed to more traditional poems? Firstly, most people 
would say that poetry, as mentioned before, has an important perceptual dimension and in 
some ways poetry is also close to music, thus being close to perceptual arts. But many could 
argue that the Dadaists’ experiments with words or texts are not poetry as traditionally 
understood from the start because conceptual artists insist that their art is non-perceptual and 
moreover non-aesthetic. The Dadaists would say that their experiments (in particular the 
latter ones) are not about what the poems mean or in the end not even how they sound or 
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appear, but they are radical gestures to show that one can reject any rules, structure and 
preconceived artistic expectations to challenge all ideas about art, life and society.
359
 The 
Dadaists’ use of absurd, offensive and random methods of creation and presentation of their 
works shocked the larger art audience, but intellectually provoked and inspired more 
adventurous artists and Dadaism, even though an eccentric movement, remains one of the 
most daring and interesting art movements of the 20
th
 Century.  
    Then to what extent is conceptual art in debt to Dadaism? The answer is to a large extent, 
because as Paul Wood says: 
 
Many of the recurrent themes of the early avant-gardes, such as the identity of the 
work of art, the relationship of art and language, the relationship of art to a world of 
commodity production set against an ideology of independence and spiritual  value, 
and what it was that the artist did, can all be seen to prefigure later Conceptual art.
360
 
 
This being said, it has to be reiterated that the conceptualist artist’s main intention is to resist 
the temptation to centre his art form on the appearances of the material base of his work. As 
mentioned before, some conceptual artists will go even further, wanting to reject any material 
form (‘the mere real thing’) for their works. This intention is supposed to insulate conceptual 
art works against an aesthetic perspective; the insulation is necessary according to some 
radical conceptualists because of the interference that an aesthetic perception of a work 
would have when experiencing a conceptual work. The fear of the aesthetic that conceptual 
artists have is about a preconception about the viewers. The conceptualist thinks that the 
viewer can fail to grasp the concept or the idea of a work if the appearances/perceptual 
qualities of the material support of the work get in the way when experiencing the work. This 
rejection of the aesthetic is grounded in the belief that the primary function of conceptual art 
is to transmit ideas and concepts and this cannot successfully happen if the work is imbued 
with sensorial appearances; the conceptual work of art needs to be experienced cognitively.  
     A lot of art lovers will see the conceptualist’s move against the perceptual and the 
aesthetic as an attack on what is most valuable in art – the aesthetic experience. And 
moreover, if the experience of conceptual art is not perceptual or aesthetic, does this make 
conceptual art a non-perceptual art? The conceptualist would say that one possible answer is 
the idea that the experience of a conceptual work should aim at an artistic experience rather 
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than an aesthetic experience. ‘Artistic’ here refers to the artistic practice that the work 
belongs to and the non-aesthetic connotations it has (social, historical, political or cultural). In 
other words, the conceptualist argues that an artist should try to avoid using the seductive 
‘clothing’ of the aesthetic 361  when presenting a conceptual work to the public. For the 
conceptualist one way of talking about an artistic experience of a conceptual work as distinct 
from an aesthetic experience of the work, is to show that such an experience mainly involves 
cognitive appreciation of an object in an artistic context without the emphasis on the object’s 
appearance. Thus according to the hard conceptualist, conceptual works should be considered 
non-perceptual works.  
     To exemplify the conceptualist’s position, one should look at a well known work like 
Joseph Kosuth’s One and Three Chairs from 1965 (Fig. 23), and assess the proposal that this 
work should be appropriately experienced only in a cognitive way, but not in an aesthetic 
way. Such a proposal insists that it is irrelevant how the work looks like, and what should be 
essential in the encounter with a conceptual work is the concept that the work transmits.  
 
 
    Fig. 23 One and Three Chairs (1965) by Joseph Kosuth 
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    First, a simple description of the work is important here. Secondly, one should attempt to 
find out what is the concept that this particular work transmits. Thirdly, one should establish 
if the appearance of the work (or its aesthetics) is irrelevant to what the conceptualist would 
call the appropriate experience of the work. In the next paragraphs I discuss these in order. 
    First, One and Three Chairs consists of three objects/elements: a wooden folding chair, a 
mounted colour photograph of that chair and an enlargement of the dictionary definition of a 
chair. The description of the work is simple because the work contains three distinct elements 
displayed in a simplistic, didactic way. There are two interesting aspects related to the 
presentation and preservation of this conceptual work: one is Kosuth’s instructions about the 
presentation of the work and the other is the initial confusion about how to store this work 
when not exhibited.  Kosuth’s instructions about the work were very straightforward. The 
first thing that the curator should do is to choose a wooden chair. Then, he should photograph 
this chair in situ (in the space the work is going to be exhibited) and the image of the chair 
should be enlarged to a real size, and it should be hung on the left of the chair. Finally, an 
enlarged dictionary definition of the chair should be hung on the right of the chair aligned to 
the top of the enlarged photograph. Those instructions are an essential part of the work, how 
the work is supposed to be ‘created’; I say ‘created’ because a small number of critics argue 
that the conceptual work entitled One and Three Chairs is the list of Kosuth’s written 
instructions produced in 1965. And all the subsequent ‘works’ produced in different 
museums and art galleries are only instantiations of the work (two such instantiations of the 
work are in MoMA in New York and in Pompidou Centre in Paris).
362
 However for the sake 
of clarity, I am referring to One and Three Chairs as the work presented in 1965 in an 
exhibition at MoMA. One interesting thing about Kosuth’s instructions is his precise 
description of how the work should be presented, the spatial relations of the elements and 
their alignment against each other. This suggests a clear intention about what the work should 
look like, thus a particular care for its appearance. One can say that, even a well known 
conceptual work like Kosuth’s One and Three Chairs, should be fully appreciated only when 
it is presented to the viewers as a result of a faithful process of creation and presentation 
based on the artist’s instructions. Thus it appears that in the case of One and Three Chairs the 
appearance of the work, its aesthetics, is essential to the work’s identity.   
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     The other interesting aspect of One and Three Chairs is linked to an urban legend of how 
the work was dealt with after being exhibited in 1965. It is said that the curators of MoMA 
did not know how to store the work as a whole. It was difficult to decide what kind of work 
of art it was. Thus the work was divided for storage according to its three main elements: the 
chair went to the design department, the photograph to the photography archive and the 
dictionary definition to the library. This story betrays a difficulty of art institutions at that 
time to classify such works because of their unusual nature. The avant-garde artists’ response 
to such institutional difficulties of classification and artistic evaluation was not to reject 
conceptual art but to embrace it and to provoke radical artistic gestures which tried to 
redefine the concept of art and the aesthetic.
 363
  
     It was not only the avant-garde artists who stirred up the artworld through new artistic 
endeavours, but also the art critics and the aestheticians had an interesting response to the 
theoretical challenges brought about by the existence of conceptual art works: the 
Institutional Theory of Art. This theory argues that what is important when evaluating art is 
the position and the place a work of art occupies within an established practice, the 
artworld.
364
 For the Institutional Theory the importance of context (historical, physical, 
social) and of the knowledge of a particular tradition we employ when encountering art are 
essential elements of art appreciation. It seems that the Institutional Theory of Art emphasises 
the work of art and its creation as part of an established practice. Even though conceptualists 
insist that there is no aesthetic appreciation involved in the appropriate experience of 
conceptual art, the proponents of the Institutional Theory would claim that we have ‘art 
reasons’ to appreciate those works. By ‘art reasons’ they mean everything from the intention 
of the artist and the placement of the works in an art institution to the recognition of these 
works a part of an art practice and a historical tradition. With this line of reasoning it is easier 
to maintain that conceptual art is a non-perceptual art because there are no aesthetic demands 
on the viewer when experiencing a conceptual work. Therefore, according to institutionalists 
a work like One and Three Chairs created problems of storage because, unlike a traditional 
work, it did not possess manifest perceptual properties as an aesthetic object would.   
      Secondly, although there are many interpretations of One and Three Chairs, I propose a 
simple deconstruction of the work: the concept that the work transmits is ‘chairness’ and 
ways of thinking of such a concept, by identifying a real object in the surrounding world, or 
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by having a representation of the object, or by having a verbal description of the object?
365
 
Language plays an essential part in communicating meaning and Kosuth shows the relation 
between ideas/concepts and the images and words that help us to convey those ideas or 
concepts. The simplicity of this work can be disconcerting and many critics of conceptual art 
would say that the same meaning was already transmitted and discussed in many previous 
philosophical or literary works. The conceptualist could agree with this, and even say that 
philosophical and literary works are the most common and effective way of presenting such 
discussions. However, the artist wants to use a different avenue for expressing or showing an 
intellectual preoccupation. The artist (rightly or wrongly) thinks that a conceptual work is a 
more a immediate and ‘punchy’ way of showing people an idea. A conceptualist would like 
what Edward Hopper said: ‘If you could say it in words, there would be no reason to 
paint.’ 366  Of course, the conceptualist would have a problem here with thinking of a 
replacement for the verb ‘to paint’; maybe the most appropriate replacement would be ‘to 
make art’. But this will be too inclusive and moreover it also will point to visual arts as 
opposed to an art using words. One can compromise and say that is understandable what the 
conceptualist means and accept that the conceptualist does not want to use philosophical or 
literary works (although this is not entirely true if one thinks of the English conceptualist 
group Art and Language, 1968, and their magazine Art Language) but wants to use other 
visual means to create his works and transmit ideas. 
     Thirdly, one needs to establish if the appearance of One and Three Chairs is in any way 
relevant to the work’s appreciation. As mentioned above, Kosuth’s instructions betray 
consideration for the aesthetics of his work. Thus, what One and Three Chairs looks like is 
an important part of the work’s identity and some would go even further and suggest that it is 
an important feature for the appreciation of the work. If a deeper analysis establishes that this 
work has essential aesthetic properties (for example, the balanced spatial relation between the 
three elements) then this conceptual work is an aesthetic piece and part of its appreciation as 
a work of art should be an aesthetic evaluation.    
      In conclusion first, the conceptualist cannot get rid of the material basis of conceptual 
works (thus there is still room for a perceptual dimension of conceptual works), and secondly, 
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one could argue that the experience of a conceptual work like the experience of all other 
works of art, can be rewarding both cognitively and aesthetically. Thus any conceptual work 
could also have an aesthetic dimension and this would vary a lot in different works. One way 
of going about and developing the suggestion that conceptual art has an aesthetic dimension 
is the application to conceptual art discussions of two of Lamarque’s ideas: one is his 
suggestion about the aesthetic appreciation of literature – the consonance of means to ends, 
and the other is his theory about essential aesthetic properties. Thus in the rest of this chapter 
I discuss my own view about conceptual art and the application of Lamarquean ideas to 
conceptual works. This is an attempt to show that the aesthetic alternative is a viable path in 
the investigation of conceptual art. 
 
Section 3: My conception of conceptual art 
 
As a preamble to my basic characterization of conceptual art I propose an imaginary story:  
Try to imagine you meet a masked entity in a dense fog which tells you: ‘Don’t look at me! 
Think of the real me, the one behind the mask!’ You would like to ignore the voice and 
concentrate on its request, but you cannot... The voice is alluring although somehow 
insubstantial. You try to guess what could be behind the mask. But you cannot escape the 
impulse of looking. What crosses your mind is the nagging question about what kind of mask 
this is. You think that you could work it out if you look more carefully at it, if you pay 
attention. What kind of mask is it, a Venetian mask, a classical Greek one or a balaclava? 
What is it made of? Is it a well known material, a holographic projection or only a figment of 
your imagination?  You know that you could be in a theatre and this can be an act or a game. 
What is this entity: a burlesque figure, a robber, a Zorro, a leper, a fancy prince, a well 
trained actor or an illusion? The mask is telling you: ‘THINK! THINK but don’t look, 
looking is irrelevant!’  You gradually remember that when you entered this space it had some 
sort of artistic feel about it. Who or what it is? Again you cannot stop looking – you feel like 
you have been cursed. You look intensively for clues, symbols, signs.... 
    I intend this short imaginative narrative as a metaphor for illustrating what I think are the 
essential demands of conceptual art on the viewer: to focus on something behind the visible 
or the immediate perceptual (to focus on the concept or idea), to recognise that the senses can 
detract from what the work about is (the interest should lie with something else than 
appearances), to ignore the specificity of medium (to accept any physical basis for the work) 
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to resist the temptations of making historical deductions (to reject an art historical hierarchy 
in interpretation of the work), to reflect on the possible implications of the work (artistic, 
social or political) and to appreciate the work for its cognitive engagement. All these 
‘demands’ were already identified in one form or another in Wood’s, Le Witt’s and Goldie’s 
and Schellekens’ characterisation of conceptual art but I think there are two important 
features of conceptual art which, in general, are not identified as such: one is what I call the 
flexibility of embodiment and the other is the inescapability of a certain aesthetic of 
conceptual works. I discuss these two features when I analyse the three most important 
aspects of existing
367
 conceptual works of art: the raison d'être of conceptual works is to 
transmit ideas (3.1), the necessity of selecting an appropriate object/design for the idea (3.2) 
and the effort to avoid sensorial pleasure and beauty (3.3). 
 
3.1 ‘Suddenly the idea was king’368 
 
First conceptual art is centred on the overwhelming need for communication of ideas or a 
concept. I think the most constructive approach is to start with LeWitt’s characterization that 
conceptual art is another art form whose material is concepts or ideas. The question arising 
from Le Witt is ‘What does he mean when he says that the ideas are the conceptual artist’s 
materials?’ Conceptual artists give pre-eminence to their ideas in their creative process, and 
because this process requires deliberations, intellectual challenge and effort, they value the 
ideas more than the actual physical object which supports these ideas and more than a 
traditional artistic skill. In other words, what the conceptualist manipulates are ideas while 
the conventional artist’s materials (paints, sculpting materials, and other materials used in 
visual arts) or the more unconventional materials (the cheap, everyday life materials) are only 
props which support the chosen ideas.  
     An interesting conceptual work of art is that of the Brazilian, Cildo Meireles’ entitled 
Insertions into Ideological Circuits: Coca-Cola project, 1970 (Fig. 24).
369 
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                         Fig. 24 Insertions into Ideological Circuits: Coca-Cola project  
                         (1970) by Cildo Meireles 
 
    The ideas behind this work were the artist’s anger with his country’s dictatorship and with 
a society dominated by American consumerism. Although many other Brazilians were upset 
or disappointed with the political regime of that time, Meireles thought about disseminating 
his ideas against the dictatorship through an unusual visual artistic form. Of course people 
can write protest poetry, write pamphlets or novels with anti-dictatorial themes or paint 
murals with anti-establishment messages, but the Brazilian artist chooses a newer form of 
expressing his protest through inflammatory messages written on Coca-cola bottles. His aim 
was to think of a different way of expressing his anger and disappointment – he used a 
symbol of American society, the Coca Cola bottle. The Coca Cola bottle did not only 
represent a consumerist society with an endless production of such an ubiquitous product, but 
it also represented a symbol of American dominance in Brazil. The Brazilian dictatorship 
(1964-1985) was supported by the USA and Meireles considered that in relation to Brazil, 
American society did not pay attention to the degradation of the human spirit and did care 
only about profit and a physical instant satisfaction (this is represented by the instant 
satisfaction of drinking of Coca Cola). Meireles wanted to disseminate his ideas to a large 
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group of people, and thought of doing this by subverting symbols of American society. The 
artist’s idea was to transmit critical political statements without the interference of censorship 
because the freedom of speech was under total control of the Brazilian government. Meireles 
also wanted to somehow involve his audience, made up of his compatriots, in participating in 
this radical form of resistance. Every time when a viewer used one of the modified Coca Cola 
bottles, probably read the artist’s political statements or instructions and this could have had 
an unexpected reaction for the Coca Cola consumers. The reaction could have varied from 
anger, militant tendencies, a newer way of protesting, humorous reactions or fear and any of 
those would have meant an increase awareness of the artist’s intentions to move something in 
his compatriots.   
     If for a painter the colours, shapes, textures, lines and his ideas are the materials he uses in 
order to create a painting then a conceptual artist would like to say that only the concepts or 
ideas are his materials to create the conceptual work. Joseph Koshut says: 
 
Conceptual art, simply put, had as its basic tenet an understanding that artists work 
with meaning not with shapes, colours or materials.’370  
 
The canvas, brushes, actual paints or pencils are tools which are used by the painter to create 
or manipulate the colours or shapes and they are the basic physical means which give us a 
perceptual access to the work, to its aesthetic qualities and to its meaning. Does the 
conceptual artist use his ideas and concepts in the same way the painter uses his materials?  
On the one hand, it can be argued that both types of artists want to create a work which 
represents or encompasses or encapsulates their ideas. On the other hand, the painter  or the 
sculptor does not necessarily need to have a very well defined idea or pre-conceived concept 
before or during the process of painting. For example, abstract expressionist paintings are 
very gestural and could be seen as an expression of a mood or emotion; the abstract 
expressionists are mainly interested in the process and the materials used rather than the 
communication of an idea. Of course, the other way of interpreting abstract expressionist 
paintings is that all such paintings have very much to do with an idea: the artist’s interest in 
the physicality of the medium, his attention to capturing the richness of the paint itself. The 
main difference is that  for the conceptual artist the pre-conceived idea is indispensable. This 
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dependency on ideas is what makes conceptual art the type of art it is. 
      But one could say that all other artistic forms communicate ideas. One can give particular 
examples where this is obvious: in the visual arts – religious or historical paintings, in the 
performing arts – theatre or ballet and in literary works – novels or short stories or poems.  
     What are these ideas that conceptual artists are interested in and how are they different 
from the ideas discussed by philosophy or history or economics or any other humanistic 
discipline or traditional art for that matter? Although in the 1960s and 1970s the ideas 
promoted by conceptual artists were mostly about the definition of artworks, the role of the 
artist, consumerism and the politicisation of the art world in contemporary art the 
conceptualists seem to tackle a variety of ideas. There are two main differences form the 
promotion of ideas by other disciplines and arts: one is that the conceptual artist tries to 
transmit ideas through different means from the ones used by traditional arts (using unusual 
and atypical means and skills) and the other is that the ideas of the conceptualists seem to be 
simpler and more direct than the other disciplines.  
    The insistence on using other means then the one used by the traditional arts attracted both 
a lot of criticism and admiration for the innovative mind of the conceptual artist. For example 
one criticism of conceptual art sounds like this: ‘If you want to transmit an idea about 
something like “the human condition” why not choose the most apt means to do that? See 
how a novel, a poem, a play or a painting can transmit ideas about the human condition in 
comparison with a conceptual work.’ I think the criticism is justified if we agree that it refers 
to the richness, complexity and multifaceted aspects of how these art forms can present such 
an idea. The proponent of conceptual art could agree with this but insists that the conceptual 
artist wants to transmit something about the human condition but in a different way; not 
through beautiful or profound prose, not through expressive imagery or complex play plot, 
not through powerful imagery but through a simple idea encapsulated in immediate and/or 
minimal artistic means. Here is what Le Witt says about conceptual works aspiration to 
present a simple, straightforward idea or concept: 
 
The idea becomes a machine that makes art. This kind of art is not theoretical or 
illustrative of theories; it is intuitive, it is involved with all mental processes and it is 
purposeless. […] The ideas need not to be complex. Most ideas that are successful  
are ludicrously simple.
371
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One can think of the last century and name a number of conceptual works that are indeed 
representative of Le Witt’s predicament that works with ‘ludicrously simple’ ideas are 
‘mentally interesting to the spectator’ even though they are ‘emotionally dry’.372  
     For example: Erased de Kooning Drawing, 1953 (Fig. 25) by Robert Rauschenberg can be 
seen as a symbol of power of the artist to go beyond the limits imposed by a particular skill or 
medium.  
 
 
                     
                                Fig. 25 Erased de Kooning Drawing (1953)  
                                by Robert Rauschenberg 
 
 
    Rauschenberg tried to react to what he would probably like to call an obsession with the 
uniqueness of the work of art and with the physical traces left by an artist at a certain time, in 
certain conditions. This reaction went full circle when he attained one of de Kooning’s 
drawings and he wiped out the original drawing, using similar gestures employed by de 
Kooning in the creation of his drawing – Rauschenberg ended up with an almost blank paper 
pointing to an earlier state of de Kooning’s work. The conceptualist would suggest here that 
Rauschenberg wanted to show that an artist’s creativity should not be dependent upon a 
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medium (which has its own limitations) or should not consist in a reverence for the art object, 
but it should be about courage and rejection of the conventional. These being said, one cannot 
escape the nagging question: what if Rauschenberg’s bold gesture destroyed the possibility of 
a wonderful aesthetic experience which could have been the result of the encounter with de 
Kooning’s original drawing? The conceptual artist would argue that this type of courageous 
gesture teaches us more about the role of the artist and raises more questions about art than 
the potential aesthetic experience of the original drawing. I think the reverence of the 
artworld with the uniqueness of the art object became more acute in late 19
th
 century and 
beginning of  20
th
 century, because of the increase in mechanical reproductions of works of 
art and because the commodification of every existing thing. However, an informed perceiver 
could argue that Rauschenberg’s gesture, although intellectually subversive is to some extent 
regrettable because the necessity of destruction of another work. 
    Since Duchamp’s and Rauschenberg’s innovative takes on the art object there were many 
other artists pushing the boundaries of creativity in similar ways. More recently the 
contemporary art scene has seen similar artistic gestures from Michael Landy (Break Down, 
2001) and Chapman Brothers (Insult to Injury, 2003). For example, Landy’s Break Down was 
a performance work in London, in February 2001, where the artist destroyed all of his 
possessions in an empty C&A shop on Oxford Street. His inventory of 7,227 items acquired 
over 37 years contained different categories of objects and one of these categories was ‘works 
of art’ (some of the works belonged to the artist and others were his own works). Two of the 
works that Landy possessed were by Tracey Emin and Damien Hirst and they were destroyed 
with all other works and possessions. One can argue that this is an even more radical gesture 
than Rauschenberg’s erasure of de Kooning’s drawing. Landy’s Break Down was a work 
which transmitted a simple idea: one needs to free himself from the ‘tyranny of ownership’373. 
The destruction of Landy’s personal belongings (works of art, letters, photographs, his 
father’s sheepskin coat and other mementos) was a complicated process (the famous art 
organisation Artangel was involved in carrying out the whole process) which showed a 
certain kind of courage. Regardless to what one thinks about the artistic value of such a 
radical gesture, Landy showed courage in ‘freeing’ himself from the dominance of his 
material possessions (this interpretation does not look at the motivation of the artist in the  
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creation/performance of this work
374
). 
     The other work I mentioned is Jake and Dinos Chapman’s series Insult to Injury, 2003, 
(Fig. 26).  This work contains 83 mint prints of The Disaster of War by Goya bought by the 
two brothers and defaced with heads of clowns, gas masks, bug eyes, swastikas, etc. 
 
 
 
            Fig. 26 Insult to Injury (2003) by Jake and Dinos Chapman 
 
   There are a number of possible interpretations of this particular of Chapman Brothers’ 
work: artistic vandalism, another way of shocking the artworld, aggressive creativity,  a 
tendency for obscenity, a jerk reaction to the horror of  Goya’s images, a nervous laughter in 
front of an old master, etc. However, I would like to suggest that Chapman Brothers defacing 
of Goya’s work was a kind of artistic parricide. The two artists have been obsessed with 
Goya’s work since art school and they created different works by adapting or recreating 
scenes for the old master. Their continuous preoccupation with Goya’s The Disaster of War 
boiled up in 2004 when the younger apprentices made a radical gesture to escape their 
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influence of Goya. When the Chapmans created Insult to Injury they were accused by some 
of vandalism and in response to this criticism the artists justify their gestural defacing by 
mentioning a precedent in Rauschenberg’s Erased de Kooning Drawing. After so many years 
of reverence for the master the brothers started to revolt and to try to escape their obsession 
with Goya and one can argue that their exhibition at Modern Art Museum in Oxford entitled 
Rape of Creativity in 2003 was a display of the killing of their artistic father, Goya. This 
became crystallized in the Chapmans’ show at the White Cube in 2005, entitled Like a Dog 
Returns to its Vomit (Fig. 27).  
 
 
     
                  Fig. 27 Like a Dog Returns to its Vomit by Jake and Dinos Chapman 
 
     In this exhibition the artists made the patricide evident with the title of the exhibition; the 
works presented in the exhibition contained older defaced etchings arranged on a wall in the 
shape of a dog defecating and vomiting. I think the Chapmans interventions of reworking and 
defacing Goya’s Disaster of War hide a simple metaphorical idea: the desire to kill a father 
who dominated someone’s life for too long. This is just a possible interpretation375 and one 
would need a more in depth discussion about the artists’ intentions, the place of the series in 
contemporary art (some would not consider the series a conceptual work), the artists’ 
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comments and interviews and the reaction of the critics, the media and the art lovers. I do 
believe though that the work is part of a contemporary artistic development and although 
shocking it created an intellectual debate about the role of artists, the limits of creativity and 
the artists’ moral duty.  
     The spark which started conceptual art was the proclamation of the idea as the king and 
this is still the driving force of most conceptualist artists. As a corollary of the argument that 
conceptual art is about transmitting ideas and concepts, one can discuss another interesting 
characterization of conceptual art as a meta-language. One way of describing conceptual art 
as meta-language is to think of reflexive communication – conceptual art talks about itself 
without becoming art criticism in the academic sense of the term or art history or aesthetics. 
For example, Donald Brook’s definition of conceptual art as a second-order or meta-activity 
is:  
… characterized by its disposition to comment on or refer to the concept of art as 
much as, for example, meta-psychology comments or at least refers to first-order or 
substantive psychology.
376
 
 
It this respect one could make a suggestion that conceptual art could be compared to a 
philosophical enquiry but this comparison is too weak to hold. However, the conceptualist 
would say that by meta-language he means another way of talking about art. Of course, when 
one says ‘talking’ one is not referring to actual talking but to a form of communication. And 
to that extent conceptual art like the other art forms is a form of communication. But painting 
in general does not ‘speak’ about painting377, thus painting is not a not a meta-language. But, 
the conceptualist believes that conceptual art ‘speaks’ about concepts and itself. Thus it is a 
self-referential language.  
    Although the suggestion that conceptual art is a meta-language has a strong appeal I do not 
think that majority of conceptual art pieces are self-referential. For example, a good part of 
conceptual art is politically charged and this particular type of conceptual art is clearly not 
self-referential. There are many conceptual artists involved in politicised conceptual 
activities
378
, but I would like to mention again on Meireles’ Insertions into Ideological 
Circuits: Coca-Cola project’, a work which is not self-referential. The artist inserting protest 
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messages with strong political content on Coca-Cola bottles which he spread into the 
commercial circuit is not a commentary about art or the creative process, but it is about the 
artist’s needs to communicate his views on the dictatorship in an unusual and thus powerful 
way.  
 
3.2  ‘It is necessary to arrive at selecting an object’379 
 
The second important aspect of conceptual art is that the conceptual artist aims to 
dematerialize the art object. However even if the conceptual artist wants to escape the strong 
grip of the art object and its appearances, he still needs to select an ‘object’ as a material basis 
for the transmission of his ideas. For example Duchamp says that ‘It is necessary to arrive at 
selecting an object’380, and in the same manner, Mel Bochner says that: ‘outside the spoken 
word, no thought can exist without a sustaining support’381. Now the interesting question here 
is if the conceptualist thinks that only one object or one physical base can transmit the artist’s 
ideas or a variety of objects or any object will do it. Le Witt argues that the work needs 
certain physical parameters in order to ‘give the viewer whatever information he needs to 
understand the work and place it in such a way that will facilitate this understanding’382. The 
emphasis in Le Witt statement should be on ‘certain’ physical parameters, because I think not 
any object will do it for the conceptualist. First there is an advantage in conceptual art when it 
comes to the means to transmit an idea: there is no specificity of medium in conceptual art as 
an art form. Secondly there are appropriate objects to be used and ways of executing an idea 
to create a good conceptual art.  
 i) First this means that there is elasticity in the ability of conceptual art to use different 
physical forms (embodiments). Returning to the imaginative story from the beginning of this 
section, I argue that if conceptual art is like the ‘masked entity’ one of its abilities is to 
change its mask freely. Sol Le Witt says: ‘It has to look like something if it has physical 
form’.383 LeWitt recognises that each conceptual work can have different physical forms and 
like Wood, Goldie and Schellekens he emphasises that the medium in which the work is 
produced is not important. Then the artistic force of conceptual art rests with this elasticity 
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regarding its form; the conceptual piece can have any form, it can be sculpture-like, painting-
like, installation-like, text-like, film-like, social event-like etc. But it will not be a sculpture, 
painting, installation, text, film or a social event in an absolute way. This flexibility of 
embodiment of conceptual art is an amazing characteristic (see the comparison I made in my 
imaginative narrative with a well trained actor). Conceptual art can play different roles 
without becoming one of its portrayed characters. It can masquerade as sculpture but is not 
sculpture, because for example, sculpture is to be looked at and touched. Sculpture is a very 
sensorial art form (it is a perceptual art form). But when conceptual art pretends to be 
sculpture it is not because it wants to be looked at or touched, conceptual art wants to be 
‘thought of’ and it demands that its physical basis (a sculpture-like object) should be only a 
conduit for transmitting a concept or an idea.   
    The idea can be a question, a criticism, an allusion, a commentary, an indication of some 
sort of concept, a protest or a provocation. The strength of conceptual art, I suggest, lies in 
this extraordinary flexibility of embodiment. The idea can take different forms: a literary or 
philosophical text, concrete poetry, a list of instructions, a painting, a collage, a sculpture, 
kinetic art, a performance, land art, a photograph, a video, an installation, etc. In all other art 
forms the medium seems to be a fixed affair (for example: paint for painting, text for 
literature, notes for music, human body movements for dance, text and music for opera or 
building materials for architecture.)
384
 Conceptual art uses different media without a 
preference for one or the other. For the conceptualist this flexibility allows the artist to have 
different means of asking questions without the governance of the vehicular medium (without 
the imposition of the materials which embody the work).  
      I intend to illustrate what I call the flexibility of embodiment by using again the example 
of Fountain, 1917 (Fig. 28) by Marcel Duchamp. In 1917 Duchamp sent anonymously a very 
unorthodox ‘sculpture’ to a competition in New York signed ‘R. Mutt’: a urinal.  
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             Fig. 28 Fountain (1917) by Marcel Duchamp 
 
 
Although the competition had an open entry and Duchamp was one of the jury of that 
competition, he could not secure the urinal’s entry. He later wrote an open letter to The Blind 
Man which was a small magazine edited by him. He wrote: 
 
Now, Mr. Mutt’s fountain is not immoral. It is an accessory that one can see every 
day in a plumber’s window. Whether Mr. Mutt has made the fountain with his own 
hands or not is without importance. He chose it. He has taken an ordinary element of 
existence and has displayed it in such a manner that the utilitarian meaning 
disappears under a new title and a new point of view – he has created a new thought 
for this object.
385
  
 
    There are many interpretations of Duchamp’s bold gesture and I am not going to present 
them. I only want to make a point about the innovative aspect of the change form a traditional 
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medium of art. Subsequent discussions about Duchamp’s work prompted many questions 
about art, the work of art and the artist. For example, it prompted questions about the 
uniqueness of the art object and its value, or questions about the reverence for certain works 
of the past, or questions about the possibility of different creative alternatives, or questions 
about the artist who does not necessarily need to be a craftsman in the traditional sense 
(Duchamp was pointing out the rigidity of traditional art schools where the emphasis was on 
craft and a hierarchical apprenticeship). In addition, there were questions about the most 
appropriate medium used by artists to transmit their ideas (Duchamp says that there is a 
necessary process of selecting an object but this should be subordinated to the idea which the 
artist wants to transmit).  One fundamental aspect of Fountain is its humour; Duchamp made 
a joke whose intention was to shock the sensibilities of ‘po faced’ art gallery goers.  
       However, some opponents of conceptual art are still wondering why this object should be 
regarded as a work of art. Even if one accepts that Fountain was a joke or a radical gesture 
and stirred up some interesting discussions, the question remains: why should Fountain be 
considered a work of art? Although until now I assumed that conceptual pieces are works of 
art, maybe here there is a need for a brief justification of this assumption.  
      There are many theories of how to define a work of art and without going into too much 
detail one can mention the best known ones, and then, focus on discussing the one favoured 
by conceptualists, the Institutional Theory of Art. Most theories of art definitions can be 
divided into essentialist approaches and anti-essentialist approaches. Of the first approach 
which looks for necessary and sufficient conditions, one can mention traditional art theories 
like: art as imitation or representation, art as expression or art as having significant form. As 
mentioned in Chapter IV, after the Wittgensteinian turn many considered that the concept of 
art or work of art should be seen as ‘family-resemblance’ concepts.386 However, Stephen 
Davies points out that after the 1960s most definitions of art appear to fall into two categories, 
functional and procedural ones. On the one hand, functionalism is centred on the value of art: 
 
Functionalists argue that art is designed to serve a purpose and something is a work 
of art only if it succeeds in achieving the objective for which we have art. [Art’s 
function] ... is to provide a pleasurable aesthetic experience.
387
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On the other hand, ‘proceduralists’ definitions are purely descriptive and non-evaluative’388 
and the best known example of a procedural approach is George Dickie’s Institutional Theory 
of Art. In the next few paragraphs I am going to briefly focus on the Institutional Theory 
which is much favoured by conceptualists.  
     Dickie’s Institutional Theory of Art has developed over a number of years since its first 
versions in the 1970s. Because of the intense debate and criticism it created, Dickie revised 
his theory. The revised theory of 1984 proposes that: 
 
A work of art in the classificatory sense is an artifact of a kind created to be 
presented to an artworld public.
389
 
 
For Dickie the artist is the person who participates with understanding in the making of a 
work of art
390. The description of the artist as ‘participating with understanding in making a 
work of art’ points towards the claim that the person creating a work of art has certain 
‘pedigree’. One can argue that this way of talking about the artist allows both a traditional 
conception, the artist as a person with skill and craftsmanship, as well as, a more 
contemporary conception where the artist is the one whose creative process is underlined by 
knowledge of what is produced. But, it is considered that this is not what Dickie meant. In his 
original version Dickie argued that a work of art can have its art status conferred by the right 
person, a person who acts on behalf of a certain social institution. But following a lot of 
criticisms
391
 Dickie focused on different criticisms of his theory. His key concept in his 
revised theory was the artworld which was not characterised anymore as a rigid institution. 
He said about the artworld or the ‘art circle’392 (this was also the name of his book Art Circle 
published in 1984): 
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An artworld system is a framework for the presentation of a work of art by an artist 
to an art public
393
 
 
    There is a lot of ambiguity in Dickie’s theory but the most important criticism is that his 
theory is not saying anything new or specific about art. His theory can be a generic theory for 
defining anything. All his main concepts can be replaced with concepts form another domain 
and his theory would explain the key terminology of this other domain.  
     In addition, Stephen Davies identifies a bigger problem with the artworld conception; he 
calls it ‘the Artworld relativity problem’. He argues that: artworld assumes the existence of a 
continuous tradition, a historically and culturally body of unified work and the appearance of 
new art works being related to this body.
394
 Looking at the historical account of art one 
knows that the unified body of work is an appearance, that there are many different cultures 
which are sometimes separated from each other and that newer works (e.g. Duchamp’s 
Bottlerack or  Fountain) do not appear to be related to the previous body of works. 
    Then, how can the Institutional Theory explain that a work like Fountain qualifies as art? 
The institutional theory supporter has an immediate answer: a work occupies a certain place 
in an institutional framework, in the artworld. But this conceptual work does not appear to be 
part of an art historical continuum and belong to a particular art practice. But, in this instance 
the institutionalist fails to find an art historical explanation for the creation of Fountain. 
There are other theories than the Institutional Theory that the conceptualist could use to 
explain the creation and the historical place of conceptual works. For example, the 
conceptualist or any person interested in theoretical explanations of the creation and status of 
conceptual works can appeal to: functional theories which make reference to the artistic value 
of works, or to family-resemblance conception (e.g. Gaut’s ‘cluster’ concepts), or to hybrid 
theories which can have advantages from both rival theories, the functional and procedural 
ones.   
     An interesting parenthesis is welcomed here: after the exhibition of Carl Andre’s work, 
Equivalent VII (known as the Bricks) at Tate in 1966, the prestigious art gallery was 
inundated with many works sent by the public to be considered as works of art. According to 
Dickie’s claim, all these works were works of art. However, Dickie would argue that these 
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were not accepted as works of art because they were not good works of art not because they 
were not art. 
     A newer and more subtle criticism of the Institutional Theory is discussed by Severin 
Schroeder in his article ‘Art, Value and Function’ from 2013.395 Schroeder makes a detailed 
conceptual analysis of a number of crucial concepts used by the Institutional Theory: art, 
artefact, creation and presentation. First I think he is right when he discusses the concept of 
art as presented by the Institutional Theory. Indeed, it seems a non-starter ‘to identity 
something as “art” without in any way committing oneself to a value judgement’. 396 
Schroeder attacks the supporters of the idea that the term ‘art’ is an entirely non-evaluative 
term.  Schroeder’s argues that the term art is a prestige concept and that it implies a 
conditional commendation. Art as a prestige concept means that when used the word has a 
positive resonance in most cultures, while art implying a conditional commendation means 
that when people call something art they recommend it to other people interested in art.
397
 
Schroeder argues that a close analysis of Dickie’s sociological approach shows that his 
approach reflects both that art is a prestige concept and it implies a conditional 
commendation.  Although I agree with the conclusion of this analysis, there are aspects of 
Schroeder conceptual analysis I dispute. For example, he claims that Dickie on the one hand, 
does not take into consideration the differences between creation and presentation, and on the 
other hand his concept of artifactuality is too wide.  
     Schroeder explains Dickie’s conception of an artefact which does not necessarily need to 
be man-made. A pebble, from a simple everyday object can become a complex object, an 
artifact, according to Dickie, by ‘a mere act of presentation’.398  Thus, because Dickie allows 
this ‘transformation’ one can conclude that he ignores the differences between creation and 
presentation. Thus my main concern here is with Dickie’s expression ‘a mere act of 
presentation’. This expression suggests an uncomplicated gesture, a simple transformation 
from non-art to art through an effortless act. It also appears disparaging. I think the problem 
with the Institutional Theory lies in how one understands the process of art creation, which is 
even more acute in the explanation of the creation of conceptual works. The expression ‘mere 
act of presentation’ can be understood, as Schroeder points out, as the act of making the work. 
Dickie would not disagree. The example of a pebble used as ‘the-pebble-used-as-an artistic- 
medium’ is interesting. One can envisage that a conceptualist makes a work by using a pebble. 
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For the sake of the argument, let us assume that the work’s physical base consists of only a 
single pebble. The work could take a long time or no time, it can have a simple title or a 
complex title, it can be presented in artistic context with a particular theme or in a casual 
exhibition with no theme, it can be lit in a certain way or shown in natural light, it can stand 
for something, its creation can be motivated by an intense emotion or cognitive preoccupation 
or not be overtly motivated by something we can identify, etc. Most of the enumerated 
possibilities could be established when one perceives the work in situ, but some of these 
features, in particular the intention of the artist, are not identifiable.  But, I think most 
conceptual artists would describe their process of creation of a work as following a 
meandering development and very rarely a ‘eureka’ moment when a simple act of presenting 
an object constitutes the work.
399
  
    To return to Fountain one knows that Duchamp made a deliberate choice to use an 
ordinary
400
 object. This is regardless of what we think his motivations were. However, the 
most plausible interpretation of his choice is that a careful selection of an ordinary object 
allowed Duchamp to express his frustration about the state of contemporary art and the 
increasing obsession with mass produced objects. Some would consider his gesture an 
ingenious and funny way to express his frustration. Although some people think that 
Duchamp opened the flood gate I would argue that without him the 20
th
 century art world 
would not have seen such a variety of art movements and new art practices.
401
. The post-
Duchampians can choose any physical basis for their work and this flexibility of embodiment 
is what makes conceptual art so different from the other art forms.    
 
ii) Even though any medium can be used by conceptual artists I would argue that if the 
conceptual work is a good work then the artist’s concept or idea is embodied in 
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 an appropriate physical form
402
. The point is here that one of the features of a good 
conceptual work is an appropriate embodiment; by appropriate I do not mean something 
beautiful or attractive but as Duchamp says:  
 
However it is difficult to select an object that absolutely does not interest you not 
only on the day that you select it but always, and which does not have any chance of 
becoming attractive or beautiful and which is neither pleasant to look at nor 
particularly ugly.
403
 
 
I suggest that Duchamp is probably referring to an effort to escape the dominance of a certain 
perceptual appearance, an effort which is a deliberate reflective activity particularly evident 
in the selection of a ready-made. Moreover, even the hard conceptualist would recognise that 
the execution/the process of creating a conceptual art is a skill and the transmission of an idea 
would be more successful in an appropriate embodiment. Thus selecting an object is an 
important process because as LeWitt argues, the work needs certain physical parameters in 
order to:  
 
give the viewer whatever information he needs to understand the work and place it 
in such a way that will facilitate this understanding
404
 
 
     In the above paragraphs we touched upon the idea of the quality of a conceptual work.  
Two quick points here about what contributes to the value of conceptual works: first the ideas 
transmitted – the artist needs to propose a simple, direct and hard-punching idea or concept 
and secondly, the execution in the design/selection of a work – the importance of the 
ingenuity of execution in order to facilitate the viewer’s understanding. However the most 
important thing for a good conceptual work is the ideas that it transmits and if the ideas are 
too complicated or too banal then even with a good execution (the finding of an appropriate 
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embodiment) the work will not be good. LeWitt says: ‘Banal ideas cannot be rescued by 
beautiful execution’405 
 
3.3 ‘The desire of the conceptualist to reject sensorial pleasure and beauty in his work’406    
 
Although there are conceptual artists
407
 who attempted an escape from the material form and 
in particular from the aesthetic through dematerialization by using ready-mades or cheap, 
unpretentious, banal, ephemeral materials, there is still the problem of how the physical 
support is apprehended by the viewers. This feature of conceptual art underlines a lack of 
concordance between the artists’ intentions (to transmit an idea without the interference of 
the perceptual aspect of the work) and the viewers’ encounters with the conceptual work (the 
perception of a physical embodiment used to transmit the idea). The viewers cannot easily 
escape the immediate perceptual aspect of a work – how it looks or how it sounds or how it 
feels and this is a problem. For the viewer there is always the ‘interference’ of what is seen, 
heard, touched, smelled, felt
408
 when encountering art. The conceptualist artist’s says: in 
order to perceive the art (the conceptual work) you need to go beyond your perceptual 
sensitivity, beyond what is in front of you, beyond the physicality of the object presented to 
you. But we have established that even the most radical conceptual works cannot escape the 
physical embodiment, thus there is a perceptual level of an art encounter with a conceptual 
work.  
    The recognition of a minimal perceptual engagement with a conceptual piece will bring 
about echoes of loud protests from some extreme conceptual artists. For example, Timothy 
Binkley says that an artwork is ‘a piece: and a piece needs not to be an aesthetic object, or 
even an object at all’409. Now, one needs to think about the reasons for such vehement 
protests: are conceptualists upset because although, they have not achieved total 
dematerialization, they think that they could in the future or because they are afraid of the 
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dominance of the aesthetic which could deter from the transmission of their ideas? I think the 
latter rather than the former is what unsettles a lot of conceptualists.  
     We discussed earlier the view that conceptual art aims to be non-perceptual (this is the 
reason that sometimes it is compared with literature or philosophy) but we agreed that to a 
large extent conceptual art is still a perceptual art. Lamarque puts this beautifully by saying: 
 
Rather than trying to make conceptual art non-perceptual […], it might be better to 
admit a perceptual level but somehow make it subservient to the conceptual.
410
 
 
Then, if we agree that conceptual works have a perceptual level, we encounter the problem of 
a possible aesthetic interpretation of works of art. But again, one of the most striking 
characteristics of conceptual art is this effort of the conceptual artists to avoid the aesthetic.  
The conceptual artist tries to do this by choosing the physical basis – as much as he can – in 
an non-aesthetic way. By ‘non-aesthetic way’ I mean a deliberate policy against employment 
of aesthetic elements; a resistance to any sensorial importance given to the work. One needs 
to remind oneself here of Lamarque’s distinction between non-aesthetic and anti-aesthetic 
means, which is this: the absence of aesthetic qualities is non-aesthetic and the presence of 
negative aesthetic qualities is anti-aesthetic.
411
 He considers that the employment of anti-
aesthetic means (ugliness, repulsiveness, kitsch, and the shocking) does not lead to the 
conclusion that a work is genuinely non-aesthetic. Conceptual artists would argue though that, 
there are many reasons for seeing the aesthetic as an obstacle to the appropriate experience of 
a conceptual work. For example: the sensorial pleasure of beauty or ugliness can deter the 
viewer from the ideas transmitted by a work, the emphasis on the sensual and beauty is old 
fashioned, the sensual does not push the limits of artistic enquiry and using aesthetic means it 
is not political and critical enough of the consumerist society and the aesthetic interpretation 
puts too much emphasis on the uniqueness of the work and the artist’s skills and it does not 
challenge the role of art. Two observations about the conceptualists’ claims are needed here. 
One is that, the critic of conceptual art can show that even though the above claims are 
promoted by many conceptual artists, conceptual works are not as different from 
conventional works of art, and that all the traditional features mentioned are part of 
conceptual works in one way or another. Secondly, there are conceptual artists that do not 
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refuse the power of appearances and consider that aesthetic qualities can be useful in 
appropriating an idea.  
     In addition, Lamarque’s wider conception of the aesthetic can be applied to the 
appreciative experience of conceptual art: the seeking of the consonance of means to ends. 
What are the means and the ends for conceptual artists? I propose that the means are aesthetic 
or experiential (different embodiments – visual, auditory, tactile) and the ends are represented 
by the transmission of ideas – the understanding of the work or the getting of the work’s 
message.  
     One way of making sense of the suggestion that conceptual works have an aesthetic 
dimension is to look at some successful conceptual works and see if the aesthetic level of the 
works is contributing to, first the work’s identity and secondly to the value of the work. I am 
choosing three conceptual works from the last half of 20
th
 century, to try to assess the role of 
the aesthetic in the identity and value of the works: Richard Long’s A line Made by Walking, 
England 1967, Jenny Holzer’s Protect Me From What I Want- from Truisms series, LED 
light installation (1982) and Anya Gallaccio, preserve ‘beauty’ 1991 – 2003. 
 
 
 
   Fig. 29 A Line Made by Walking, England (1967) by Richard Long  
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    First, Richard Long’s famous work A Line Made by Walking, England 1967 (Fig. 29) is an 
early work created by the artist in his journeys between Bristol (his home) and St Martin 
school of Art (his art college) in a field in Wiltshire. The artist walked up and down many 
times until the grass was flattened to retain his walking trace. Long recoded the resulting line 
in the grass by photographing it and recoding the date of his performance. There are a 
number of things worth mentioning here: most of Long’s work is carried out in a natural 
environment and what the audience sees, are records of his walks or interventions 
(photographs, films, diaries pages, drawings, screenprints, marks on maps, geographic 
measurement, etc). His work challenges the preconceptions about sculpture and most of his 
work tries to be free of ownership (because it exist outside and it has a direct connection with 
its natural context). However, Long had many solo exhibitions
412
 in which he brought his 
performances in a gallery setting by using physical materials like stone, wood, or mud 
creating both sculptural works and impressions of his performance works. When the audience 
is presented with a record of A Line Made by Walking, England 1967, a photograph, the most 
important thing is considering imagining the actual performance of the artist and the trace left 
by his steps on the Wiltshire field after he left. The viewer can imagine the aesthetics of the 
work by using the photograph as a guide – the interesting thing is that, Long’s black and 
white photograph is in itself a work because it is well balanced, evocative and luminous. I 
propose that the aesthetic properties of the work after the artist left were: being ephemeral, 
suggesting a delicate human presence in a semi-wild setting, being shiny, breathing 
peacefulness, having a diversity of green tonalities and mostly being original. These aesthetic 
properties are the result of a creative interpretation. To what extent does this work have an 
aesthetic character, in particular when the viewer is not experiencing the work directly and 
when the work was a performance from 1967? I like using the present when discussing 
performance works because even though, these do not exist anymore, there are records of 
these works or witnesses’ testimonials and one can use imaginative interpretation to discuss 
different properties which these works could have.  
     I think the most important aesthetic property of Long’s work is originality. Here I use  
Goldman's list of aesthetic properties and 'being original' is a historically related property 
which he considers an aesthetic property. I am using a wider sense of the aesthetic thus I do 
not need to say that the aesthetic is only perceptual (as linked to the senses). For example, the 
first cubist painting was original and this is to a large extent a perceivable property (if the 
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viewer was familiar with other styles of paintings before this particular cubist painting). In 
addition, Lamarque's idea of consonance of ends to means as a way of aesthetically 
appreciating a work can be used to describe a work as 'being original'. For example, Lewis 
Carroll literary nonsense displays originality in the way he used language (the means) and 
this is a property which is perceptually appreciated.  
    I would compare Long’s works, his new conceptual approach to contemplating and 
depicting nature with the impressionists’ bold decision of taking their easels outside and 
trying to paint in natural settings in order to capture the bathing of light on natural forms and 
people, and this is an inovative take on art making.  
    A very different conceptual sculpture is Jenny Holzer’s Protect Me From What I Want- 
from Survival series, LED light installation, 1982, New York Times Square (Fig. 30).  
 
 
 
           Fig. 30 Protect Me From What I Want- from Survival series (1982) by Jenny Holzer 
 
     Holzer’s work is distinctive because of its message and the way the message is presented. 
Although she uses different modes of presenting her work (posters, notices, T-shirts, 
paperweights, engraved metal plates, sound recordings, etc) she uses as her signature LED 
displays or illuminated advertising boards which carry simple one-liners which become well 
known as her ‘truisms’. Most of her truisms are based on a feminist outlook and her three 
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main themes used in her works are: sex, death and war. Her truisms usually have an 
immediate impact on the viewer even though often they have an ambiguous meaning. Since 
the 1990s she started showing her work on a larger scale, for example  a big LED sign in the 
Guggenheim Museum (1989), or illuminated words on Battle of Leipzig Monument (1996). 
Protect Me From What I Want installation must have stopped passers-by in their tracks with 
its Jungian like message. The work’s impact was amplified by the context of presentation – 
the heart of New York. Protect Me From What I Want has a strong conceptual character but 
is not devoid of an aesthetic dimension and the viewers’ response to this work is rich in both  
phenomenology (in particular if the work is experienced in situ) and in semantic content.  
     The aesthetic properties of   Holzer’s installation are twofold: some have to do with 
appearances of the work, its display and context (formal properties like composition, colour 
and scale) and the others have to do with the idea that Holzer wanted to transmit because she 
uses text (these aesthetic properties are emotion properties, evocative properties and art 
historical related properties). The question now we have to ask is which of those or how 
many of those aesthetic properties are essential to the identity and value of the work as a 
work of art. I think that the most important essential aesthetic properties of the work are: 
being daring and playful at the same time, having a theatrical directness and a seductive 
façade. The aesthetic character of the work can be described by the viewer as based upon the 
appropriate experience of the consonance between the aesthetic means Holzer uses and the 
artistic aim of the work.  As mentioned above many passersby would have reacted to the 
billboard message in Times Square but not all would have had an aesthetic experience. The 
appropriate perceiver could enjoy the work aesthetically, if we agree that there is the 
possibility of experiencing a consonance between the means and the aims of the work. In 
short the consonance can be a realization of the artist’s intentions by admiring the way she 
achieved this. I also believe that the aesthetic value of the work is revealed when the viewer 
fully feels the work’s hinterland of possible interpretations (from feminist interpretations to 
social, political and humorist ones). 
    The last work I would like to mention is Anya Gallaccio, preserve ‘beauty’ 1991 – 2003, 
presented in 2003 at Tate Britain, as part of the Turner Prize (Fig. 31). This work is an 
installation (the work’s dimensions are 2600 x 5350 x 25 mm) consisting of four large panels 
of glass hung on the wall and which have underneath the glass red flowers. The 2,000 flowers 
in this work are a hybrid between a gerbera and daisy
413
 and all the flowers’ heads are facing 
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the viewer and their stems are visible only on the bottom of each panel. Gallaccio’s 
installations use organic materials which in time disintegrate and get destroyed; preserve 
‘beauty’ is such a work in which the flowers slowly wither and die.  
   
 
 
  Fig. 31 preserve ‘beauty’ (1991 – 2003) by Anya Gallaccio 
 
The work is both visually and olfactory astonishing because the flowers would decay and 
they would fell from underneath their glass sheet and they would be left untouched by the 
gallery’s attendants (Fig. 32, detail) 
    This work is both about the ephemeral through the decay of the flowers and their quality as 
mass produced ‘objects’ and the need for the preservation of beauty which is what painters do 
when they paint still-life or landscapes and what women do when they arrange bunches of 
flowers in their houses. This works’ aesthetic properties are more easily detectable than other 
conceptual works’ properties. Gallacio’s preserve ‘beauty’ is beautiful, it is graceful and 
balanced, its colors range from vivid to pale (according to the time of perception), its smell 
varies from a natural, pleasant smell to the smell of decay and rotten plants (again, time 
dependent), it is powerful because it is visually evocative (makes the viewer to reflect upon 
big themes: beauty, time passing, decay and death). This work has essential aesthetic 
properties (I have already mentioned some) and one can easily discuss the aesthetic character 
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of the work and argue that in this work the seeking of the consonance of means to ends has 
the same experiential feel as if one is in front of an old master’s painting.      I used the above 
three examples of conceptual works to try to show the importance of artists’ ability to work 
out their ideas in a material form but not through traditional means. 
 
 
 
       Fig. 32 preserve ‘beauty’, detail (1991 – 2003) by Anya Gallaccio 
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There are aesthetic aspects that these works have both detectable aesthetic properties and a 
general aesthetic outlook. However, the hard conceptualist would have a strong complaint 
about the three examples of works I have chosen; he would say that most conceptual works 
do not have the powerful aesthetic impact that my examples have. They could give their own 
examples (works from the magazine Art & Language which are mainly text based, Andy 
Warhol’s empty plinth, David Tremlett’s The Spring Recordings 1972, Michael Craig Martin, 
An Oak Tree 1973, or Robert Barry’s Telepathic Piece, etc) and argue that the properties of 
the work should be referenced only in conjunction with the idea or the concept of the work 
not in relation to any of the perceptual properties of the physical embodiment of the work. 
    There are two answers I have already proposed in this thesis to counteract the conceptualist. 
First answer is that all works of art including conceptual works have aesthetic properties 
because even conceptual art works cannot fully dematerialize the art object – a conceptual 
work can be experienced and judged form an aesthetic point of view. I believe that 
conceptual works have both essential and inessential aesthetic properties and some of the 
aesthetic properties can be: the well known ones like the ones present in Sibley and 
Goldman’s lists or the more unusual ones which are the anti-aesthetic properties (like the 
ones proposed by Lamarque: the banal, the kitsch or the ordinary). My second answer would 
be to urge the conceptualist to reconsider his conception of the aesthetic and adopt a wider 
sense which includes an active seek of consonance of means (artistic or aesthetic) to ends (the 
ideas and concept that the artist wants to transmit) in the engagement with a work of art. The 
conceptualist should be amiable to this last suggestion because I emphasise the active 
involvement of the viewer in the encounter with a conceptual work (the conceptual artist 
insists on a mentally focused engagement with a conceptual work).  
     In conclusion, my intention in this last chapter was to apply Lamarquean concepts to 
conceptual art and to emphasise that even though conceptual art appears not to be primarily a 
perceptual art (like painting or music) it is more like the visual arts and performing arts then 
the non-perceptual arts like literature
414
. I suggested that conceptual art can be aesthetically 
experienced and appreciated if we actively seek in the work the consonance of means to ends. 
This appropriate experience of the consonance is dependent of the artist’s ideas (what kind of 
ideas he wants to transmit) and his ability to manifest these ideas by embodying them in an 
appropriate form. The audience’s capacity to ‘seek and find’ the consonance largely depends 
on the normative aspect of the engagement with the work (for Lamarque this is having 
                                            
414
 Lamarque points out that although literature is non-perceptual, it is amenable to aesthetic ends (W&O, p.227) 
203 
 
knowledge about the object experienced). In other words, this means the capacity to both 
abstract from or distance from a quotidian approach to the physical object that embodies the 
work and to critically engage with a work as part of a historical continuum not as a part of an 
anti-art movement.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis is motivated by an interest in contemporary philosophical debates about the nature 
and appreciation of conceptual works of art. The received wisdom is that conceptual works 
do not possess aesthetic properties, or at least that if they do they are not essential to their 
character as works of art. I closely followed Peter Lamarque’s view that the aesthetic 
character of a work of art is determined by the possession of essential aesthetic properties.  
     In developing my account of conceptual art, I defend property realism and an aesthetic 
essentialist account of conceptual works inspired by Lamarque’s individual aesthetic 
essentialism. Part of my defence of an aesthetic essentialist outlook consists in a certain way 
of thinking about the nature and the role of aesthetic properties in the experience and 
appreciation of works of art.  
     Thus, I used Chapter I to introduce the concept of the aesthetic and its multifarious uses. 
In this chapter, I also presented one of the most important accounts of aesthetic concepts, that 
of Frank Sibley. I argued that aesthetic concepts can be divided into purely evaluative 
concepts and mixed concepts; this division is inspired by Sibley’s original distinction between 
evaluative and descriptive aesthetic concepts. However, I suggested that the category of 
mixed concepts is a continuum and each mixed aesthetic term has two dimensions: a 
descriptive one and an evaluative one. Both of these dimensions fluctuate from dominant to 
minimal. I concluded this chapter with an initial account of the main characteristics of the 
aesthetic: the aesthetic is indissolubly liked to the perceptual, aesthetic concepts can be 
divided into evaluative and mixed concepts and each concept in the mixed category has an 
evaluative and a descriptive dimension. My account of aesthetic concepts although close to 
Sibley’s, it differs from his in that, the mixed category of concepts forms a continuum, even 
though the bulk of concepts are towards the descriptive end.  
     Springing from this discussion, Chapter II analyses Sibley’s relational account of aesthetic 
properties, an account which is essential to Lamarque’s own conception of aesthetic 
properties. The crux of Sibley’s account of aesthetic properties rests upon the explanation of 
the relation between aesthetic properties and non-aesthetic properties from which they 
emerge. Here I used the example of one of Degas’ painting to illustrate the relation of a 
number of the painting’s aesthetic properties with some of its non-aesthetic properties and 
also with some of its other aesthetic properties.  
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     A second important aspect of Sibley’s aesthetic properties is their relation to informed 
perceivers in appropriate encounters with works of art. The discussion about response 
dependent properties is developed in conjunction with the debate between realists and anti-
realists in aesthetics. This debate is used by Lamarque to explain the distinction between two 
types of interpretations of works of art: revelatory interpretations and creative interpretations. 
However, Lamarque points out the advantages of both a realist and a constructivist position,  
and proposes a way to bridge the gap between the two apparently irreconcilable 
interpretations. He tries to reconcile the two interpretations by showing that acceptable 
interpretations of any kind are constrained by the properties that the object has in itself, the 
properties possessed by the object which identifies the object as an object of attention. I 
concluded this chapter by showing that understanding the relation between aesthetic and non-
aesthetic properties and their response-dependent nature, is essential to Lamarque’s view of 
works of art and their aesthetic properties.  
    Chapter III discusses Lamarque’s view of aesthetic properties; a view which has a lot of 
common characteristics with other aestheticians’ views (e.g. Sibley, Walton and Levinson), 
but which also, has a number of features that sets it apart from these other aestheticians. 
These differences were important in establishing the conceptual framework which sustains 
Lamarque’s individual essentialism. I used different visual works of art, in particular art 
photography, to show how different pairs of aesthetic properties are attributed to those works. 
Here I introduced one of Lamarque’s most important explanations of aesthetic appreciation: 
aesthetic pleasure comes from an understanding and admiration of consonance of means to 
ends. Lamarque uses the concept of consonance in relation to literary appreciation: the reader 
‘sees’ how the author achieved his literary purpose and this is a kind of aesthetic experience. 
However, according to Lamarque both the ‘perception’ of literary works and that of works of 
visual art involve an appreciative experience, the experience of art as art. The case of the 
experience of conceptual works is less problematic if one agrees with Lamarque that this 
experience is an experience of art as art. Here, I assume that the status of conceptual works as 
works of art is not in question. However a problem resurfaces when one thinks about the 
suggestion that conceptual works are experienced aesthetically.  
      In the rest of this chapter, I discussed different contemporary views about the distinction 
between the aesthetic and the artistic. I focused on Marcia Muelder Eaton’s characterization 
of objects that are characterized by the two terms. I end up agreeing with Eaton’s traditional 
view that the class of works of art is included in the class of aesthetic objects, but I distanced 
myself from her claim that conceptual works are not works of art. On the one hand, I agreed 
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with Lamarque’s wider conception of the aesthetic, a conception which goes beyond the 
traditional belief that the aesthetic is only perceptual. But on the other hand, I rejected 
Lamarque’s suggestion that art is not necessarily aesthetic. The distinction between aesthetic 
properties and artistic properties is different from that of the distinction between aesthetic 
objects and artistic objects. That is because the two classes of properties intersect and the 
boundaries between them are not fixed. I illustrated the difficulties of the distinction between 
artistic and aesthetic properties by analysing Les Demoiselles d’Avignon (1907) by Picasso. I 
showed that some artistic properties can become in certain context aesthetic properties. 
 In conclusion, this third chapter identified different terminological differences between 
Lamarque and other thinkers and looked at a number of different conceptions of the aesthetic 
and the artistic, and clarified some of Lamarque’s aesthetic ideas in order to be able to 
present a defence of his aesthetic essentialism.    
     In the following two chapters I discussed Lamarque’s argument for individual essentialism. 
Lamarque defends a version of aesthetic essentialism in which aesthetic terms are construed 
in a realist manner, ‘as standing for properties’ and in which some of those properties play a 
crucial role in the description and identity of works of art. He argues that some works of art 
possess some aesthetic properties essentially and these contribute to the works’ distinct 
aesthetic character. There are two parts of Lamarque’s argument for individual aesthetic 
essentialism. First, is his new-object (non-identity) theory discussed in Chapter IV.  
Secondly, there is his explanation of works of art possessing different types of aesthetic 
properties, to which he adds that some of those works possess with necessity essential 
aesthetic properties (this explanation was analyzed in Chapter V). 
     In Chapter IV, I introduced essentialism as a general philosophical position in order to 
clarify the main terminology of the essentialist framework, and in order to be able to 
characterise an aesthetic essentialist view of art. First, I justified my choice for using the term 
‘essential properties’ rather than ‘essence’. By ‘essential properties’ I mean the most 
important or significant properties without which the object would not be what it is. In the 
case of essential aesthetic properties these would be significant for the aesthetic character of 
the work. The second section of this chapter introduced Lamarque’s individual essentialism 
(I-essentialism) and discussed Lamarque’s first premise in support of I-essentialism. The 
premise is that works of art are new objects which are ontologically different from the 
material base or the object that embodies them (Lamarque calls this view ‘new-object 
theory’). Lamarque proposes for his new-object theory two ways of investigating the nature 
of works of art: one is about general conditions for works of art to be art (work-identity and 
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work-survival), and the other is about work-specific identity conditions.   
     I focused on the conditions for work-identity, work-survival and work-specific conditions 
by applying Lamarque’s conceptual framework (new-object, cultural wrappings, genetic and 
artistic completion of works, and vehicular and artistic medium) to three works from the 
visual arts: the painting Guernica by Picasso, the sculpture Laocoon and His Sons from the 
Hellenistic period and pre-historic the Chauvet Cave paintings. I concluded this chapter in 
agreeing with Lamarque that works of art are cultural objects which are public and 
perceivable. They are new things brought into the world by artists’ manipulation and creation 
under a certain conception and these new objects have certain identity and survival 
conditions. 
     Chapter V begins with a presentation of Lamarque’s two versions of aesthetic 
essentialism. The rest of the chapter is dedicated to the investigation of Lamarque’s support 
for the weaker version of I-essentialism, which suggests that some aesthetic properties are 
possessed essentially by some works of art. I asked what makes an aesthetic property 
essential to some works of art and not to others. According to Lamarque, aesthetic properties 
are essential if they are salient features without which the work would not be the work of art 
it is. In order to show how some aesthetic properties are essential to one work but not to the 
other I used Grayson Perry’s series The Vanity of Small Differences (2012) to point out that 
the work has tragic elements within its six tapestries but as a whole is not a tragic work. 
Lamarque’s argument for aesthetic essentialism which proposes that some works of art 
possess some aesthetic properties essentially and that these properties contribute to the 
identity of these individual works as the works they are, is put to the test by discussing in 
detail some of the aesthetic properties of two of Fra Angelico’s paintings. I provided reasons 
for accepting that some of the aesthetic properties of Fra Angelico’s paintings are essential to 
the paintings and make the paintings the works they are. I concluded this chapter tentatively 
agreeing with Lamarque’s individual essentialism. However, I pushed his essentialism further 
by attempting to show, in the next chapter, that all conceptual works of art have aesthetic 
properties, with the caveat that only some of these works have essential aesthetic properties 
(most conceptual works have inessential aesthetic properties).  
     In the last chapter of this thesis I applied Lamarque’s aesthetic essentialism to a number of 
conceptual works and concluded that some conceptual works possess essential aesthetic 
properties. Chapter VI has three sections: a reminder of the main conceptual framework I 
presented in previous chapters, a general characterisation of conceptual art, and my own 
characterisation of conceptual art. I discussed a number of important views about conceptual 
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art (by artists and philosophers) in order to capture different characterizations of conceptual 
works. Moreover I tried to elucidate the conundrum of perceptual and non-perceptual art by 
discussing other art forms than conceptual art. In addition, I proposed Lamarque’s 
suggestions about the experience of literary works, as guidance for the experience of 
conceptual works.  
     My main argument in support of the claim that works of conceptual art are not non-
perceptual works and that they can be assessed aesthetically is two-fold: first conceptual 
artists cannot avoid a perceptual/physical base for their conceptual works and secondly, the 
experience of a conceptual work, like the experience of all other works of art, is rewarding 
cognitively, affectively and moreover, aesthetically. This means that, even though the 
conceptual work is not identical with its physical base (not even in the case of ready-mades), 
there are still perceptual features that are the focus of appreciation in encounters and 
interpretations of conceptual works. Ascertaining this was vital in showing that all conceptual 
works have inessential aesthetic properties. There is always a ‘look’ or an appearance or an 
experiential aspect of a conceptual work.  
     However, my most radical suggestion is that some conceptual works have essential 
aesthetic properties and this is one of the most important aspects which contributes to the 
value of these works as works of art. One obstacle to such a view is an anti-essentialist 
position or an institutionalist’s position. Thus, I highlighted different arguments against the 
aesthetic essentialist by using examples of well known works of conceptual art and I showed 
that these works have both detectable aesthetic properties and a general aesthetic character.  
     In conclusion, I suggested that conceptual art can be aesthetically experienced and 
appreciated if we actively seek in the works the consonance of means to ends. This 
appropriate experience of the consonance is dependent on the artist’s ideas (what kind of 
ideas he wants to transmit), his ability to manifest these ideas by embodying them in an 
appropriate form and the viewer’s level of engagement both cognitive and affective.  
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